SOUTHERN TRIBAL ENGAGEMENT REQUIRES MORE COORDINATION AND

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000107

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2017
TAGS: MOPS PBTS PGOV PINR PINS PREL PTER IR IZ
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN TRIBAL ENGAGEMENT REQUIRES MORE COORDINATION AND
RESOURCES

REF: A. BASRAH 17 B. BASRAH 73 C. BASRAH 78 D. BASRAH 103

BASRAH 00000107 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Louis L. Bono, Director, Regional Embassy Office
- Basrah, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(c),(d)



CLASSIFIED BY: Louis L. Bono, Director, Regional Embassy Office
- Basrah, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(c),(d)



1. (S/NF) Summary & Comment: Southern Iraq's security situation
remains fragile: Iranian lethal aid is pouring in, militias
continue to act outside the law, and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
remain incapable of establishing law and order. Inspired by the
successes of Anbar, southern tribal leaders are seeking to work
with the Coalition to promote stability. While tribal
engagement is not the sole solution to stabilizing southern
Iraq, it is a component - as is reconciliation - of our overall
strategy. However, it will fail or gain little ground unless we
seize the existing momentum, increase interagency coordination,
and dedicate additional resources. End Summary.

SOUTHERN TRIBES EAGER TO ENGAGE
--------------


2. (C) Over the last several months, a number of tribal sheikhs
from Basrah, Maysan and Dhi Qar have sought meetings with
Regional Embassy Office (REO) officials to express their desire
for greater cooperation to address security problems (refs.
A-D). They complain about the rise of the militias, ISF's
inability to confront militia activities, increase in crime and
violence, growing Iranian influence and lethal aid smuggling,
and high unemployment in their areas. They note that
unemployment is the primary driver for their young tribesmen to
join the militias. Sheikhs are eager to play a positive role by
emulating Anbar's success and some have already formed tribal
councils for that purpose.

COALITION EFFORTS THUS FAR
--------------


3. (S/NF) MND(SE) engages with tribal leaders primarily for
information, but does not seem predisposed to engagement. U.S.
Special Forces (CJSOTF) is developing a strategy to form Tribal
Security Forces (TSF). CJSOTF proposes to train tribal members
and employ them to protect their tribal area from militias and
report lethal aid smuggling. CJSOTF would provide $500/month
for four months to each member. CJSOTF intends to start small -
recruit approximately 250 members from one tribe - and expand
the program if successful. REO Basrah has helped to identify
key sheikhs and broker introductory meetings.

HURDLES: IRAQI POLITICS, COORDINATION & SUSTAINABILITY
-------------- --------------


4. (C) The GOI and ISF commanders have expressed concerns of
tribal militias falling outside of their control. Additionally,
provincial governors and councils may view a tribal power as a
potential threat to their influence and militias. This is
particularly true in Maysan where the governor and council have
strong ties to the Jaysh al-Mahdi. Iran will also view this
strategy as a threat to their Iraqi operations and may increase
hostilities with the tribes. (Note: PRT Maysan believes that
even the appearance of supporting the tribes will deal a serious
blow to their efforts of engaging the elected provincial
authorities but also believe that employment-generating
activities are useful. End Note.)


5. (S/NF) Currently, there appears to be a lack of coordination
among USG agencies working on tribal engagement in southern
Iraq. Military, diplomatic, and reconstruction stakeholders are
acting independently and unaware of the efforts others are
making. The strategy is also unsustainable at present.
CJSOTF's plan would only employ tribesmen 3-4 months. Though
their plan will not commence unless TSFs can be employed
afterwards, they lack the budget to fund follow-on employment.
Thus, tribesmen may return to more nefarious activities if
long-term employment is not found at the end of their TSF
period. If the scale of the strategy is not large enough due to
limited personnel or resources, it may not be able to reach a
critical mass for success.

BASRAH 00000107 002.2 OF 002



A STRATEGY TO LAST
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6. (S/NF) As we look to carry a tribal engagement strategy
forward, we need to ensure that it will achieve realistic USG
objectives. Tribes should be deployed where we need them most
and where they will be most effective - along the Iranian border
to report lethal aid smuggling and in their own rural villages
to promote stability. TSFs could also serve alongside the ISF,
particularly the police, to "keep them both honest." Initially,
they should remain away from urban centers to avoid conflict
with militias, but as the program gains strength TSFs could move
inward towards the cities.


7. (S/NF) This strategy has to be sustainable in order to
effectively dissuade disenfranchised, young males from
gravitating to the militias or facilitating terrorist
activities. Job opportunities must be found after their TSF
service and funding should be sufficient to "outbid" any militia
or Iranian offers for employment. TSFs could be integrated into
the ISF to alleviate GOI and provincial government concerns of
uncontrolled militias. Basrah's Chief of Police MG Jalil Khalaf
Shueil told us November 10 that he supports the integration of
tribesmen into his force. After transferring untrustworthy
officers out of Basrah, he has the capacity, budget and mandate
to hire 500 more officers.


8. (S/NF) Alternatively, TSFs could be transitioned into job
programs. Job creation and reconstruction programs should be
identified in advance to gain the buy-in of provincial
governments and as a reward to participating tribes. USG funded
development projects should dove-tail tribal engagement to
provide a seamless transition from TSF to full-time job. One
sheikh suggested building a tile factory in Maysan to employ the
TSF after their service. PRT Basrah told us that projects that

SIPDIS
increased access to tribal villages had the secondary effect of
positive job growth.


9. (S/NF) Finally, USG, and perhaps even Coalition efforts
should be closely coordinated by implementing a well-thought
out, centralized strategy. A mechanism should be established to
de-conflict which sheikhs/tribes are to be engaged, resources
should be shared among agencies, and as mentioned above,
development projects need to be integrated into the plan.
Increased coordination will promote synergy in our efforts to
make tribal engagement a more effective component of our
stability operations in southern Iraq.
BONO