Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BASRAH55
2007-06-24 09:37:00
SECRET
REO Basrah
Cable title:  

IRAN COMMANDEERS BASRAH JAM

Tags:  PTER PREL IR IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4188
RR RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHBC #0055/01 1750937
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 240937Z JUN 07
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0562
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0144
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEPGAB/MNF-I C2X BAGHDAD IZ
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0589
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BASRAH 000055 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/24/2017
TAGS: PTER PREL IR IZ
SUBJECT: IRAN COMMANDEERS BASRAH JAM

REF: (A) BASRAH 41 (B) BASRAH 02 (C) 06 BASRAH 55 (D) BASRAH 46

BASRAH 00000055 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Louis L. Bono, Director, Basrah Regional Embassy
Office, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)

SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BASRAH 000055

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/24/2017
TAGS: PTER PREL IR IZ
SUBJECT: IRAN COMMANDEERS BASRAH JAM

REF: (A) BASRAH 41 (B) BASRAH 02 (C) 06 BASRAH 55 (D) BASRAH 46

BASRAH 00000055 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Louis L. Bono, Director, Basrah Regional Embassy
Office, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)

SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION


1. (C/REL UK, AUS) The rising violence that has gripped Basrah
results largely from Iran's success in commandeering and
empowering Basrah cells of the Ja'ish al-Mahdi (JAM). This is
the near unanimous view expressed by Iraqi and Coalition sources
tracking the declining security situation in Iraq's second city,
which lies a few miles from the Iranian border. JAM, which
Moqtada al-Sadr (MAS) formed in 2003 to fight al-Qaeda in Iraq,
has split into two factions - a nationalist faction, loyal to
MAS, and a pro-Iranian faction that is said to be carrying out
most of the violence in Basrah. This cable describes the Basrah
JAM and its members, Iranian influence in JAM, and the split
between those elements under Iranian influence and those loyal
to MAS. End summary.

BASRAH JAM


2. (C/REL UK, AUS) JAM (aka the Mahdi Army) was formed by
Moqtada al-Sadr as the military wing of his Office of Martyr
Sadr (OMS) party to enforce the Sadrist's nationalist - anti
Coalition/anti Iran - agenda and to protect Shi'as from attacks
by Sunni insurgents, particularly al-Qaeda. Since there are few
Sunnis and minimal al-Qaeda activity in southeastern Iraq, JAM
has focused its efforts on asserting its dominance throughout
the region. In Basrah, it has reportedly taken control of the
Um Qasr ports and seeks to wrest control of the oil industry
from Fadhila. JAM has also undertaken a campaign to expel the
"occupiers," and over the last year, with Iranian support, it
has increased attacks against the Coalition.


3. (C/REL UK, AUS) JAM also seeks to emulate Hamas and Lebanese
Hezbollah, purporting to defend the interests of the poor and
downtrodden, such as orphans and widows. Its support base is
centered in urban slums, such as the Hayanniyah and Jumhurriyah
districts. Most of the residents in these districts are the
so-called "Marsh Arabs," who were displaced after Saddam drained
the marshes, and those who migrated in search of jobs. The

levels of education and income in these areas are low;
unemployment is high and educated Basrawis look upon these
residents with contempt. During a raid on a JAM cell in late
April, British forces recovered a 27-page notebook containing
the names and phone numbers of people apparently receiving
welfare payments. However, local sources say that the extent of
JAM's largesse is much less than it claims. If a JAM militant
is arrested, then the organization will provide support for the
militant's family while he is incarcerated, but systemic
community programs do not exist. JAM has however proved adept
in creating public relations opportunities. For instance, under
Operation Sinbad, British forces rehabilitated schools
throughout Basrah. After completion of the work, JAM members
would invariably move in, post JAM propaganda, and claim credit
for the renovations. The Basrah public however is becoming
disenchanted with JAM and its tactics. Its inaccurately aimed
rockets and mortars do as much damage to Iraqis living near the
Coalition installations as to foreign forces. In May, Basrah
civic groups staged street demonstrations to demand that the
militants stop the indiscriminate fire and threatened to
retaliate if they did not. (See ref. A.)


4. (C/REL UK, AUS) While JAM may purport to be the protector and
benefactor of the downtrodden, in reality, it is a decentralized
amalgamation of cells that wreak terror throughout Basrah and
engage in criminal activity - "thugs and thieves." JAM's modus
operandi is to terrorize citizens into submission and carry out
attacks against the Coalition. Despite its weak power structure
and the incoherency between cells, it has evolved into the most
notorious and probably the most powerful militia in Basrah,
primarily through its Iranian benefactors. Its fighters are
effective in supporting each other in the urban war that has
engulfed the city. For example, if a militant is arrested at a
police checkpoint, his comrades will intimidate the director of
the detention facility into releasing him. After the release,
gunmen will go to the checkpoint where the arrest was made and
kill the policemen. In one instance, JAM militants captured a
group of Iraqi Army officers and shaved their heads. Such
tactics effectively terrorize well-intentioned policemen and
soldiers from acting to defend public security.


5. (C/REL UK, AUS) JAM has also infiltrated the Basrah Police
force through political patronage, and its members often conduct
acts of violence against citizens and the Coalition while in
uniform, utilizing police vehicles. In one instance a British

BASRAH 00000055 002.2 OF 003


Police delegation was departing from a police station when a man
in a police uniform fired an RPG at their convoy. More
recently, British soldiers stationed at the police headquarters
have come under fire from within the compound. The notorious
Basrah Police Serious Crimes Unit, which MND-SE sought to
disband in December 2006, continues to operate as a JAM cell.
(See ref. B.) On June 15, its members openly engaged a British
patrol following the destruction of a Sunni mosque. There are
also indications that Iraqi Army units drawn from Basrah, such
as the 10th ID, 1st Bde., are also under JAM influence.


