TRYING TO RIGHT THE SHIP OF BASRAH

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BASRAH 000053

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/17/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINS PREL IZ IR
SUBJECT: TRYING TO RIGHT THE SHIP OF BASRAH

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CLASSIFIED BY: Louis L. Bono, Director, Basrah Regional Embassy
Office, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



SUMMARY


1. (S/NF) Over the past few months, there have been several
indicators that raise concerns about the ability of Iraqi
authorities to adequately govern Basrah. In March, there was a
direct attack against the Governor's palace followed by a
coordinated attempt within the Provincial Council to depose him.
Iranian elements are intensifying their efforts to undermine
the Coalition in order to strengthen their sphere of influence
in the region. We have witnessed an ongoing intimidation
campaign by the Ja'ish al-Mahdi (JAM) militia, despite attempts
of MND-SE forces to weaken its capability. The Iraqi Police
forces are laden with militia members, and the Army's 10th
Infantry Division is still a fledgling entity. Security
officials are incapable of stemming the violence and organized
crime and many politicians have external loyalties. The British
have essentially declared that the situation will not improve
and seek to turn over control of provincial security to the
Iraqis (PIC) by August or September. Unless action is taken by
the GoI to stabilize the political situation and replace the
inept security officials before PIC, we should prepare for
Basrah to continue on its wayward course.

ALL POLITICS ARE LOCAL


2. (C) On March 7, 2007, Fadhila withdrew from the governing
United Iraqi Alliance (UIA),further widening the tenuous divide
between Basrah Governor Mohammed al-Wa'eli (Fadhila) and the
Basrah Islamia list (BIL) of the Provincial Council, led by
Hasan al-Rashid (Badr Organization). On March 21, JAM attacked
Wa'eli's residence and Fadhila headquarters after Wa'eli
replaced an Office of Martyr Sadr (OMS)-linked official with a
Fadhila crony. A few weeks later al-Rashid and Thar Allah
leader Sayid Yousuf led a coordinated effort to oust Wa'eli.
Both al-Rashid and Yousuf harbor personal enmity toward Wa'eli
and tried to unseat him last year as well. On April 16, they
organized mass street demonstrations calling for Wa'eli's
resignation and garnered 27 Provincial Council members, some
reportedly under duress, to sign a petition of no confidence
against the governor. Yousuf also hinted of a plan to
assassinate Wa'eli should all else fail. With Fadhila out of
the ruling Coalition, and its major power base under siege, it
appeared that Fadhila's ship was sinking. Or so we thought.


3. (C) Fast-forward two months, and Fadhila remains afloat. The
question of whether the 27 signatures are sufficient to remove
Wa'eli has been put to Prime Minister Maliki for legal review.
At issue is whether non-voting members of the Council - the
governor and deputy governor - should be counted for the
two-thirds majority requirement, and whether all 27 signatures
are valid. Maliki had indicated he would rule against the
governor, but it has been weeks and no order has been issued.
It is believed that Maliki has been reluctant to rule against
Wa'eli with the nationalists courting Fadhila's 15 votes in the
Council of Representatives. Now, according to Wa'eli, Maliki is
under increasing pressure from Iranian-backed Iraqis to dismiss
him.

POWER PLAY


4. (S) One Provincial Council member suggested the only way to
resolve this impasse was to request Islamic Supreme Council of
Iraq (ISCI) leader Abdulaziz al-Hakim to intervene with the BIL.
Indeed, National Security Director Mufaq al-Rubai reportedly
said, the issue over Wa'eli is a UIA problem. However, this
proposal was discounted by another reliable contact who advised
that al-Hakim could not make such a move without the blessing of
Tehran. According to this contact, Iranian agents exercise
significant influence over all of the major political
organizations and militias in Basrah, particularly Badr, OMS,
and Thar Allah, by supplying them with financial and
organizational support.


5. (S) The Shi'a party in Basrah with the fewest tethers to Iran
appears to be Fadhila, following a falling out between Wa'eli
and his Iranian handlers last year. Wa'eli and his brother
Ismail appear to have consolidated their control over the oil
industry, antagonizing the other Shi'a parties over shares of
the oil smuggling revenues, and the Iranians who are seeking to
influence the industry. With hostility between the Shi'a
factions growing, the green light to take out Wa'eli apparently
came following the withdrawal of Fadhila from the UIA.


