Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BASRAH102
2007-11-01 16:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
REO Basrah
Cable title:  

ISF-JAM CLASHES PREVIEW BASRAH PIC

Tags:  PINS MARR IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5583
RR RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHBC #0102/01 3051653
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 011653Z NOV 07
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0212
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0629
RUEPGAB/MNF-I C2X BAGHDAD IZ
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/JCS NMCC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0663
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000102 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/1/2017
TAGS: PINS MARR IZ
SUBJECT: ISF-JAM CLASHES PREVIEW BASRAH PIC

REF: (A) BASRAH 99 (B) BASRAH 100

BASRAH 00000102 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Louis L. Bono, Director, Basrah Regional Embassy
Office, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000102

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/1/2017
TAGS: PINS MARR IZ
SUBJECT: ISF-JAM CLASHES PREVIEW BASRAH PIC

REF: (A) BASRAH 99 (B) BASRAH 100

BASRAH 00000102 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Louis L. Bono, Director, Basrah Regional Embassy
Office, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C/REL MNF-I) Summary: On October 26, Police Chief Major
General Jalil Khalaf Shueil provided Regional Embassy officers
(REO) with an account of the recent clashes between Iraqi
security forces (ISF) and Jaysh al-Mahdi fighters (JAM). (Ref.
A) While the Iraqis were able to resolve the conflict without
Coalition support, Jalil's testimony underscores that the ISF in
Basrah are still no match for JAM. End summary.


2. (C/REL MNF-I) Jalil said that at approximately 1100 on
October 23, Iraqi National Police confiscated an unlicensed SUV
with tinted windows at the al-Junaynah checkpoint. The SUV
belonged to Thamer Tarteip (aka Abu Abdullah),an advisor for
the Ministry of Transportation employed at the Umm Qasr port,
and a JAM leader. (Note: Umm Qasr is reputedly controlled by
JAM. End note.) The driver was arrested and was taken with the
vehicle to the 6/2 National Police Headquarters, located at the
former Naval Building on the Shatt al-Arab.


3. (C/REL MNF-I) Shortly thereafter, Tarteip sent a delegation
to Jalil to demand the return of the driver and the SUV, which
they claimed was an official Port Authority vehicle. In return,
they offered Jalil a deal: if Jalil would allow the militia
unfettered movement throughout Basrah, militia members would not
attack the police. Jalil told them that Tarteip must honor the
rule of law and insisted on an official letter from the Port
Authority to verify ownership of the vehicle.


4. (C/REL MNF-I) At approximately 1320, gunmen attacked the
al-Junaynah checkpoint. Two members of the National Police were
injured and two others were kidnapped. This was followed by
coordinated attacks against several checkpoints. JAM fighters
also overtook the National Police headquarters, freed the driver
and commandeered several vehicles, including two Humvees, as
well as weapons, ammunition and communications equipment. About
50 police were taken hostage. (Note: There are conflicting
reports that two other police stations were over taken and that
some soldiers were also taken hostage. End note.) Jalil said
GEN Mohan was slow to respond. He claimed that Mohan could have
released Iraqi soldiers from the 1st of the 14th who were
located "minutes" from the Police HQ, but he failed to do so.


5. (C/REL MNF-I) Between 1600 and 1630, Sheikh Khadim
al-Ghatrani, leader of the Basrah al-Ayan Tribal Council, and
other tribal leaders approached JAM and OMS leaders to resolve
the conflict. They then approached Jalil and arranged for him
to meet with the JAM and OMS leaders, including Sheikh Bakir,
the reputed leader of JAM. Jalil insisted on the immediate
release of his police officers and the return of his vehicles,
weapons, and equipment. Around 1700 hostages were ordered
released, and JAM withdrew from the police headquarters and
checkpoints, but only the two Humvees were found, and none of
the weapons or communications equipment was returned.


6. (C/REL MNF-I) On Wednesday, October 24, several masked gunmen
attacked Jalil's motorcade as it was departing the al-Maghez
market. The following day, October 25, a Sadrist delegation
from Najaf called on Jalil to "promote peace and cooperation."
Jalil refused to meet with the delegation because he "did not
have authority from GEN Mohan" and in order "to appear strong."
He did speak to them by telephone and listed four conditions for
JAM: (1) disarm, (2) respect the rule of law, (3) turn over the
attackers, and (4) do not interfere in police matters.


7. (C/REL MNF-I) Jalil said that the National Police officers
stood and fought with JAM but were overwhelmed. As for the
performance of local police units, Jalil said they failed. If
anything, the local police and local IA troops assisted the JAM
fighters. Jalil said he has little confidence in his local
police force. Indeed during the meeting he received a phone
call reporting that a person was kidnapped and placed into a
police vehicle.


8. (C/REL MNF-I) Comment: The events of October 23-25 provide
some insight into what Basrah may look like under Iraqi control.
On a positive note, Mohan and Jalil did not have to resort to
Coalition ground forces, and upon request, they received
Coalition UAV and fast air cover (albeit late, according to
Jalil). The Iraqis also demonstrated a willingness and ability
to quickly resolve the conflict. On the other hand, the Jaysh
al-Mahdi served notice that it is still a powerful force in

BASRAH 00000102 002.2 OF 002


Basrah and is willing to openly confront the ISF when ordered.
Further, local contacts have decried the ISF's performance as
abysmal. This calls into doubt the ISF's ability to implement
Mohan's security plan. (Ref. B)
BONO