6. (C/REL UK, AUS) Lately there have been reports that some JAM
cells are seeking to impose Taleban-like restrictions throughout
the city. For example, barbers have been assassinated because
they cut hair in a modern, un-Islamic style; produce vendors
have been threatened for displaying bananas or tomatoes and
cucumbers together due to perceived sexual connotations; ice
vendors have been killed by gunmen who proclaim that the Prophet
Mohammad did not drink cold water; taxi drivers are forced from
their vehicles because the Prophet did not drive; and owners of
tire repair shops have had their air compressors riddled with
bullets by gunmen who say air has been provided by God who
intended it to be free, not bottled up in tanks. These acts are
antithetical to JAM's nationalistic objectives and reflect more
of a Wahabi-style fundamentalism, despite their claim to be
committed Shi'as.

WHO ARE THE BASRAH JAM GUNMEN?


7. (C/REL UK, AUS) Estimates of JAM's hard-core members range
from 300-400 to 1500-1700, with perhaps as many as 10,000 to
15,000 sympathizers in Basrah. (See ref. C.) They hail from
urban slums, such as the Hayanniyah and Jumhurriyah districts.
Ironically, these neighborhoods where JAM draws its recruits
were the most boisterous in welcoming the Coalition forces in

2003. Most are unemployed and uneducated. Although JAM
rhetoric brims with Islamic references, religious belief has
little to do with JAM's appeal. Rather, by joining JAM, young
men achieve a sense of self-worth and belonging and a chance to
make money. The lower echelons of JAM are comprised of local,
unskilled operatives who are reported to earn between $100-250
for each rocket or mortar attack they launch at Coalition
targets.


8. (C/REL UK, AUS) The leadership of the JAM is concentrated in
the hands of a youthful, dynamic and "angry" group, who are
mostly under 30 years old. Abu Qadir, the most recent Basrah
commander was only 23 years old when he was killed during a
firefight with Iraqi and British forces on May 25. His
predecessor, Sayid Naji, who was captured by Coalition forces in
December 2006, is about 26. (See ref. D.) These younger
Basrawi commanders are becoming increasingly independent of MAS.
Various cells are operating under the JAM banner, but receive
direction and financial and material support principally from
Iranian sources. Following Qadir's death, Basrah JAM has become
even more decentralized as no one has stepped forward to replace
him. While there is currently no hierarchical structure, these
JAM cells are able to rally in support of each other through the
use of cell phones, particularly when engaged with Coalition
forces.

IRANIAN INFLUENCE DIVIDES JAM

9. (C/REL UK, AUS) In 2005, MAS established secret JAM cells to
serve as his professional hit squads. Direction of the secret
cells was taken over by Qays al-Kha-zhli (who is in U.S.
custody) and Akram al-Kabi of Najaf who turned to Iran for
financing and training. Once in Iran, the Iranian Republican
Guard Corps (IRGC) was able to assert influence over the secret
cells, which it employs as an anti-Coalition force. It also
began to recruit JAM cells from other areas of Iraq,
particularly Basrah, the Coalition's stronghold on its
southeastern border and Iraq's economic center.

10. (C/REL UK, AUS) Iranian agents recruit JAM cell leaders in
Basrah first by making a religious appeal based on common Shi'a
beliefs, followed by offers of money, according to multiple
sources. If a cell leader resists switching loyalties, then
threats are used. If the obduracy continues, a relative of the
cell leader is assassinated, and ultimately the cell leader
himself is taken out. Similar recruitment and intimidation
methods are applied to sheikhs, teachers and other members of
society. One REO contact predicts that within one year, Iran
will exercise influence over about 90 percent of the JAM
adherents in Basrah, compared to about 60 percent at present.
Predominantly Sunni countries in the Gulf are reported to
support the nationalist branch of JAM as a barrier against the
spread of Iranian influence.

11. (S/REL UK, AUS) The increasing Iranian influence over JAM is
creating a split in the organization between what our contacts

BASRAH 00000055 003.2 OF 003


describe as "nationalist" JAM and "external" or "militant" JAM.
MAS is reportedly angered that his best teams have been annexed
by Iran, and nationalist JAM leaders are wary of this budding
rival with better equipment, training, and resources. While
nationalist elements in Basrah proclaim loyalty to MAS, it is
evident that this loyalty is not steadfast, and it appears the
nationalists in Najaf are growing concerned about this wayward
franchise. Intermediaries have approached us, as well as
British officials, about the prospects of talks with nationalist
JAM and OMS officials. It is not clear where relations between
MAS and Iran stand after his four-month sojourn, nor is it clear
whether he supports rapprochement with the Coalition. According
to a source, a decision by MAS to open talks with the United
States could puncture his claim to be Iraq's liberator from the
Coalition, but he may be desperate enough to need an ally
against Iran.

WHAT LIES AHEAD?


12. (C/REL UK, AUS) JAM is only one of many Iranian instruments
operating in Basrah. The Badr Organization, led by former
Governor Hasan al-Rashid, and Thar Allah, led by Sayid Yusuf
al-Musawi, field militias with strong ties to Iran. Political,
clerical, and tribal leaders who visit the REO predict that war
will break out between the militias after provincial Iraqi
control occurs (PIC) and the relocation of British forces to the
air station. PIC under these circumstances will be viewed by
the militias as a victory over the Coalition. There is
speculation that at that point, JAM's usefulness to Iranian
intents could end. The only person offering a more comforting
view on the prospect for civil strife is Badr's Hasan al-Rashid
who said, "since Iraqis have been living in an unstable
environment for 20 years, the current situation is normal, and,
even if civil war did occur, Iraqis would end up unified in the
end."
BONO