IRAQI ARMY NOT PREPARED FOR PIC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000050

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/2/2017
TAGS: MCAP PTER ABLD IR
SUBJECT: IRAQI ARMY NOT PREPARED FOR PIC

REF: (A) BASRAH 47 (B) BASRAH 35

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CLASSIFIED BY: Louis L. Bono, Director, Basrah Regional Embassy
Office, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) Summary: The commander of the Iraqi Army's (IA) 10th
Infantry Division (ID),Major General Habib Abbas al-Husseini,
told the Regional Embassy Office (REO) director on May 28 that
his forces will not be able to secure Basrah once provincial
Iraqi control (PIC) is handed over. His comments are reinforced
by recent encounters between Ja'ish al-Mahdi (JAM) militia and
IA soldiers. MG Habib is keen to occupy the Palace after the
REO departs and says his troops are the only force that can
secure it. End summary.

IA NOT PREPARED FOR PIC


2. (C) MG Habib, who commands IA forces in southeastern Iraq,
said the 10th ID cannot provide security as Basrah moves toward
Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC). He said the 10th ID is unable
to contain the rising power of JAM, which has engaged in
kidnappings and murders with growing impunity during the past
two months. He said the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are unable
to disarm the JAM without a political consensus among the
warring parties. Describing his 10th ID as "fledgling," the
general said that he has only 2,000 soldiers under his command
for the entire Basrah Province. In contrast, the Basrah police
force has 17,000 men on its payroll, the majority of whom are
militia gunmen. The general said that four additional
battalions, including one new brigade, have been approved for
the 10th Division and would increase its troop strength by over
6,000. He said without the additional troops, he would not be
able to secure Basrah. Comment: In addition, if more 10th ID
troops are reassigned, even temporarily, in support of the
Baghdad Security Plan, it will further inhibit the 10th ID's
capability. Should this be necessary, we should encourage the
reassignment of Basrawi troops, rather than troops originating
from other areas of Iraq. End comment.

JAM INTIMIDATES 10TH DIVISION


3. (C) Recent incidents between JAM and the 10th ID show that
the militia is willing to take on the army with growing
intrepidity. On May 23, JAM attacked a 10th ID patrol riding in
armored Humvees. The gunmen destroyed two Humvees and captured
weapons, radios, helmets and body armor, according to the IA.
On May 25, following the killing of Basrah JAM leader Wissam
al-Wa'eli (aka Abu Qadir) by Iraqi Special Operations Forces,
JAM attacked the home of the 10th ID's chief of staff. A
spokesman hurriedly declared that the division had nothing to do
with the killing in order to convince JAM to call off its
attack. (See reftel A.) Also that evening, JAM attacked
British troops garrisoned at the Provincial Joint Coordination
Center. The British requested 10th ID reinforcements, but an
Iraqi commander refused, saying his troops were not ready.

IS THE PALACE STILL AVAILABLE?


4. (C) MG Habib asked the director about the status of the
Basrah Palace and said he would like to establish his
headquarters and station troops there immediately. He said the
Ministry of Transportation is looking to reclaim the Shatt
al-Arab Hotel from the 10th ID for its Ports Directorate.
(Note: The Shatt was recently vacated by British forces and
turned over to the 10th ID. End note.) The director said it
would not be possible to garrison Iraqi soldiers at the Palace
until the REO departs late July. In any event the director said
the GoI is interested in reclaiming the Palace for the Council
of Ministers and stationing a presidential palace battalion to
secure it. The director asked about plans to locate the 10th ID
HQ at Camp Graham. MG Habib complained about construction
delays at Camp Graham and expressed frustration with the
contractor. He said the 10th ID needs the Palace, because it
would allow the 10th to expand, and the IA is the only
institution in the region with the integrity to keep JAM out.
The director asked about the utility of stationing troops in
Basrah city if they could not provide security. MG Habib said
the Army could provide security in the vicinity of the Palace
and provide further support to the Iraqi Police forces in the
city.

COMMENT


5. (S) MG Habib's reluctance to handle security post-PIC is
disappointing and contrasts his previous assertions that his
forces would take on the IDF teams. (See ref. B.) His
comments, coupled with JAM's intimidation of IA units,
underscore the degree of influence that JAM wields in Basrah.

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Currently, Fadhila is the only force that countermands JAM, and
if it loses the governor's office, JAM's position will
strengthen. The 10th can still play an important role in
securing Basrah, provided it receives the additional forces and
they are recruited from outside Basrah. MG Habib may also
require a little encouragement from the GoI.


6. (S) Despite the 10th ID's reluctance to take on JAM, we
believe it is best positioned to occupy and secure the Palace in
the immediate future. In less than two months, the REO will
turn over its security responsibilities to the British Army, who
in turn, seek to turn the Palace over to the Iraqis in early
August. We should urge the GoI to station the 10th ID at the
Palace, at least for the near term. This will enable us to hand
over the Palace to an established, fairly reliable entity that
is present in Basrah and would provide the "fledgling army" with
much needed accommodation and furnishings. It would also allow
the GoI time to raise and train a presidential palace battalion.
Otherwise, if the GoI insists on its own plan and continues to
drag its feet, the British could find themselves at the Palace
well beyond their end of summer deadline.
BONO