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6. (S) While Wa'eli's fate languishes with Maliki, Fadhila has
reportedly been making overtures to OMS and to ISCI and Badr.
The latter two remain the wild card in Basrah. While OMS and
JAM have played a very visible role in creating a maelstrom,
Badr, led by al-Rashid, has been relatively quiet, not
withstanding al-Rashid's attempts to unseat Wa'eli. Al-Rashid,
who spent years in Iran as a political refugee and was educated
at the Iranian military academy, preceded Wa'eli as governor.
There is speculation that with PIC approaching, he is looking to
make a power move.


7. (S/NF) Against this backdrop, the British have all but
declared their intention to depart Iraq within a year, resigned
to the fact that the security situation in Basrah will not
improve. The British consider the withdrawal from Basrah Palace
and the handover of provincial Iraqi control (PIC) the first
steps in this process. The Iranians, who are wary of Coalition
forces on their doorstep, are eager to be seen as the impetus
for the British withdrawal and to strengthen their sphere of
influence in Iraq's second city. They have intensified their
proxy war against the British forces, principally through JAM,
and according to Wa'eli, are increasing efforts to remove him.
Wa'eli has declared that Basrah is not ready for PIC, presumably
concerned that British forces will no longer be around to
support him. Meanwhile JAM, despite the loss of its recent
leader Abu Qadir, is leveraging its Iranian support to establish
itself as the dominant force in Basrah.

MOVING FORWARD


8. (S) With PIC by this autumn an apparent fait accompli, fears
persist among our contacts of an increase in violence. Thus, if
we are going to have any degree of success, we will have to
divorce ourselves from the idealic conditions set forth by the
Joint Committee for the Transfer of Security and focus our
efforts (and the GoI's) on maintaining a semblance of balance
among the factions. As we see it, there are essentially three
options for the GoI: (1) do nothing and maintain the status quo,
(2) uphold the petition and replace Wa'eli, or (3) dismiss the
petition and keep Wa'eli in office, with the GoI retaining
authority over the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).


9. (S) The first option, is probably the least tenable. Wa'eli
claims to be conducting business as usual, but al-Rashid and
others are still intent on replacing him. And while there has
been surprisingly little violence between Fadhila and the other
blocs over the past few months, it is difficult to predict what
would happen if this ends up as a "no decision." Further, it
has been clear for months that the police chief and the
Emergency Security Committee do not control the security forces
and need to be replaced, and it is increasingly evident that the
Iraqi Army alone cannot secure Basrah. Unfortunately, with the
Prime Minister vacillating for over a month on the fate of the
governor and for several months on the police chief, this
appears to be the course on which we are heading.


10. (S) The ideal solution would be to replace Wa'eli with a
Fadhila candidate who can work with the Provincial Council, the
security officials, and the Coalition. Al-Rashid has offered to
accept a Fadhila replacement, and Wa'eli claims that Maliki has
offered him an ambassadorship to any country or a post as deputy
minister if he resigns. However, Wa'eli said he does not intend
to step down, and Fadhila does not appear inclined to replace
its cash cow.


11. (S) The third possibility, is to keep Wa'eli in office and
to appoint a new security tsar and police chief or even combine
the positions. Given the ineptitude of the ISF, Fadhila, under
Wa'eli, is perhaps the only force capable of countermanding JAM
at this point. Indeed, a Ministry of Interior (MoI) delegation
recently opined that an "anarchy-type" situation could ensue if
Wa'eli were removed. However, the delegation also recognized,
and we agree, that it would be a mistake to invest Wa'eli with
the security portfolio given his reputation as a smuggler and
ruffian. Thus, the MoI delegation recommends that Wa'eli
remain, but that the GoI should appoint new security officials
and retain control over the ISF.

COMMENT


12. (S/NF) The British would prefer to replace Wa'eli with a
more acceptable candidate, particularly in light of his
opposition to PIC, but they acknowledge that this scenario may
not be realistic. Pragmatically speaking, we believe the best
scenario may be to leave Wa'eli in office until the elections.
We also reiterate the need to appoint formidable individuals to
replace the feeble police chief and ESC, with the caveat that
not much in the way of reform will be accomplished in the next
few months. Reliable contacts believe this is the only way to

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maintain the balance of power in Basrah and point out that
Wa'eli has in fact been fulfilling the responsibilities of his
office. Regardless of our perspective, it is incumbent upon the
Prime Minister to resolve the fate of the Governor and security
officials. While this may not necessarily improve the
situation, if we do nothing, the ship will likely continue
sailing in the wrong direction.
BONO