Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BASRAH51
2007-06-08 12:21:00
SECRET
REO Basrah
Cable title:  

HALLELUIA; MOI SECURITY COMMITTEE UNCOVERS HOW BAD BASRAH

Tags:  PTER PGOV PINS PREL MCAP MARR ZP 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9775
PP RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHBC #0051/01 1591221
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 081221Z JUN 07
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0553
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEPGAB/MNF-I C2X BAGHDAD IZ
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0580
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000051 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR DS/IP/NEA, DS/IP/ITA, NEA/IPM FOR JENSEN, LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/8/2017
TAGS: PTER PGOV PINS PREL MCAP MARR ZP
SUBJECT: HALLELUIA; MOI SECURITY COMMITTEE UNCOVERS HOW BAD BASRAH
REALLY IS

REF: A. A. Baghdad 1851

B. B. Basrah 50

BASRAH 00000051 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Louis L. Bono, Regional Director, REO Basrah,
DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(d)



S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000051

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR DS/IP/NEA, DS/IP/ITA, NEA/IPM FOR JENSEN, LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/8/2017
TAGS: PTER PGOV PINS PREL MCAP MARR ZP
SUBJECT: HALLELUIA; MOI SECURITY COMMITTEE UNCOVERS HOW BAD BASRAH
REALLY IS

REF: A. A. Baghdad 1851

B. B. Basrah 50

BASRAH 00000051 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Louis L. Bono, Regional Director, REO Basrah,
DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(d)




1. (S) Summary. In a two-hour meeting with the Regional
Director on June 7, the Interior Ministry committee charged with
evaluating Basrah's security situation quickly admitted that
they found security in Basrah to be very poor and laid the blame
squarely on the chief of Police, Iraqi Police Service, the Iraqi
Army's 10th Division, the Emergency Security Committee,
political parties and factions, and the governor. Stating that
police were tasked to do additional duties for political parties
and that a lack of confidence between all of the factions added
to the instability, the committee did come up with a number of
proposals to submit to Prime Minister Maliki (PM) in order to
try and redress the situation. Corruption, Iranian and Arab
Gulf country interference, and weak Basrah Provincial Council
leadership were also highlighted as causes behind Basrah's
abysmal security. End summary.


2. (C) On June 7 the Regional Director, Deputy Regional
Director, and Regional Security Officer met with Ministry of
Interior's Security committee charged by the PM with evaluating
the security situation in Basrah. The committee was led by
Major General Rasheed Flayeeh and included Major General Mahdi
Al Garawi, the Assistant Deputy of Police Affairs, Major General
Abbas, the Support Forces representative, and Brigadier General
Hudur, the Inspector General's representative. The committee,
in Basrah for almost two weeks, has had 13 site visits and 45
meetings with, amongst others, tribal leaders, the governor, the
Basrah Provincial Council (BPC),the British military, and all
of the political parties and blocs in Basrah. Not surprisingly,

they reported that they found the security situation "not good
at all" and planned on submitting a list of suggested changes to
the Prime Minister in order to avoid "anarchy" in the province.


3. (C) Stating that Basrah needed a "strategic security plan"
due to its location as the axis or gateway for Iraq, Major
General Mahdi said that Basrah needed to get back under Iraqi
control and to be protected from the Iranian threat,
particularly the Iranian intelligence units that operate out of
Basrah. Mahdi also stated that the GCC were also trying to
control Basrah and had recently formed a joint operations center
to try and keep Basrah, and specifically its ports, out of
Iranian control. According to Mahdi, the joint operations
center is being headed up by UAE's Interior Minister and has a
working budget of three billion dollars. Its goal was to
control Basrah's ports through specific projects and
construction works and by using humanitarian organizations to
gather intelligence. Either way, Mahdi added, the Iranian and
Gulfies' plans can only be countered by a strong security
apparatus, something that Basrah currently does not have.

Examples of Weak Basrah


4. (C) According to Mahdi, Basrah's Iraqi Police Service (IPS)
is in very poor shape. The police chief needs to be replaced
and a non-Basrawi put into the position. When asked about
reports that Major General Jalil Khaluf Shwayid was poised to be
the next police chief, the committee members were clear that it
was not possible; Jalil was from the Defense Ministry and the
police chief had to come from the Interior Ministry. Stating
that he knew Jalil personally, Mahdi said that the decision
still had not been made but they would urge the PM to replace
the current police chief quickly since the situation was
serious. (Note: On June 3, Prime Minister Maliki told the
Ministerial Committee for National Security that he planned to
appoint Jalil as Basrah police chief. (See ref. A.) End note.)


