IRAQI ARMY OPENS TALKS ON FUTURE OF BASRAH PALACE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000035

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/30/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MOPS IZ IR
SUBJECT: IRAQI ARMY OPENS TALKS ON FUTURE OF BASRAH PALACE

REF: (A) BASRAH 31, (B) BAGHDAD 1451, (C) BASRAH 17

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CLASSIFIED BY: Louis Bono, Director, Basrah Regional Embassy
Office, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(d)




1. (C) Summary. The commander of the Iraqi Army's (IA) 10th
division in charge of southern Iraq, Major General Habib Abbas
al-Husseini, met with the Basrah Regional Embassy Office (REO)
director on April 25. The two discussed efforts to stabilize
the province and prospects for the IA taking control of the
Basrah Palace Compound after the REO relocates to the Basrah Air
Station. General Habib expressed interest in garrisoning troops
in Palace Compound and declared that he is committed to
aggressively countering the militias, despite being understaffed
and inadequately equipped. The REO considers the IA 10th
division, under General Habib's command, to be the best hope for
stability in Basrah and recommends steps to support the
division. End summary.

REO, IA LAY TENTATIVE PLANS TO TRANSFER BASRAH COMPOUND


2. (C) General Habib said the housing trailers, equipped with
furniture, plumbing, showers, televisions and air conditioning,
would be welcomed by his troops, many of whom now sleep on bare
floors. But he said that at his current force level, he does
not have enough troops to occupy the Palace Compound while
continuing to man other installations in Basrah that the British
forces recently turned over to him. General Habib said that he
has 2,000 troops under his command in Basrah province and has
requested troop transfers from the IA 8th division. He said he
needs 5,000 troops to stabilize the province.


3. (C) The REO director and the general discussed a
two-pronged approach to secure the Palace: First the general
will to continue to press the Ministry of Defense for additional
troops to occupy the Compound. If this is not possible, the
general will relocate his troops from the Old State Building and
the Shatt al-Arab Hotel to the Basrah Palace Compound. (Note:
The Old State Building could go to the Provincial Council and
the hotel, to the Tourist Board. End note.) General Habib and
the REO director agreed to meet again in the near future to
discuss details of the proposed handover.

10TH DIVISION SHOWS PROMISE IN HANDLING DEMONSTRATIONS


4. (C) Regarding the security situation in Basrah, the general
said he has deployed his forces at the oil fields, ports,
government buildings, main traffic intersections and other key
points in Basrah Province. To maintain order during
demonstrations April 16-17 aimed at toppling Governor Mohammed
al-Wa'eli (ref A),the general said he had imposed a ban on
weapons in the streets. He added that the Iraqi Police Service
(IPS) in Basrah were useless during the demonstrations and that
the 10th Division had been forced to take over IPS duties as a
result. General Habib declared that his units have stepped up
raids on militia leaders and warned that his actions may provoke
heavier militia rocket and mortar fire at the Palace Compound.
The director praised him for offering promotions to troops who
capture or kill militia fighters caught in the act of launching
rockets and mortars. [In contrast to Basrah, other units of the
IA 10th Division stationed in neighboring Muthanna Province have
performed poorly. (Ref B)] The general informed the director
that his forces are hampered by lack of telecommunications
equipment and must rely on commercial cell phones to coordinate
their operations. Unlike other IA units that operate in
American sectors, he said, the 10th division receives little
material support from the Coalition. When asked what he needs,
he requested radios, uniforms and Humvees.

GENERAL HABIB SOLICITS SUPPORT FROM TRIBAL LEADERS


5. (C) General Habib reported that he has had an initial
meeting with tribal leaders to request their support for the
IA's effort to stabilize Basrah. In the general's assessment,
the sheikhs made some positive suggestions but no firm
commitments. (Note: On February 21, REO, British Consulate and
British military officials met with 25 tribal leaders to urge
them to mobilize their members to stabilize Basrah. On that
occasion, the majority of the sheikhs pointed the finger of
responsibility for Basrah security at the Coalition Forces. (See
ref C.) End note.)


6. (C) Comment: The REO and the British forces within MND-SE
see General Habib as the best hope for stability in Basrah and
the IA as the only reliable element of the central government
capable of maintaining the Palace. Under General Habib's
command, the IA is demonstrating a growing capacity to maintain
security as Basrah moves toward Provincial Iraqi Control. In

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the REO's assessment, all logistical support should be given to
the 10th Division, including the provision of radios, uniforms
or vehicles as requested by General Habib. This would go a long
way towards building relations between the soldiers of the 10th
and the USG. On the issue of tribal involvement in security
efforts, the REO believes it would be useful to bring together
U.S. military officers from Anbar and British officers to
discuss the role tribal leaders have played in securing Anbar
province. End comment.


7. (C) British Brigade intelligence assessment of General
Habib:

"Habib appears to be a competent commander of the 10th Division
in comparison to his predecessor Latif. He is keen to establish
a security plan with MNF but believes that to achieve the
desired effect he will require the use of soldiers from outside
the province, as those local to Basrah could be subjected to
intimidation from the militia. It is believed that Habib has no
real respect for Ali Hammadi in his role as head of the
Emergency Security Committee and regards Mohammed Hammadi as
incompetent. Habib also has aired his frustrations over the
lack of progress in the Iraqi Police Service, probably due to
the level of corruption and lack of effectiveness.

"General Habib is two months in post. He is a 'high' Shia and
commands a great deal of respect from the tribal leaders and
from his officers. By his no nonsense approach and his
insistence on high standards, he has already had a significant
impact on the Division. Knowledgeable, experienced and
professional, he is determined to confront all forms of crime
and insurgency across his divisional area of operations and --
within the bounds of Arab culture -- appears to be free of
corruption. His only stated interest is to raise the capability
of the 10th Division of maintain security in Basrah and more
widely across the area of operations, and while he has yet to
demonstrate effect on the ground, he appears to be the best
thing to have happened to the 10th Division in the last three
years."
End comment.


8. (C) General Habib's Biographical Information

Full name: Habib Talib Abbas Musa al-Husseini
Date of birth: 1 July 1958, Babil Province (Abu Gharaq area)
Enlistment date: 12 November 1977
Commissioning date: 6 January 1980, Military College as a
Lieutenant

Appointments

Platoon Commander
Company Commander
Commander of Corps Reconnaissance Regiment
Instructor in the Military College
Staff Office in Brigade HQ
Staff Officer in Division HQ
Staff Office in Corps HQ
Brigade Commander
Deputy Divisional Commander, 8th Division

Units

1st Mechanized Division
Staff College
4th Infantry Brigade, 2nd Division
425th Infantry Brigade, 22nd Infantry Division
HQ 22nd Infantry Division
HQ 17th Armored Division
HQ 28th Infantry Division
HQ Reconnaissance Regiment, 5th Corps
HQ 3rd Corps

Personal

Lives in Nasariya
Married with four children
BONO