Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BASRAH38
2007-05-08 07:14:00
SECRET
REO Basrah
Cable title:  

BASRAH GOVERNOR REMAINS IF OFFICE, FOR NOW

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM IZ IR 
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VZCZCXRO8336
RR RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHBC #0038/01 1280714
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 080714Z MAY 07
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0123
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0535
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0562
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000038 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/8/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM IZ IR
SUBJECT: BASRAH GOVERNOR REMAINS IF OFFICE, FOR NOW

REF: (A) 06 BASRAH 58 (B) BASRAH 25 (C) BASRAH 60

BASRAH 00000038 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Louis L. Bono, Director, Basrah Regional Embassy
Office, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000038

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/8/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM IZ IR
SUBJECT: BASRAH GOVERNOR REMAINS IF OFFICE, FOR NOW

REF: (A) 06 BASRAH 58 (B) BASRAH 25 (C) BASRAH 60

BASRAH 00000038 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Louis L. Bono, Director, Basrah Regional Embassy
Office, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION


1. (C) The latest attempt to oust Basrah Governor Mohammed
al-Wa'eli appears to be over, at least for now. The three
leading opponents, provincial council members Hassan al-Rashid
(Badr) and Sayid Yousuf (Thar Allah) and Defense Ministry
advisor Majid al-Sari, visited the Regional Embassy Office (REO)
on Friday, May 4, and the Governor visited the following day.
Both the Governor and the opposition leaders indicated their
willingness to sit down together, and we understand one or more
representatives from the GoI will help facilitate the talks.
Despite varying reports of threats and intimidation, both sides
exercised remarkable restraint during the process given their
personal enmities toward each other. Nevertheless, we are not
out of the woods yet, and we are encouraging both sides to find
a peaceful solution. End summary.

THE CASE AGAINST THE GOVERNOR


2. (C) Al-Rashid said there were about 15 charges against the
Governor. While he could not remember them all, he said the
principle charges were failure to provide security and services,
corruption, and misuse of public funds. He said for one year,
the Governor did not attend provincial council meetings and
frequently traveled abroad without providing an accounting for
his trips. During our meeting the following day, Wa'eli
dismissed the charges as senseless. He said Basrah provides
"the best services in Iraq" for fuel and electricity, and said
some of the others made no sense, such as his support for the
MND-SE operation to disband the Basrah Police serious crimes
unit and his continued engagement with MND-SE, even after the
Prime Minister had ordered disengagement. (Note: The Prime
Minister ordered disengagement from MND-SE after British forces
raided the Basrah National Iraqi Intelligence Agency office on
March 4. End note.) The Governor said he was also charged with

supporting the detention by MND-SE of certain individuals,
defaming religious figures, and his brother's belligerence
towards the police chief.

THE GOVERNOR SURVIVES AGAIN, BUT BARELY


3. (C) Al-Sari organized the May 4 meeting as a last-ditch
effort to enlist Coalition support for their waning cause.
Al-Sari, al-Rashid, and Yousuf led an unsuccessful attempt last
year to depose Wa'eli, and came very close in this latest
attempt. (See ref. A.) Al-Rashid, the well-regarded provincial
council member and former governor, said 27 members exercised a
vote of no confidence in the Governor and contended that this
vote complied with the two-thirds majority requirement for the
Governor's removal. When the REO director pointed out that
two-thirds of 41 is 28 not 27, al-Rashid replied that the
Governor and his deputy are non-voting members and thus do not
count. The director noted that this may very well be a matter
for the courts but opined that 27 votes will probably not
suffice without such a ruling.


4. (C) Yousuf and al-Rashid said the Iranian Consul General
offered to arrange a meeting between the parties, but they
declined his offer. Al-Rashid told the Iranian that if anything
went wrong, Fadhila would blame Iran. Both underscored the need
for the situation to be resolved without outside interference
and expressed appreciation for the Coalition's decision to
refrain from involvement. Nonetheless, the less-polished Yousuf
made a veiled attempt to enlist the REO's support. He and
al-Rashid said that if Wa'eli stepped down, they would agree to
replace him with another Fadhila candidate.


