Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BASRAH104
2007-11-05 14:03:00
SECRET//NOFORN
REO Basrah
Cable title:  

IRANIAN FRONT GROUP COMES OUT OF THE SHADOWS

Tags:  PGOV PINR PINS PREL PTER IR IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8073
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHBC #0104/01 3091403
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 051403Z NOV 07
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0633
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0216
INFO RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUMICEA/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEPGAB/MNF-I C2X BAGHDAD
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0667
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000104 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/5/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINR PINS PREL PTER IR IZ
SUBJECT: IRANIAN FRONT GROUP COMES OUT OF THE SHADOWS

REF: A. A. TD 314/69042-07 (12 OCT 07)

B. B. TD 314/17343-07 (03 MAR 07)

C. C. TD 314/55060-07 (26 JUL 07)

BASRAH 00000104 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Louis L. Bono, Director, Regional Embassy Office
- Basrah, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(c),(d)



S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000104

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/5/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINR PINS PREL PTER IR IZ
SUBJECT: IRANIAN FRONT GROUP COMES OUT OF THE SHADOWS

REF: A. A. TD 314/69042-07 (12 OCT 07)

B. B. TD 314/17343-07 (03 MAR 07)

C. C. TD 314/55060-07 (26 JUL 07)

BASRAH 00000104 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Louis L. Bono, Director, Regional Embassy Office
- Basrah, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(c),(d)




1. (S/NF) Summary: Leaders of Sayyid al-Shuhada (translated as
`Lord of the Martyrs'),an Iraqi Shia party with close ties to
Iranian intelligence, met with Regional Embassy Officers (REO)
on November 3. They told us this was an introductory meeting to
dispel rumors of their Iranian ties, nefarious activities, and
that they wanted to cooperate with the U.S. However, they
blamed the U.S. and Gulf States for "forcing" them to Iran after
the Iraqi Marsh Arab revolt and referred to U.S. forces as
"occupiers." They stressed they were no longer militants, but a
legitimate political party. They noted their good relations
with the other local parties, but are at odds with Governor
Mohammed Wa'eli (Fadhila Party). They suggested the REO might
act as an intermediary among Basrah's parties, and seek to
maintain relations. End Summary.

Lord of the Martyrs
--------------


2. (S/NF) According to U.S. intelligence, Sayyid al-Shuhada
(SAS) is an Iranian front organization. It was formed as an
opposition group against Saddam Hussein in 1991 when Iraqis fled
to Iran during a Marsh Arab revolt. With the collapse of
Saddam's regime in 2003, the group returned to Iraq. Members
receive salaries and orders from of the Iranian Revolutionary
Guards Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) (ref A). SAS resembles
Lebanese Hizbollah: a political party with charitable
organizations that gathers intelligence, smuggles lethal aid,
and conducts limited attacks under Iranian direction. As a Shia
fundamentalist group, they have close ties to Thar Allah, Badr
Organization, Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, 15 Sha'ban, and
Hizbollah Movement. Iraqi parliamentarian, Sayyid Daghir

al-Musawi, is the Secretary General and believed to be an
IRGC-QF Brigadier General.

WE'RE NOT AS BAD AS YOU THINK
--------------


3. (S/NF) On November 3, we met with members of SAS who
identified themselves as Deputy Secretary General (and brother
of Sayyid Daghir) Hilal Na'im, Political Office Director and
Basrah Provincial Council member Qasim al-Fayad, and Head of
Organizations As'ad Khaliaf. Hilal said this was an
introductory meeting, but they wanted to cooperate with the U.S.
From the outset, Hilal sought to dispel the "negative rumors"
about SAS, stressed their independence from Iran, and
"challenged anyone to show evidence SAS has attacked U.S. or UK
forces."

