Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BASRAH91
2007-10-03 07:26:00
CONFIDENTIAL
REO Basrah
Cable title:  

TENSIONS RISE AND ABATE BETWEEN BASRAH'S PC AND ISF

Tags:  PREL PGOV PINR IZ 
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VZCZCXRO5013
RR RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHBC #0091/01 2760726
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 030726Z OCT 07
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0608
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0191
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDHP/DIA DHP-1 WASHINGTON DC
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEPGAB/MNF-I C2X BAGHDAD IZ
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0642
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000091 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/3/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR IZ
SUBJECT: TENSIONS RISE AND ABATE BETWEEN BASRAH'S PC AND ISF

BASRAH 00000091 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Howell Howard, A/Director, Regional Embassy
Office - Basrah, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000091

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/3/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR IZ
SUBJECT: TENSIONS RISE AND ABATE BETWEEN BASRAH'S PC AND ISF

BASRAH 00000091 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Howell Howard, A/Director, Regional Embassy
Office - Basrah, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) SUMMARY: Members of Basrah's Provincial Council (PC),led
by the Fadhila Party, attempted to "vote out" Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF) commander LTG Mohan Hafith Fahad and Provincial
Director of Police (PDOP) MG Jalil Khalaf Shueil at a September
22 "emergency session." Both officers left before the meeting
began, objecting to the media's presence. The next day, PC
members said they were assuming responsibility for Basrah's
security. National Security Minister Shirwan al-Wa'eli, said
the government supported Mohan and Jalil and only Prime Minister
Nuri al-Maliki could dismiss them. Jalil reinforced that
message to the media on September 24. For now, the Council
appears to have backed off; tensions were building for months
and the episode highlights problems in Iraq's federal system.
End Summary.


2. (C) On 22 September, Basrah's PC held an emergency session to
discuss the deteriorating security situation with PDOP MG Jalil
and Security Chief LTG Mohan. Relations between Mohan/Jalil and
the PC quickly deteriorated when Iraqi Police (IP) officers
(reportedly associated with Fadhila) refused to stand up for
Jalil and Mohan, infuriating both officers. Mohan also hotly
objected to the media's presence at the invitation of the PC;
Mohan and Jalil left before the session began.


3. (C) Most of the PC members came from Fadhila and the Iraqi
National Accord, but PC Chairman Mohammed al-Obadi (Dawa) was
also present. With only 18-19 of the 41 members present, they
still lacked a quorum. At the meeting, the PC issued a report
critical of Mohan and Jalil's failure to enforce Basrah's
security and voted: 1) to dismiss Jalil as the PDOP; and 2)
"no-confidence" in Mohan's Basrah Operations Center (BOC) and
not to renew Mohan's three month-long term (already expired) as
ISF chief. One PC member at the meeting told us they intended
to write a letter to the central government nominating three
individuals as Jalil's replacement. Finally, we heard that the

PC was also considering establishing a new security committee
led by Jalil's pro-PC and newly appointed deputy, Mohammed
al-Ali and other pro-PC police officers.


4. (C) Both sides held competing press conferences October 23.
The PC announced at its event that Jalil should be replaced by a
Basrawi, that the ISF was unable to provide adequate security,
and that the PC was taking control of Basrah's security
portfolio. On the other side, visiting Minister of State for
National Security Shirwan al-Wa'eli told reporters at a press
event in the BOC that Mohan and Jalil were fully supported in
their duties by the central government, that he was speaking on
behalf of PM Maliki, and only Maliki could dismiss Mohan or
Jalil.


5. (C) To make the central government's position fully
understood, Jalil told us that he was instructed by the PM's
office and Interior Minister Jawad Karim al-Bulani to hold
another press event September 24. Jalil shifted the blame for
Basrah's security to the political parties by telling reporters:
that the IP was infiltrated by party militias; that 250 IP
vehicles were out of his control because they were being used by
the parties; that officers were doing party business rather than
their duties; and that parties were pushing their nominees for
IP positions. He also explained that the PC had no authority to
dismiss him; that authority rested with PM Maliki, who appointed
him and Mohan under an emergency security act.


6. (C) For now, the PC appears to accept the GOI's primacy for
Basrah's security and has backed off. During the PC's regular
meeting on September 26, security issues were placed at the
bottom of the agenda and were not discussed. Nor has the PC
sent the aforementioned letter, discussed a new PC-friendly
security committee any further, or held any press events to
counter the central government's position. The best indicator,
however, was Mohan's September 27 dismissal of the pro-PC DPDOP
al-Ali, which elicited no response from the PC.


7. (C) Comment: Tensions between Mohan/Jalil and the PC have
been rising for the last two months and finally came to a head.
The PC's invitation of the media was sheer political theater
designed to ambush both officers who are viewed as a threat to
the political parties' stranglehold over the ISF. Additionally,
the Chairman was upset with the ISF's slow reaction to his car
being stolen in the summer; many members are angry with Jalil's
decision to reduce the number of policemen acting as their

BASRAH 00000091 002.2 OF 002


bodyguards; members are angry that neither Mohan or Jalil
consult them on security issues; and the Council is frustrated
that Basrawis are blaming them for the deteriorating security
despite the PC not having authority over the police.


8. (C) This episode also illustrates some of the tensions in
Iraq's federal system. One PC member, who participated in the
vote against Jalil, said that the PC disagrees with the central
government's control over the IP, which is a provincial matter.
As he put it, "The Council wants the central government to
respect us," and "the Council was asserting its equality, not
its subservience to Baghdad." While CPA 71 allows Councils to
remove a police chief with a 2/3 majority (something they did
not achieve),the Council nevertheless misunderstood or ignored
the fact that they do not nominate replacements and that the
province still has not been turned over to Provincial Iraqi
Control (PIC). The passage of the Provincial Powers Act will be
a step forward in clarifying some of the vagaries in the CPA
orders. End Comment.
HOWARD