SECURING BASRAH

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000002

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/2/2017
TAGS: MOPS PGOV PREL PINS PHUM
SUBJECT: SECURING BASRAH

CLASSIFIED BY: Louis L. Bono, Director, REO Basrah, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(d)



1.(S) Summary: MND (SE) commanders are increasingly frustrated
by the ineptitude of local security officials. Iraqi support for
a recent joint operation to disband a rogue police force never
materialized, and local officials are now disavowing the
operation. MND (SE) has asked MNC-I to prompt the GoI to declare
its support for the operation and to consider replacing the
Basrah Chief of Police. Many senior security officials have
links to rogue militias and remain fearful of them. We also
should urge the GoI to cut out this cancer and install
individuals who will not be intimidated. If the GoI does not
intervene, the security situation in Basrah is likely to further
destabilize. End summary.
2.(C) In the early morning hours of December 25, British forces
conducted a raid on the Jameat building, home of the notorious
Basrah police Serious Crimes Unit (SCU). The SCU was ridden with
Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM) and other anti-coalition militia members
who exploited their power, using the SCU as a platform for death
squads and crime syndicates. The objective of the raid was to
disband the SCU and destroy the Jameat, which was previously
used as a torture chamber by Saddam Hussein's secret police.
3.(C) The raid, codenamed Operation Thyme, was approved by Prime
Minister Maliki and reinforced by Interior Minister Boulani. It
was to be a joint operation with units of the Iraqi Army 10th
Infantry Division and Iraqi military police. However, the 10th
ID units never appeared. They were ordered to stand down by
Basrah Emergency Security Committee (ESC) member (and acting
Chairman) Ali Ibrahim, who reportedly feared retribution.
Ironically, Ibrahim originally told the British commander he
wanted to detonate the charges on the building.
4.(C) No SCU members were captured as most received advance
notice of the raid. British forces recovered dozens of SCU
prisoners being held at the Jameat and took video images to
substantiate the torture allegations, before turning the
prisoners over to Iraqi police. We are told MND (SE) may provide
the footage to various news outlets.
5.(S) Local security officials continue to complicate matters.
Ibrahim denied ESC ever approved Operation Thyme and has ordered
Iraqi security forces to disengage from coalition forces. While
the Army continues to cooperate with the British, Chief of
Police Brigadier General Hamadi has implemented Ibrahim's order.
Hamadi, who reportedly is fearful of JAM, has agreed to
reinstate some members of the SCU once a new crime unit is
established. Further Hamadi has reportedly allowed SCU members
access to the Jameat prisoners, but denied Interior Ministry
officials access. Meanwhile, Hamadi's brother, who is the ESC
security chief, has been conveniently away on Haj.
6.(S) Despite widespread public support for Operation Thyme,
several members of the Basrah Provincial Council (BPC) are
advocating for official disengagement with MND (SE). Many
privately support the raid but fear retribution from SCU
members. Others seek restitution for the destruction of public
property. The Governor, who is no beacon of virtue, has remained
absent from the mix. Reportedly, he is furious with MND (SE)
after "wanted" flyers of his brother and a bodyguard were
issued. He has reportedly gone to Damascus for a few days to
cool his heels.
7.(S) MND (SE) Commander MG Shirreff wrote LTG Odierno on
January 1 and asked him to intervene with the GoI. "Ideally" he
wrote, "we would like Minister Boulani to take up the baton
against the SCU and make it clear to his subordinates,
especially the [Chief of Police], that the old SCU is disbanded
in accordance with the PM's direction." He continued "we now
need the Iraqis to have the courage to fulfill their part of the
bargain in preventing the SCU from resurfacing." He suggested
Minister Boulani consider replacing BG Hamadi. Expressing his
frustration, MG Shirreff continued "if the Iraqis do not back up
their stated intent to close the SCU, then we will have no
alternative but to step back and let them face the consequences."
8.(S) We concur that the GoI must intervene in this situation.
Local security officials are unwilling to discharge their
responsibilities because of links to and fear of JAM and other
rogue militia elements. Further, neither the Governor nor the
BPC have the capability or political will to stand up to the
militias. The ESC was established by the Prime Minister in June
2006 to address this very power vacuum. However, its members too
have been largely ineffective. It is time for the GoI to
recognize this fact and replace the current ESC with individuals
who will not succumb to threats or intimidation. We urge you to
impress this point on GoI officials.
9.(S) In addition to political action, we need to maintain
operational momentum. British commanders, buoyed the recent
successes of Operations Thyme and Phoenix, and the apprehension
of JAM leader Sayed Naji, are anxious to continue the fight and
have requested SIGINT and Special Forces support. One local UK
commander noted they had been trying to capture Naji for months
in Basrah, and SAS was able to do it in hours, while Naji was in
Baghdad. We should encourage and facilitate MND (SE) efforts to

BASRAH 00000002 002 OF 002


neutralize those who terrorize the city and attack coalition
members. (Note: Operation Phoenix involved the detection and
capture of several insurgents who fired on a coalition base.
British forces also recovered caches of weapons, body armor, SCU
ID cards, maps of coalition bases and firing coordinates. End
note.)
10.(S) We are now at a crossroads. The SCU represented an
omnipresent threat to the citizens of Basrah, and its
disbandment was an important step toward our goal of
stabilization. However, if the GoI does not commit to its end of
the bargain, we should expect the situation to deteriorate.
BONO