Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BASRAH68
2007-08-13 11:23:00
SECRET//NOFORN
REO Basrah
Cable title:  

BADR LEADER SUGGESTS TRUCE BETWEEN ISF AND MILITIAS

Tags:  PREL MOPS IZ IR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8672
RR RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHBC #0068 2251123
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 131123Z AUG 07
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0159
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0578
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEPGAB/MNF-I C2X BAGHDAD IZ
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0608
S E C R E T BASRAH 000068 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/13/2017
TAGS: PREL MOPS IZ IR
SUBJECT: BADR LEADER SUGGESTS TRUCE BETWEEN ISF AND MILITIAS

REF: (A) BASRAH 66 (B) BASRAH 59

CLASSIFIED BY: Louis L. Bono, Director, Basrah Regional Embassy
Office, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



S E C R E T BASRAH 000068

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/13/2017
TAGS: PREL MOPS IZ IR
SUBJECT: BADR LEADER SUGGESTS TRUCE BETWEEN ISF AND MILITIAS

REF: (A) BASRAH 66 (B) BASRAH 59

CLASSIFIED BY: Louis L. Bono, Director, Basrah Regional Embassy
Office, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) SUMMARY: Badr leader Hasan al-Rashid met with Regional
Embassy Officials (REO) on July 28 and August 9. He said he
would serve as governor if asked, and that as governor he would
seek to improve security by reconciling the politicians, the
Iraqi security forces (ISF),and the militias. He said he was
approached by Ja'ish al-Mahdi (JAM) to intervene with the
Coalition and is eager to develop a strategic relationship
between the REO and Badr/Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI)
to establish the latter's independence from Iran. End summary.


2. (C) Al-Rashid, the interim Basrah governor between 2004-05,
telephoned us on July 26 to announce that the Council of
Ministers had ordered Governor Mohammed Wa'eli to step down.
(Ref. A) Two days later, al-Rashid downplayed rumors that he
was the leading candidate to replace Wa'eli but said he would
accept the position if elected. He then discussed his vision
for improving security in Basrah. Al-Rashid said the key is to
reign in the militias, particularly JAM, and resolve conflicts
between the political parties and with the Coalition.


3. (C) Al-Rashid said the security forces must confront the
militias, but currently lack the fortitude to do so. He cited
the recent curfew imposed by Police Chief Major General Jalil
Khalaf Shueil as an example of what not to do. JAM openly
defied the curfew, exposing Jalil's lack of control. He said
the best way to control the militias is through an accord
between the politicians, the ISF, and the militias. He said the
militias should not be required to disarm, and the ISF should
only intervene against the militias to prevent criminal activity.


4. (C) On the role of the Coalition, al-Rashid said the
withdrawal from the Palace is a positive step, but the Coalition
should not pull out of Basrah. He said the Coalition is needed
to provide training, logistical and organizational support, and
a quick reaction force for the ISF. Al-Rashid said a dialogue
between the Provincial Council and the Coalition could solve
half of Basrah's problems. He and other members of the Council
have formed a security committee and have restarted talks with
British officials. (Note: The Provincial Council officially
disengaged from the Coalition following a December 2006 raid on
the serious crimes unit and again in March 2007 after a raid on
the Iraqi Intelligence Agency office in Basrah. End note.)


5. (C) A key component of this dialogue is JAM. Al-Rashid was
approached by JAM to serve as an intermediary with the
Coalition; he asked if we would support this role. The REO
director encouraged al-Rashid to develop relations with JAM and
the Sadrists. Al-Rashid is eager to commence a strategic
dialogue with the REO. He said although Badr/ISCI maintain
close relations with Iran, stronger relations with the U.S.
would be good for the parties and Iraq. He also seeks to
demonstrate that Badr and ISCI are not Iranian vassals. (See
ref. B.)

COMMENT


6. (S) The 40 year-old al-Rashid is a shrewd and deadpan
interlocutor. He spent several years in Iran and has avoided
getting too close to us in the past. Thus, his sudden
enthusiasm to improve relations with the U.S. seems a bit
uncharacteristic. While we are unconvinced of his detachment
from Iran, his background and his political potential
necessitate a strong relationship. (He was nominated for the
2008 IV program.)


7. (S/NF) British officials prefer al-Rashid to Wa'eli because
his ability to control the Provincial Council could be a
stabilizing factor. Al-Rashid's prescription for Basrah may
well establish harmony among the local power players but would
essentially proscribe Coalition strike operations. While this
may create a facade of stability, it would not necessarily stem
the militias' chokehold on Basrah nor their support to
insurgents in other regions. This does not seem to bother
al-Rashid; as he once told us: "Iraqis have been living in an
unstable environment for 20 years; the current situation is
normal.

BONO