S/I SATTERFIELD HELPS BASRAH GOVERNOR AND PRIME MINISTER

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000114

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/3/2017
TAGS: ECON PTER PGOV PREL MARR MOPS IR IZ
SUBJECT: S/I SATTERFIELD HELPS BASRAH GOVERNOR AND PRIME MINISTER
IMPROVE RELATIONS

REF: A. A. BASRAH 113

B. B. BASRAH 110

C. C. BASRAH 93

D. D. BASRAH 96

E. E. BASRAH 97

F. F. BASRAH 98

G. G. BASRAH 88

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CLASSIFIED BY: Hal Howard, A/Director, Regional Embassy Office -
Basrah, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(d)




1. (S/Rel MCFI) SUMMARY: Senior Advisor to the Secretary and
Coordinator for Iraq (S/I),Ambassador David Satterfield,
encouraged Basrah Governor Mohammed Wa'eli to contact and work
through Iraqi National Security Advisor (NSA) Muwafaq al-Rubaie
as an intermediary to improve the Governor's relations with
Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki in advance of planned December 16
Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) taking place, during a November
25 visit to Regional Embassy Office (REO)- Basrah. Wa'eli
agreed (and subsequently traveled to Baghdad for ongoing
discussions with Rubaie and the PM). Satterfield also discussed
a range of issues with other key Basrawis including
reconciliation among local political parties, security in the
province, the economy, and Iranian influence. END SUMMARY.


2. (C/Rel MCFI) In advance of a visit by Deputy Secretary John
Negroponte to REO Basrah on November 25, S/I David Satterfield
met with a range of key Basrawis (each in a separate meeting) to
discuss general conditions in the province. The participants
included Basrah Governor Mohammed Wa'eli, Basrah Operations
Commander Lieutenant General Mohan Hafith Fahad, Police Chief
Major General Jalil Khalaf Shueil, and Sheikhs Amr al-Fais,
Mansour al-Tamimi, and Sayid Abd al-Mousawi.

BRINGING WA'ELI AND MALIKI CLOSER


3. (S/Rel MCFI) S/I Satterfield told Governor Wa'eli that with
the Higher Juridical Council's ruling in Wa'eli's favor and the
Governor's status finally settled, all parties needed to respect
the decision and it was now inappropriate for the GOI to exclude
Wa'eli from the Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) process planned
to take place December 16 (Refs A-C). Satterfield informed
Wa'eli that, as a result of a November 25 USG-UK-GOI dialogue,
PM Maliki authorized NSA Rubaie to speak with the Governor as an
intermediary. Satterfield encouraged Wa'eli to seize this
opportunity to improve relations with Baghdad and quickly
contact Rubaie. Wa'eli agreed; he subsequently traveled to
Baghdad for discussions with Rubaie and the PM.


4. (S/Rel MCFI) LTG Mohan told Satterfield that he was ordered
by Maliki not to turn over the security portfolio to Wa'eli at
the PIC ceremony because the Emergency Law placed all Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF) under Mohan's control (Ref D). (Note:
According to Embassy Baghdad Legal Advisor, Mohan's authority
under the Emergency Law may have expired. End Note).
Satterfield said that may be true for security, but stressed it
was not useful for the GOI to continue ignoring the Governor's
political and administrative responsibilities, especially after
the court settled the matter. Mohan agreed that his work would
be easier if Wa'eli and Maliki resolved their differences.
Unfortunately, he opined that Maliki would find it difficult to
step back from previous statements deposing the Governor.
Satterfield responded that we would continue to bring the two
parties together.

LOCAL PARTY RECONCILIATION


5. (C/Rel MCFI) S/I Satterfield asked the Governor about
reconciliation among Basrah's political parties. Wa'eli
responded that his Fadhila party was working with the opposition
Basrah Islamic List (BIL) to identify a democratic path towards
a power-sharing arrangement (Refs B & E). He also noted that
the Sadrists made a positive declaration to support the ISF,
punish criminals in their ranks, and obey the law. He lamented
that if the leaders of the BIL parties in Baghdad stopped
interfering, the local parties would get along much better. For
his part, Wa'eli said he is ready to do development projects
with all the parties to make Basrah better.

