SECURITY - COALITION URGES TRIBAL ENGAGEMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000017

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/28/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ IR UK KCOR
SUBJECT: SECURITY - COALITION URGES TRIBAL ENGAGEMENT

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CLASSIFIED BY: Louis L. Bono, Director, REO Basrah, Department
of State.
REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(d)




1. (C) Summary. U.S. and British diplomats and the commander of
British forces in southern Iraq met on February 21 with 25
sheikhs from the Basrah Tribal Council to encourage them their
role in the security process. The sheikhs and the Coalition
exhorted each other to take the lead in fighting the militias,
offering to support the other. The discussions ended in vague
agreements to form tribal and community councils to deal with
the issue. End Summary.

2007 A DECISIVE YEAR FOR BASRAH


2. (C) The British Consul General (CG) Rosalind Marsden said
2007 is going to be a decisive year for Basrah, with the
transfer of security responsibility from British to Provincial
Iraqi Control (PIC),the reduction of British forces in southern
Iraq, and provincial council elections. The CG declared now
that Iraq has a sovereign government, Iraqis must increasingly
shoulder the burden to "contain criminals and neutralize
radicals." She added that the Coalition would continue to offer
support, even after PIC. She encouraged the sheikhs, who
command public respect but have been marginalized by the
political parties, to support honest, qualified and capable
candidates in the coming elections and to hold accountable the
local government, which is seen as corrupt in the eyes of the
Basrah public.

SHEIKHS SAY BASRAH POLICE SERVE CORRUPT PARTIES

3. (C) The sheikhs, to a man, said that turning security over to
the Basrah government would lead to chaos. The Council leader,
Sheikh Muzahem al-Kanaan said PIC would remove all restraints on
the political parties and their militias. Muzahem, who was
governor of Basrah under the Coalition Provisional Authority,
said corruption played a major role in the formation of the
militias. He said many were formed as money collection agencies
and were subsequently harnessed by the political parties during
the election campaigns. With other sheikhs nodding and
muttering in agreement, Muzahem said the Coalition cannot
abdicate its security responsibilities, because it destroyed the
old security forces and rebuilt new ones on "a wrong
foundation."


4. (C) The British commander, Major General Jonathan Shaw, told
the sheikhs that Basrah is no different from Muthanna and Dhi
Qar provinces, which are functioning under PIC. He added that
the tribal leaders must learn to operate within the new
democratic framework. He commented that the Coalition forces
lack the understanding needed to stabilize Basrah. "I want to
give power to you, because you understand your own people. If
you have a plan, I will support your plan," he said. Muzahem
took issue with Major General Shaw's assertion that Basrah is no
different from the other provinces that have implemented PIC.
He said the fight for control for Basrah is fiercer because of
the great wealth of the province, and because there is no
dominant tribe to impose order in the divided society. He added
that Iranian influence in Basrah is unavoidable because of
numerous family ties to the Arabs of western Iran, resulting in
large-scale movement across the border.

5. (C) The REO director said that PIC is inevitable for Basrah
and that ways to work with the unsavory Provincial Council need
to be found. Explaining that the power of the Council as a
whole is greater than the sum its individual sheikhs, he urged
them to band together to influence the process. On security, he
posed two probing questions: (1) if the police could be purged
of corrupt and violent elements, how do we deal with thousands
of armed and jobless men suddenly turned loose on the streets;
and (2) if the right people could be found for the senior
security jobs, would they be able to control the rogue elements
in the forces?

SHEIKHS WILLING TO ENGAGE


6. (C) Muzahem suggested three ways that the tribal leaders
could help confront the militias: (1) identify an apolitical
candidate for chief of police and give him a trial period; (2)
strengthen ties with the Iraqi Army, which, Muzahem said, has a
higher sense of patriotism and discipline than the police; and
(3) form a council consisting of sheikhs, civic leaders, and
clerics to advise the Coalition on militia issues. The REO
director welcomed the idea and said he was willing organize such
a meeting. "The REO will support you in this process" he said,
but reiterated "you must take the lead."


7. (C) Comment. The tribal leaders and the Coalition agree on
the need to cleanse the security forces of destabilizing

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elements, but both believe the other should take the lead. We
will continue to impress upon the sheikhs, clerics, and others
the efficacy of their role in stabilizing Basrah. End comment.
BONO