SECURITY IN BASRAH PROVINCE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000088

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/25/2017
TAGS: PINS PGOV ASEC ECON IZ
SUBJECT: SECURITY IN BASRAH PROVINCE

REF: A. BASRAH 086

B. BASRAH 072

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CLASSIFIED BY: Howell Howard, A/Director, Regional Embassy
Office - Basrah, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(d)




1. (S) Summary: While attacks against Coalition Forces (CF)
remain at a six-month low, security for Basrah's politicians and
government security forces is bad. A series of assassinations,
or attempts, of politicians and security officials has
highlighted the failure of basic law enforcement. University
professors, journalists and those who work with the Coalition
continue to be targeted and contract killings for non-political
disputes abound. Police Chief Jalil is trying to bring law and
order but so far has not achieved success. End Summary.


2. (C) A series of high level (for Basra) assassinations or
attempts highlights a lack of security for both police and
political actors. All were attacked by sniper fire.
- BG Nuri: Director of Al-Baldah police station (edge of
Basrah City),wounded September 22.
- Sheikh Amjed Al-Janabi: Sunni cleric, killed September 21
in Zubayir.
- Sheikh Adnan: Sunni cleric, wounded September 21 in
Zubayir.
- Sayid Salem: killed September 17 in Abu Al Khaseeb, edge
of Basrah. Member of 15th of Shaban or Sayid Al Shuhada
Movement. Contacts suspect the Islamic Party.
- Police Captain Abd Al-Muhsin: nephew of Police Chief MG
Jalil; killed September 18. Contacts suspect Jaysh Al Mahdi
(JAM).
- Sayid Hussein Al Husayni: killed first day of Ramadan,
September 13, unknown assailants. Member of Al Shaheed Al
Mihrab.
- Imad Al-Batat: Basrah representative of Ayatollah Muhammad
Ali al-Husayni al-Sistani survived assassination attempt in
which a guard was killed, about a week ago, in Al-Hayonea (Basra
city center).
- Brigadier Eydan: Deputy Provincial Director of Police;
suffered superficial head wounds September 20 in Basrah City.
Contacts report the sniper was sent by an "Iranian group" in
Basrah, upset over Jalil and Eydam's firing a number of National
Information and Investigation Agency (NIIA) officers weeks ago.
(After the firing, unknown assailants fired shots through MG
Jalil's door.)
- LTC Majeed Shenan Fary al-Yassiri: acting Commander Police
Criminal Investigation Division; wounded September 21, in
hospital intensive care.
- Police Chief Major General Jalil Khalaf Shuei told us
unknown persons tried to assassinate by IED him several days
ago. He did fnot ormally report it as he considered it a
"routine" incident. (Note: Jalil has endured four other shooting
attacks in the last few weeks. End Note.)


3. (S) While Basrah's police have been ordered to investigate
some of these attacks, no one has been arrested. Contacts seem
to be sure of the militia affiliation for many. MG Jalil has
consistently reported that Basra's police are thoroughly
infiltrated with JAM and other militia elements. There are some
positive Iraqi Security Forces developments, however. Jalil
appears eager to confront militias (Reftel) with his new
battalions of police from outside Basrah, while Basrah security
chief General Mohan has tried to reconcile parties/militias with
a communally-signed (except by JAM) "Honour Document" which
commits militias to surrender heavy weapons. The arrival of
Iraqi Army armored units could be used to support Iraqi Special
Forces operations against snipers.


4. (C) Other killings and kidnappings continue, especially
among academics. In the past month, the bodies of two university
professors have been found, kidnapped several weeks earlier.
Contacts tell us that non-political murders remain common in the
Basrah/Zubaiyr metropolitan area. These killings reflect
score-settling for disputes such as marriage conflicts,
business deals gone awry, neighborhood property disputes, etc.
Disaffected persons hire militia members to moonlight as
contract hit men. Many contacts tell us that official death
tolls as released by the Provincial Joint Coordination Center
(PJCC) are underreported and Jalil admitted to us an accuracy
rate of fifty percent. (Note: there is no longer an MND-SE
liaison working at the PJCC, although there is a PJCC liaison at
MND-SE. End Note.) A Basrah University professor told us that
his friend's daughter was kidnapped two days ago for an unknown
motive. Another professor said that his friend working in a
hospital morgue reports several bodies from violent deaths per

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day in that one hospital which he thinks do not get reported.


5. (U) For the average working class or small business owner
Basrawi, things are pretty much the same and economic life
continues - so long as a person does not become embroiled in a
dispute important enough to warrant violence. For the people
living near the Basrah Palace Complex (BPC),there is relatively
more security as the formerly frequent stray IDF rounds often
fell on civilian homes. For the average citizen, there is still
no effort to contact the police to deal with crimes, since
police are associated with militias. Crimes associated with
militia religious radicalism are prevalent: 30 barbers killed in
the past two weeks, suspected alcohol users or sellers killed,
and the bodies of four women were found in Basrah City recently,
all too common events.


6. (S) The climate of insecurity extends to locally employed
laborers at the MND-SE's Basrah Air Station (BAS) base and its
REO tenants. The contractor hired to regrade the road into the
REO was kidnapped a month ago, then ransomed. As a result, he
will no longer do contracting on the base. Several days ago
presumed JAM members kidnapped a youth near the Basrah Palace
Complex who knew the names of Iraqi workers at the REO. JAM
distributed leaflets addressed to REO workers telling them to
stop cooperating with the Americans or else. Many of the
workers have stayed home over the past couple of days to lay low
and give the impression that they are not working here. There
have also been reports that laborers working for the British
forces have been targeted.


7. (S) While rocket attacks against the MND-SE base have been
sparse since August 17, the Shaibah logistics base (previously
vacated by MND-SE) has been the subject of a number of mortar
attacks over the past week. MND-SE has previously concluded that
the IDF attacks were related to the presence of a US MiTT Team,
now departed. Alternative theories are that either some JAM who
agreed not to attack MND-SE are looking for loopholes, rogue JAM
elements continue their attacks, or other militias are
attacking.


8. (S) JAM on JAM violence also appears to be escalating.
Sadrist Cleric Sheik Mohammed Daod Al-Basyri (Ref B) telephoned
us that one of his associates was tortured and then released
after refusing to admit that Sheik Mohammed had been talking to
Americans. That associate reported coming from a room with
around 30 JAM-related persons who were being tortured by
electric drills and gunshots to make them tell of contact with
Americans. We reported this to Generals Mohan and Jalil as
actionable information, but to our knowledge the police did not
attempt any arrests.


9. (S) COMMENT: We assess that security for political actors
and police is deteriorating; security for the average citizen
continues at unacceptable levels. The JAM ceasefire and any
other arrangements that might exist are not stopping political
hits. The new police battalions should be a positive
improvement for Jalil's attempt to control the city, but there
still has yet to be a test of the police confronting violent
groups or individuals. The security climate also prevents the
PRT and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers from visiting
reconstruction projects. It remains to be seen if Mohan's
mediation and Jalil's plan for applying force will be able to
stop sniper attacks. Intimidation of MND-SE and REO workers,
along with other incidents suggest that elements hostile to the
Coalition are still a threat. Other complicatons offer both
threat and opportunity: while most interlocutors mention Iranian
influence as exacerbating violence, trbail sheiks are now coming
to us interested in having a postive impact on provincial
security. As we move towards Iraqi control of Basrah Province,
it will be important to improve ISF tools to combat violence.
End Comment.
HOWARD