SECURITY IN BASRAH PROVINCE


6. (S/NF) Interlocutors expressed deep concern for Basrah's
security and according to Mohan, the province was not ready for

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PIC. Each participant noted that the Iraqi Army (IA) was mildly
better than the Iraqi Police (IP),but neither was capable of
facing down the militias (Refs F & G). The police were still
beholden to the political parties, infiltrated by militias, and
responsible for committing crimes. Police Chief Jalil
emphasized this by stating that the army, not the police, needed
to impose the rule of law. That said, Wa'eli noted that
Basrah's sole IA division was not sufficient.


7. (S/Rel MCFI) Mohan claimed some progress has been made in
reforming the ISF by transferring the worst units out of the
province, restructuring his command to limit party influence,
and noted the increases in ISF activities and arrests. However,
there was still a long way to go, he surmised. He and Jalil
described their intentions to continue reforming the ISF by
transferring and purging, step-by-step the malign elements from
their forces. Both lamented the lack of support they were
receiving from the GOI to improve their forces. Mohan mostly
blamed the Interior Ministry for either ignoring their requests
or being too slow to respond. Satterfield said he would
communicate their requests to MNF-I.

ECONOMY


8. (C/Rel MCFI) Wa'eli stressed the economic and geo-strategic
importance of Basrah given its oil resources, Iraq's only port
facilities, and shared border with Iran. Basrah's resources
could greatly assist Iraq's economic development, but were not
sufficiently leveraged due to the weak security environment.
Wa'eli said he wanted to pursue Basrah's economic and security
improvements on parallel tracks starting in the safer areas
close to the Gulf.


9. (SBU) As one of Basrah's leading businessmen (and a respected
Shi'a cleric),Mousawi told Satterfield that the economy was in
chaos. Some were benefiting from new developments, but
unemployment remained high, temporary jobs failed to provide
long-term security, the Ministry of Planning was weak, incomes
were unpredictable, and the security situation discouraged
economic development and foreign investment. Both Mousawi and
Wa'eli suggested passing the investment law as a step forward,
but Mousawi said security needed to improve first. (Note: the
Basrah Development Forum is scheduled for December 12 at Basrah
Airport. End Note.)

IRAN


10. (S/Rel MCFI) Every interlocutor complained of Iran's
negative influence. Jalil said Iran uses various means, each
like an octopus tentacle, to slowly gain control of Iraq.
Politically, Mohan claimed that 90 percent of Basrah's parties
are under Iranian influence, notably Badr/Islamic Supreme
Council of Iraq (who he called the "sons of Iran"),Hizbollah
Movement, Thar Allah, Sayyid al-Shuhada, and to some extent
Dawa. Wa'eli pointed out that Iran pressures these parties to
integrate their militias into the ISF so that the IRGC can
control them.


11. (S/Rel MCFI) On the intelligence front, Wa'eli and Mohan
said that Basrah's Iranian Consul, Mohammed Rida Baghaban, is an
IRGC-QF intelligence officer; Mohan called Baghaban the "real
decision-maker in Basrah." Not only is the Iranian consulate an
intelligence headquarters, there are several branches throughout
the province. Mohan, Wa'eli and Jalil all claimed that
Iranian-supported secret cells were targeting them for
assassination, and in Wa'eli's case the Iranian-backed parties
were behind the efforts to oust him. Each interlocutor expressed
concern over Iranian training, financial, and logistical support
for some militias.


12. (S/Rel MCFI) Tamimi also noted the extraordinary amount of
Iranian investment in Basrah. Culturally, he said that Iran
used Shaheed al-Mihrab in Amarah and Sayyid al-Shuhada in Basrah
to spread the Iranian revolution's ideology through exhibits,
conferences, book publishing, educational programs, teacher
exchanges, and funding clerical salaries. Basrawis were
divided: a majority opposed Iran, but were silent due to
intimidation; a small minority who once lived in Iran were
already indoctrinated; and the remainder were the parties and
militias beholden to Tehran. Iran opens its borders to Iraq,
while the other neighbors are shutting them. If this continues
and the Coalition does nothing, Tamimi opined we would loose
that silent majority.


13. (U) S/I Satterfield cleared this cable.
HOWARD