5. (C) Some of the problems that they uncovered included the
discovery of two fake IPS battalions that were masquerading
around in police uniforms, acting as personal security detail,
and conducting operations without any proper authorization for
the past eight months. Mahdi stated that the Emergency Security
Committee (ESC) knew about their existence for some time and
never reported it. Two recently arrested members of the fake
battalions confessed to committing over twenty killings on the
orders of unnamed superiors. Mahdi also questioned the reason
for the ESC's continued existence.


6. (C) Additionally, the committees found that the BPC's 500
police bodyguards were mostly non-existent. They were able to
find only 50 on the job. The rest they believe were out

BASRAH 00000051 002.2 OF 002


committing crimes, including killings, in the city. A similar
find occurred with the governor's protective detail. Out of 430
men, they could only find 70 on the job. At the National Iraqi
Intelligence Agency (NIIA)'s Basrah office, the committee found
400 individuals on the books who are not actually in the office
working to collect intelligence. They also discovered 56 NIIA
cars unaccounted for. (Note. ISF militia members often use
official cars when carrying out crimes and attacks. End note.)


7. (C) According to the committee, the Serious Crimes Unit
(SCU),which the British claimed to have disbanded in the Jameat
raid on Christmas morning 2006, is still in existence and
active. The committee stated that the SCU, the most notorious
and nefarious of the corrupt police units, was simply purged of
some personnel and is currently active, working for both the
public interest and for Ja'ish Al Mehdi (JAM) at the same time.


8. (S) Mahdi stated that when the committee heard about some
Iraqi Army 10th Infantry Division (10th ID) officers recently
being taken hostage, having their heads shaved, and their
humvees burned to the ground, they realized that the problem is
not just with the IPS. (See ref. B.) Mahdi made the point,
supported by the others, that three battalions of the 10th ID
need to be replaced with soldiers from outside of Basrah, a
suggestion that General Habib, the 10th ID commanding officer,
supports.


9. (S) Lastly, Mahdi asked the director outright if the
governor should be replaced or should be retained, albeit with
different powers, in the near term. The director said that
Iraqis had to make such decisions for themselves. He added that
in order to stabilize Basrah, the GoI must consider the
political power struggle between Fadhila and the United Iraqi
Alliance, at the national level, as well as the personal enmity
that exists between Basrah's political leaders. He also said
that Fadhila's hold on the governorship maintains a balance of
power in Basrah. Mahdi agreed; he said the governor should not
be removed so close to the elections, and that to do so would
create "an anarchy-type situation." He did advise that if the
governor was kept on, he should have "his wings clipped" and
some of his powers and militia removed from him. Stating that
Al Wa'eli is " a very strong man and a decision-maker and
someone who we need in the current situation," Mahdi made it
clear that he, if not the committee, preferred to keep him in
place for the time being since he still has influence in every
part of Basrah and "he can help" the situation.


10. (S) Flayeeh told the director that the committee plans to
provide ten suggestions to the GoI to improve security in Basrah:

1) Purge twenty percent of the IPS in Basrah.
2) Replace the police chief within 30 days with someone from
outside of Basrah.
3) Determine the status of the governor within the province.
The PM must make a decisive decision on this as soon as possible,
4) Issue a decree by the PM to prohibit all political parties,
nongovernmental organizations and other groups to interfere with
police affairs.
5) Return all police members to regular active duty and return
all police property (such as cars) to allow the police to do
their work out of police stations rather than out of political
party offices and residences.
6) Issue license plates to all Oil Facilities Protective
Services vehicles in order to differentiate them from other
official vehicles that do not carry license plates. Minimize
the use of police vehicles for other use.
7) Open five manufacturing plants to promote employment, as an
alternative to the militias. The five plants would be in
petrochemicals, steel, cement, paper, and port infrastructure
rehabilitation.
8) Form a commando unit under the authority of the police chief
with 30 to 40 percent of the slots to be filled from outside the
province.
9) Request support from Coalition Forces to continue training
incoming police and to provide human rights training for all
police officers.
10) Request support from Coalition Forces to reinforce Coast
Guard units with steel-hulled craft and heavy weaponry in order
to better interdict the heavily-armed smugglers on the Shatt
al-Arab.

The director said the list is a good start, but with provincial
Iraqi control likely to occur in August or September, the window
of opportunity is closing.
BONO