GENERAL MOHAN'S SECURITY PLAN FOR BASRAH

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000100

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2017
TAGS: MCAP MOPS PBTS PGOV PINR PINS PREL PTER IR IZ
SUBJECT: GENERAL MOHAN'S SECURITY PLAN FOR BASRAH

REF: A. BASRAH 67 B. BASRAH 50 C. BASRAH 53 D. BASRAH 88 E. BASRAH 98

BASRAH 00000100 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Louis L. Bono, Director, Regional Embassy Office
- Basrah, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (a),(b)




1. (S) SUMMARY: Basrah's Security Chief, Lieutenant General
Mohan Hafith Fahad, has laid out his security plan for Basrah,
which relies heavily on the Iraqi Army (IA) rather than the
Iraqi Police (IP),which remains compromised by militia
infiltration. The ambitious plan calls for the central
government's support in replacing the Department of Border
Enforcement (DBE) and the Coastal Guards and Internal Waters
(CGIW) forces with IA units to secure the province's borders.
The plan would also replace the police at checkpoints on the
city's perimeter, establish `strong points' in militia
neighborhoods, and upon conclusion of a weapons amnesty program,
conduct limited strike operations against militia/criminal
cells. For these reasons, Mohan is requesting additional IA
troops. The plan is to be presented at the Ministerial Council
on National Security meeting scheduled for Sunday, October 28.
END SUMMARY.


2. (S) Basrah's Security Chief, LTG Mohan has had a concept for
several months (ref A),but his ability to implement a plan has
been stifled by pervasive levels of corruption, militia
influence and overall ineffectiveness of the Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF) in Basrah. In order to buy time to build a capable
force, Mohan negotiated an accommodation with Jaysh al-Mahdi
(JAM) (refs A-C). Now, after four months in command, Mohan has
finally articulated the specific actions he intends to take.
The six-page document is summarized below and will be forwarded
to Embassy Baghdad. We are told that Mohan will personally
present his plan before the central government at the next
Ministerial Council on National Security meeting on October 28.

GENERAL ASSESSMENT


3. (S) Mohan attributes Basrah's security problems to multiple
factors (internal political parties/militias and external
neighboring countries) that individually are at cross-purposes,
but collectively are destabilizing the province (ref D). Other
areas that he says need to be resolved are: the dispute between
Governor Mohammed Wa'eli and the Provincial Council,
unemployment, and interference by neighboring countries.

BORDER CONTROL


4. (S) Mohan recognizes that military efforts within Basrah will
not be successful as long as the currently porous borders
continue to allow material support to reach the militias. He
admits that the DBE officers are corrupt and beholden to the
political parties, and its subsidiary CGIW force is also corrupt
and either involved in smuggling or in covering up smuggling
activities. He recommends relieving the DBE's 4th Sector
commander, Brigadier Abbas Muhsin Ali, and the CGIW's commander,
Brigadier Hakeem Jassim Jassaam for being inept and tied to the
political parties. (Note: Jassim was once a serious candidate
for the Basrah Police Chief and was supported by Badr and other
Basrah Islamia groups. End note.) Mohan seeks to relieve the
4th DBE from its duties and hand over border security to the IA.
If he faces political opposition to this move, he will replace
the DBE with other DBE units from outside Basrah. Mohan also
seeks to relieve the CGIW of its duties patrolling the Shatt
al-Arab Waterway (SAAW) in favor of the Naval Force.

SECURING ENTRY INTO BASRAH


5. (S) In addition to securing the borders from smuggling, Mohan
also intends to secure the entry/exit points to Basrah city (ref
E). To that end, he will replace the police at vehicle
checkpoints on the city's outskirts with two IA infantry
battalions. Another IA infantry battalion will be deployed to
the tribal areas between Basrah and Maysan (Dair, Hartha, Nahr
al-Izz, Qurna, etc.) to deny militias safe-havens for conducting
criminal activities and prevent what he believes to be the main
routes for arms smuggling into Basrah. An additional infantry
battalion will deploy to observe and control the area east of
the SAAW to the Iranian border, which due to the lack of an IA
presence, dense date groves, and proximity to the Iranian
border, permits significant, unobserved militia activity.

SECURING BASRAH


BASRAH 00000100 002.2 OF 002



6. (S) Within Basrah, Mohan's plan calls for a media campaign to
advertise a weapons amnesty program with cash payments.
According to the plan, amnesty would be supported by political
parties, religious and tribal leaders, and NGOs. At the end of
the amnesty period, Basrah would be declared a "weapons free
city." Military `strong points' would also be established in
areas of significant militia activity to control neighborhood
entry points, contain militia movements, and provide launch
sites for 24-hour patrolling and combat operations. One
reinforced company would set up in each of the neighborhoods of
Hayaniah, Five Mile, Gizaizah, al-Qiblah, Timaniyah, Basrah
Qadeemah (old Basrah),and Jumhuria. Two infantry battalions
would be required to man the `strong points.'


7. (S) With strong points emplaced and at the end of the amnesty
period, "limited disruptive operations (with guaranteed
successes) against areas" known for sheltering terrorists,
criminals, and weapons would be conducted with the intent of
"raising troop moral and to make it clear to militias, parties,
and criminals [the ISF's] ability to confront them." Some
limited joint operations with Coalition air cover would also be
conducted against terrorist/criminal safe houses and smuggling
activities in Abu al-Khaseeb and Safwan. Mohan admits that the
IA would enforce the majority of his security plan, because the
IP are patently corrupt.

GOI SUPPORT REQUIRED


8. (S) In order to implement his plan, Mohan requests the
central government's support for his initiative to relieve the
DBE of its border duties and to reform IP units, particularly
its intelligence unit. He also requests that the 1st and 2nd
Brigades (presumably of the 14th IA Division now being formed)
be supplied with sufficient weapons, vehicles, and equipment
within a month. He is urgently requesting two light infantry
battalions, one mechanized infantry battalion (with wheeled
armored vehicles),and one tank company to reinforce his command
to implement the plan.

ANSWERING HIS CRITICS


9. (S) Mohan's document also addresses some of the criticisms
laid against him that the ISF have "waited too long" before
confronting Basrah's security problems and "turning a blind eye"
to militia activities, particularly JAM. Mohan implies that the
multiple negative influences (political party support for
militias and foreign influences) make the situation complex and
difficult to manage, but despite that, crime has decreased and
the ISF represent a "real deterrence." JAM, he claims, is
abiding by terms he "imposed" not to "embark upon any deed that
is not acceptable to us" and its leadership is now divided due
to Mohan's orders not to openly carry arms.
BONO