5. (C) During his visit, Wa'eli declared that the coup had
failed, and he was back at work. He said Council of
Representatives speaker Mahmoud Masheddani declared the vote of
no confidence could not be used to remove Wa'eli from office.
Wa'eli said his opponents were backed by Iran, which is seeking
influence in Basrah's oil and gas resources. Wa'eli said the
opposition was only able to muster 27 votes by threatening
non-Basrah Islamic List (SCIRI, Badr, Thar Allah) provincial
council members and their families. Wa'eli said Yousuf
personally threatened the Council Chairman Mohammad al-Obadi,
who reportedly fled Iraq after the vote.


6. (C) Wa'eli, robust in appearance and persona, acknowledged
that the last few weeks had been difficult for him. The
director noted that by remaining in Basrah against the advice of
the British, Wa'eli had persevered through the crisis, a victor
of sorts. However, given that this was not the first attempt to

BASRAH 00000038 002.2 OF 002


oust him, and would likely not be the last, the director asked
if Wa'eli was considering resigning. Wa'eli said despite rumors
to the contrary, he had no plans to resign, and that he has the
full backing of the Fadhila party. He said even if the
opposition agreed to replace him with a Fadhila member, there is
no way to guarantee the Council would abide by the agreement.
Wa'eli was scheduled to speak at the Iraq Reconstruction
Conference in Amman on May 8 but told us he would not be
attending.

PEACE FOR NOW


7. (C) In both meetings, the director highlighted the absence of
violence and said the right to conduct peaceful protests is an
important component of democratic government. He noted that
Yousuf, the organizer of the protests, previously said if the
Governor would not resign, he could be assassinated. (See ref
B.) The director lauded Yousuf, not known for his congeniality,
for exercising restraint and preventing violence from breaking
out. He said Basrah needs serious leaders, and both he and
al-Rashid had emerged from this crisis as leaders for their role
in keeping the peace. The director told the Governor that this
was a positive sign and urged the Governor to reconcile with his
opponents. The director noted that the crisis began when he
removed an OMS member from his position in the Power
Administration and replaced him with a Fadhila member. The
director said while the Governor has the authority to fill
positions, he should consider an equitable distribution of
public sector jobs.


8. (C) Both parties agreed to open a dialogue. Al-Rashid said
he would sit down with the Governor as long as all political
parties had equal representation and there were no red lines for
the talks. He said the central government was going to send a
representative to moderate the discussion, but noted that if the
talks fail, he could muster 29 votes against the Governor. The
Governor confirmed that the Prime Minister was sending a
delegation within the next two weeks to mediate between the
parties, but said he would not sit at the table with anyone who
"broke the law." The director urged both parties to negotiate
in good faith and said the REO and Coalition were prepared to
help facilitate talks if called upon.

COMMENT


9. (S) We are still not sure whether this game of chicken is
over. Negotiation seems to be the exception, not the norm, to
resolving political disputes in Basrah, and Yousuf and al-Rashid
are sworn enemies of Wa'eli. At stake here is not just the
governorship but control of the lucrative oil industry.
Speculation continues that Fadhila fears losing its only
political bastion and its share of oil profits, and it may yet
urge Wa'eli to resign. This begs the question whether Wa'eli
needs Fadhila more than Fadhila needs Wa'eli. Wa'eli's ego and
reputation, not to mention his pocketbook, would suffer were he
to walk away empty handed. Last year, Wa'eli told the REO that
he was offered an appointment in a government ministry during
the effort to unseat him, but he turned it down. (See ref. C.)
If the Prime Minister really wants to remove him, it would
probably take a high-profile position to pry him away.
Meanwhile, if Wa'eli goes, Hassan al-Rashid seems to be the
candidate of choice, despite his close ties to Iran.
BONO