Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BASRAH86
2007-09-23 05:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL
REO Basrah
Cable title:  

BASRAH POLICE CHIEF ON IRAN & SECURITY

Tags:  IR IZ PGOV PINR PREL PTER 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5187
RR RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHBC #0086/01 2660519
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 230519Z SEP 07
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0603
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0185
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDHP/DIA DHP-1 WASHINGTON DC
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEPGAB/MNF-I C2X BAGHDAD IZ
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0635
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000086 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/23/2017
TAGS: IR IZ PGOV PINR PREL PTER
SUBJECT: BASRAH POLICE CHIEF ON IRAN & SECURITY

BASRAH 00000086 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Howell Howard, A/Director, Regional Embassy
Office - Basrah, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(d)



C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000086

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/23/2017
TAGS: IR IZ PGOV PINR PREL PTER
SUBJECT: BASRAH POLICE CHIEF ON IRAN & SECURITY

BASRAH 00000086 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Howell Howard, A/Director, Regional Embassy
Office - Basrah, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(d)




1. (C) Summary: Basrah Police Chief, Major General Jalil Khalaf
Shueil, told Regional Embassy Officers September 18 that Iran is
training a Hezbollah-like force in reaction to rumors of a U.S.
deployment to Basrah following a British withdrawal. Jalil
expressed concern that Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki only
got information on the South through Dawa party contacts and was
unaware of any security improvement efforts. Jalil described
his relations with Basrah's security chief, General Mohan Hafith
Fahad, as good, but the two disagree on the path for improving
security. Mohan favors political accommodations with the
militias; Jalil wants to actively confront law-breakers. Jalil
also doubted the effectiveness of Mohan's Honor Document calling
for militias to disarm. He called the police ineffective due to
militia infiltration, but described his plan to purge bad
officers and create a hand picked force. End summary.

IRANIAN TRAINING FOR PROXY WAR IN BASRAH
--------------


2. (C) Jalil informed us September 18 that Iran is reacting to
rumors of U.S. forces deploying to Basrah, when the British
withdraw, by training a Hezbollah-like force to fight a proxy
war. The training is being held in Iran from September 2 to
November 2 for 80-100 snipers and 300-350 persons on EFP/IEDs,
IDF weapons, as well as how to hit helicopters with small arms
and RPG fire. It is suspected that Iranian influenced Jaysh
al-Mahdi (JAM) members are receiving the training. Jalil
commented that Iran's concerns over U.S. troops in southern Iraq
and Tehran's interest in spreading its influence will trump
Maliki's request that Iran stop aiding militia's during his
recent visit to Tehran.

JALIL ON MOHAN'S SECURITY PLAN & HONOR DOCUMENT
-------------- --


3. (C) Jalil said that he greatly respected Mohan, but they are
at odds on how to solve security problems. Jalil opined that

Mohan is acting more like a politician than a general by being
"soft on the militias" and accommodating them, especially JAM.
Jalil prefers using the tribes to counter-balance JAM and some
of the more militant political parties.


4. (C) Jalil is also skeptical of Mohan's "Honor Document"
saying it would achieve little. The document included
provisions that militias would give up medium to heavy weapons
by the end of September; political parties would stop
interfering in security matters; security forces would prosecute
violations of the law, protect political offices, and prohibit
the use of police vehicles for partisan political purposes.
Basrah's political parties agreed to the document on August 31
and then signed it September 7. Jalil noted there was no
Sadrist representative at the signing and doubts the document
will make a difference, since JAM is unwilling to disarm until
the Coalition leaves Iraq.

MOHAN'S EYE ON THE PRIZE
--------------


5. (C) According to Jalil, Mohan has political aspirations and
now hopes to become Minister of the Interior. Jalil confirmed
rumors that Mohan had been seeking either the Chief of Staff or
MOD advisor roles, but would have had difficulty given the
personal animosity of Chief of Staff LTG Babakir Zebari, Deputy
Chief of Staff LTG Nasir al-Abadi, and Minister of Defense Abd
al-Qadir al-Mufriji.

JALIL'S PLANNED POLICE REFORM
--------------


6. (C) Jalil told us he and Mohan met Maliki last week, but he
expressed frustration that Maliki was unfamiliar with their
efforts to improve Basrah's security. While Maliki expressed
concern about the south in national security meetings, Maliki
was only getting the Dawa Party perspective. Jalil was also
surprised that MNF-I and MNC-I did not want to meet him to
discuss Basrah's security.


7. (C) The Iraqi Police (IP) in Basrah, Jalil said, is currently
incapable of restoring order. IP units are entirely infiltrated
by the militias; hundreds of IP vehicles, gas, and weapons are
used to commit crimes; officers are afraid to make arrests; and

BASRAH 00000086 002.2 OF 002


there are too many departments to control. "The police are an
increasing threat to society," he assessed.


8. (C) Jalil described his plan to reform the police starting
with the formation of two "Emergency Brigades" totaling 5,000
officers. The units would be hand picked from the 15,000
existing officers and recruited from outside the four southern
provinces. Unburdened by the influence of local militias and
heavily equipped like the existing Tactical Support Units, the
Emergency Brigades would be capable of confronting the militias.
The remaining 10,000 officers would be given routine police
duties or transferred to other areas. He also intends to send
1,000 officers - presumably the worst ones - to Baghdad soon.


8. (C) Jalil said he was glad to see the arrival of the 6/2
National Police Brigade, and though he had not deployed them
yet, he would in the near future to make some key arrests. The
6/2 BDE would be held in Basrah until he was finished forming
the Emergency Brigades.


9. (C) Comment: Several reasons may account for Jalil's more
aggressive approach than Mohan: Jalil probably feels emboldened
by the arrival of the National Police Brigade and 2/3/9 (IA) BN
armor support; Jalil has survived several recent attempts on his
life; his nephew, a police captain, was assassinated; and
several of his high-ranked subordinates have also been wounded
or killed in assassination attempts over the last two weeks. It
is likely those attempts are in reaction to his firing 112
National Information and Investigations Agency officers. We
believe that Jalil is a competent and dedicated Police Chief,
but is limited in affecting change by a corrupt police force and
Mohan's accommodation with JAM. End Comment.
HOWARD