BASRAH MOD ADVISOR SAYS IRAN TRAINING JAM FOR PROXY WAR

S E C R E T BASRAH 000089

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/26/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINR PINS PREL PROP PTER IR IZ
SUBJECT: BASRAH MOD ADVISOR SAYS IRAN TRAINING JAM FOR PROXY WAR

REF: A. BASRAH 86 B. BASRAH 88

CLASSIFIED BY: Howell Howard, A/Director, Regional Embassy
Office - Basrah, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(c),(d)




1. (S) Summary: MOD Advisor Majid al-Sari told REO September 23
that Iran was now hosting training for 3,000 Jaysh al-Mahdi
(JAM) members on collecting intelligence, radio intercepts, and
employing EFPs and snipers for operations in Basrah. According
to al-Sari, Tehran was secretly behind a September 25-27
conference in Iran to showcase closer ties to Basrah, and wants
to make Basrah a proxy Iranian province. Basrah's security
situation was worsening because unfettered militias were
expanding their influence. Iraqi security forces (ISF),even
with reinforcements, would not be effective; what was needed
were either covert ISF operations or support to nationalist-JAM.
End Summary.


2. (S) Basah-based Iraq Ministry of Defense Advisor Majid
al-Sari confirmed earlier reporting (ref A) to Regional Embassy
Officers September 23 that Iran was training Jaysh al-Mahdi
(JAM) members within Iran to learn how to collect intelligence,
use radio intercept equipment, and employ EFPs and sniper teams
to wreak havoc in Basrah. He put the number of trainees at
3,000 while Police Chief Major General Jalil Khalaf Shueil
previously told us 300-350. Ayatollah Sistani representative,
Al-Mehdi Battat, and Thar Allah leader, Sayyid Youssef
(currently in Iran),were al-Sari's sources for this information.


3. (S) Al-Sari also told us that Tehran was secretly behind a
September 25-27 conference in Ahvaz (aka al-Hawaz),Iran to show
the USG that Iran has closer ties to Basrah. According to
al-Sari, Iran's ultimate goal is to make Basrah the capital of a
proxy Iranian province run by the Islamic Supreme Council of
Iraq. The conference, ostensibly to break the Ramadan fast,
will rename the Saddam Hussein-titled "Week of the Martyrs" - in
honor of the Iran-Iraq War - as the "Week of Iraq-Iran
Brotherhood." The Imam of the Al-Ahwaz mosque extended
invitations to al-Sari, as well as Basrawi clerics and leaders
of JAM, Badr Organization, Thar Allah, Al-Shaheed al-Mihrab, 15
of Shabban and Sayyid al-Shuhada. Note: The same week is called
the "Week of the Sacred Defense" in Iran.


4. (S/NF) He also told us that Basrah's security situation was
worsening because the militias, unencumbered by Coalition or
police opposition, were expanding their influence (ref B). He
dismissed "legal" solutions because law enforcement was too
corrupt, ill suited, or too scared to confront the militias.
British plans to separate national and Iranian-influenced JAM
would also fail because those supported by Iran are too
powerful. He was also skeptical that the Iraqi Security Forces
(ISF) in Basrah, though recently reinforced, could tackle the
militias for lack of firepower. Even if the ISF were capable,
he doubted MND-SE would allow such operations for fear that it
would prolong the UK's presence in Iraq. However, he said, the
"ceasefire deal" is between JAM and MND-SE and should not
preclude ISF operations.


5. (S) What was needed, he opined, were "dirty, secretive,
Contra-like" operations using either the ISF or through support
to nationalist-JAM. If the latter, it would have to be well
thought out to ensure Coalition deniability and in such a way
that once the nationalists were strengthened, they did not turn
on the Coalition.

HOWARD