REVISIONIST HISTORY
--------------


4. (S/NF) Hilal explained how the group was formed out of the
1991 uprising, but was originally called the Islamic
Organization in the Marsh Area. He criticized the U.S. for
mistakes during the 1991 Gulf War and "supplying Saddam with
weapons" that allowed Saddam to oppress the Marsh Arabs. He
also blamed the Gulf States for closing their borders to Iraqi
refugees, and the U.S. for not intervening, thus forcing them to
flee to Iran. He lamented how hard it was for them in Iran:
they were forced into a country they had fought against, they
had no jobs, and they did not speak Farsi. "If Iraqis could
have fled to the Arab Gulf States, there would be less Iranian
influence in Iraq today," he said. He said that initially
Coalition Forces were viewed as "rescuers" for ousting Saddam,
but after several mistakes, Iraqis view us as "occupiers."

LOOKING FOR LEGITIMACY & TELLING US WHAT WE WANT TO HEAR
-------------- --------------


5. (S/NF) Our interlocutors stressed that after returning to
Iraq in 2003, they changed their name to SAS, gave up their
weapons and became a "legitimate political party." They
characterized SAS as a moderate-Islamic, nationalist party that
supported Iraq's government and Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki.
They claimed to respect the rule of law, denounce terrorists,

BASRAH 00000104 002.2 OF 002


and support Iraqi Security Forces. Locally, they said SAS
funded charities for orphans and the poor, as well as "cultural
institutions" around Basrah's neglected outskirts to educate
people (ref B). They also said SAS wants to promote economic
growth and improve services. Internationally, they sought
better relations with Iraq's neighbors and the U.S., as well as
improving Iraqi's image in the international community.

ALL POLITICS ARE LOCAL
--------------


6. (S/NF) Hilal said, however, they were disappointed in
Basrah's ISF leadership, citing their poor performance during
the October 23 confrontation with Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM). He
opined that ISF leaders showed weakness negotiating with JAM,
which would only embolden militias to commit further violence.
All of them said relations with the other political parties,
including Fadhila, were good, but they said Governor Wa'eli
(Fadhila) was corrupt and failed to deliver public services.
They said that during the Provincial Council's efforts to oust
Wa'eli, they suggested replacing him with another Fadhila
member, but Fadhila refused. Tensions continue between SAS and
Wa'eli, but they recently agreed to work together on improving
services and maintaining their dialogue. They also suggested
that the REO act as an intermediary between SAS and other
parties to eliminate any conflicts.

ESTABLISHING A CONTINUING DIALOGUE
--------------


7. (S/NF) The REO Director thanked Hilal for the background on
SAS, but corrected his historical inaccuracies regarding the
USG's role in Iraq. As they were willing to meet again, we
suggested future discussions on specific political, economic,
security, and social issues. Hilal nearly jumped out of his
seat at the mention of militias saying, "That's what we need to
discuss first!"

COMMENT
--------------


8. (S/NF) It is not yet clear if SAS is actually distancing
itself from Iran or just claiming to as a means of establish
increased legitimacy. Additional meetings will be required to
fully assess their intentions. For this first meeting they kept
to their script - persuade us they were moderates and not
Iranian puppets. It may be a trend; Badr and some Sadrist
leaders have also told us they are seeking to transform into
legitimate political entities, and Badr leader Hasan al-Rashid
has emphasized Badr's independence from Iran. It was obvious
they were not prepared to discuss much else, and they seemed
surprised that we were very receptive to their overture, rather
than wary of their motives, as they may have expected.


9. (S) As their name suggests, and comments indicated, SAS has
something of a martyr's complex having suffered at the hands of
Saddam's regime, foreign powers, and possibly Iran. This was
reinforced when they complained other parties did not take them
seriously having given SAS only one seat on the Council of
Representatives and in the Provincial Council. End comment.

OBSERVATIONS
--------------


10. (S) The personal information provided by the three is
consistent with U.S. intelligence (refs A & C). Their known
names are: (1) Hilal Na'im al-Musawi (aka Hasan Jasim Kazim
Jafar al-Musawi, Jafar al-Musawi, Abu Jafar al-Musawi),possibly
an IRGC-QF Colonel and the brother of Daghir Jasim Kadhim Sharif
al-Musawi; (2) Qasim Muhammad al-Fayad; and (3) Isa'd Khaliaf.
It was clear that Hilal dominated their delegation (others
deferred to him),and at some points, he even interrupted them
so they would not stray off message or divulge too much. We are
certain all three understand English to some degree - As'ad
probably better than the others.
BONO