REO BASRAH EAC MEETING HELD ON 04/14/2007

S E C R E T BASRAH 000030

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DS/DSS, DS/IP/NEA, NEA/EX, NEA/I

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/16/2017
TAGS: ASEC PTER AMGT IZ
SUBJECT: REO BASRAH EAC MEETING HELD ON 04/14/2007

REF: A) BASRAH 026, B) BASRAH 023

CLASSIFIED BY: Louis L. Bono, Director, Basrah Regional Embassy
Office, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)


1. (S) Summary and Introduction: The Regional Director chaired a
meeting of the expanded Emergency Action Committee (EAC) on
April 14, 2007 to discuss the continuing incidents of indirect
fire (IDF),including the attack of April 13, in which four
housing trailers were damaged, and three personnel narrowly
avoided serious injury. Attending the meeting were the Acting
Regional Security Officer, Management Officer, Information
Management Officer, Public Affairs Officer, Acting ORA Chief,
and representatives from the Strategic Counter-Intelligence
Directorate (SCID),KBR, and Triple Canopy. The Committee
resolved to continue the course of action decided upon at the
last EAC meeting (April 10. See ref. A). It was agreed that more
could be done at all levels to expedite the move to the Basrah
Air Station (BAS),and that more should be done to protect the
personnel at the Basrah Palace compound while preparations for
the move are underway. To limit the likelihood of casualties at
the Palace compound, the Committee agreed that the REO needs to
press for a better offense, while at the same time, improving
our defense. End summary.

2. (S) The EAC members agreed on the need to "weather the storm"
in order to effectuate an "organized and timely move" as first
put forth in ref. A. The RSO and Director explained that in
order to do so, we need to further minimize the exposure of
personnel to IDF. The RSO explained that the practice of
overstaying the prescribed time limits spent in the trailers,
the wearing of only ballistic plate-carriers (smaller, lighter
vests),and unfastened helmets is insufficient protection
against the more frequent and accurate IDF that we have been
receiving. He therefore announced that more stringent controls
would be put into place. Personnel will be permitted to spend up
to three, one-half hour blocks in their trailers, but must sign
in and out. (The previous policy was up to one hour at a time in
trailers.) Personnel will also be required to properly wear
their full PPE whenever outside of hardened cover. The Director
and RSO explained that a "zero tolerance" policy would be in
effect for those who choose to disregard these personal
protective measures. To alleviate some of the stress, we are
working to install satellite television in all of the hardened
buildings and are acquiring individual hardened accommodations
on the FCO compound, which we will be made available to REO
personnel.

3. (S) The Committee also expressed frustration over the delay
in the relocation process. We appreciate the extensive attention
and assistance we have received from the Department and Embassy
Baghdad, particularly the Management Office. We are aware that
there were obstacles in commencing construction of the overhead
cover project (OHP) at the Parsons camp and were told it would
commence on April 15. However, construction has been delayed
pending a notice to proceed to the contractor. We are living on
borrowed time, and each day this move is delayed, the risk of
death or serious harm to REO personnel increases. We therefore
request that the process for the OHP and funding for the
relocation project be approved with all due speed. The latter
will enable KBR to commence the modifications to the Parsons
camp necessary to accommodate the REO, notably life support
facilities, and begin transferring equipment to the Air Station.

4. (S/NF) We also note the increase in counter-IDF activity by
MND(SE)and appreciate Embassy Baghdad's support in acquiring
additional resources for this purpose. (See ref B.)
Nevertheless, with the closing of three other British bases in
Basrah, attacks on the Palace compound are not subsiding. This
creates the perception that no efforts are being made to counter
the attacks, and severely impacts upon morale. We are consulting
with MND(SE) to see if additional assets, such as close-air fire
support, would assist in curtailing IDF attacks. If so, we would
appreciate Embassy Baghdad's support in securing these assets
during the transition process.

5. (S) The Director held a "town hall" meeting for all personnel
on April 14. The Director, RSO and Management Officer discussed
the situation. As in the past, the Director emphasized that, for
all personnel, their continued presence at the REO is voluntary.
The RSO reiterated that every person at the REO should be made
aware that if the level of IDF attacks continues, it is probable
that casualties, including deaths could occur. Personnel
expressed concerns about the additional restrictions and the
Director and RSO advised they would revisit the situation later
this week.

BONO