THE U.S./GAMBIAN RELATIONSHIP: DEPARTING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BANJUL 000332

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE PASS EXIM, USTDA, OPIC, USTR, PEACE CORPS; USDOC FOR
ITA; DAKAR PLS PASS ODC, DAO, AND RAO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINS PHUM KPKO KPAO EINV ETRD
KMCA, EAID, MASS, EPET, GA, AU, IR, VE
SUBJECT: THE U.S./GAMBIAN RELATIONSHIP: DEPARTING
AMBASSADOR'S ASSESSMENT

BANJUL 00000332 001.2 OF 005


Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOSEPH STAFFORD, REASON 1.4 (B AND D)



SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) The U.S./Gambian relationship remains strained,due
primarily to President Jammeh's increasingly authoritarian
leadership and consequent decline in the human rights
environment here -- a decline that figured prominently in the
June 2006 suspension of The Gambia's eligibility for the
Millenium Challenge Account (MCA) program. Reversing the
negative human rights trend is the leading U.S. priority in
The Gambia, but lack of pressure on the GOTG from other
donors, Taiwan, in particular, is a key constraint on our
efforts. Jammeh's courting of Iran and Venezuela was evident
at the Gambian-hosted "midterm" African Union Summit in
June/July 2006. In the intervening year since the Summit,
Jammeh's regional standing has eroded, as underscored by
frayed ties with such neighbors as Senegal and Ghana; it
remains to be seen whether the new Nigerian President -- or
another African leader -- will take over Obasanjo's role as
Jammeh's mentor and mediator.


2. (C) Jammeh's erratic behavior on both domestic and foreign
policy casts doubt on his effectiveness as a partner on
counter-terrorism and other key areas of interest to the U.S.
Notwithstanding Jammeh's behavior, Gambians continue to
indicate appreciation for our efforts on behalf of the
country's development and poverty alleviation. As a
moderate, peaceful Muslim country in a turbulent region, The
Gambia remains fertile ground for our public diplomacy
initiatives. In short, while The Gambia, a small,
impoverished country, can do little to influence U.S.
interests for good or ill, I nonetheless see compelling
reasons for our continued engagement here -- and there have
also been "rough patches" in the U.S./Gambian relationship in
the past. END SUMMARY .


THE "ROUGH PATCH" CONTINUES
--------------


3. (C) As my assignment here approaches its end, the strains
evident in the U.S./Gambian relationship over the past year
and a half persist, with no clear prospect of their easing
soon. The strains are due primarily to Gambian President
Yahya Jammeh's increasingly authoritarian leadership, and, as
a consequence, the negative human rights and governance
trends that prevail in this country. Manifestations of these
trends range from arbitrary detention and mistreatment of
oppositionists and others to flawed elections due to the
ruling party's irregularities to a crackdown on private media
institutions. An abortive coup plot here in March 2006 was a
major factor in the negative trends, as an enraged,
vindictive Jammeh responded by ordering the roundup of
numerous potential suspects as well as the closure of a
privately owned, anti-GOTG journal, the "Independent."


4. (C) The abuses following the failed plot figured
prominently in the Millennium Challenge Corporation's (MCC)
June 2006 decision to suspend The Gambia's eligibility for
the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) program, which held
the prospect of a substantial increase in U.S. development
assistance to this countr.* The volatile Gambian leader
reacted defiantl,, as his senior aide brusquely rejected the
Embas"y's offer of consultations on the MCA reinstatemett
process. Indicative of Jammeh's iron-fisted control of his
cabinet, his Finance and Economy Mins"ter recently confided
to Ambassador that he fulyy recognized the potentially vital
contribution f" the MCA program to The Gambia's development
an was keen to meet and discuss MCA eligibility
reinstatement -- but also made clear that Jammeh wouldn*ot
permit such discussions, at least for the prssent. In his
public statements over the past months, Jammeh has refrained
from citing the USG by name, but we are clearly a prime
target in his venomous attacks on the "West" over its alleged
exploitation and bullying of Africa.

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ADVANCING THE TOP U.S. PRIORITY
--------------


5. (C) The abuses that led to the suspension of MCA
eligibility serve to highlight the overriding U.S. objective
here -- promoting an improved human rights environment and
stronger democratic institutions. In pursuing this
objective, the Embassy will need to continue using the full
array of tools at its disposal, ranging from dialog with the
GOTG and civil society to public diplomacy initiatives such
as International Visitor Grants for human rights activists
and workshops for journalists. While mindful of the
stringent resource environment, I believe that additional
resources are needed to maximize the effectiveness of our
strategy for advancing the leading U.S. interest in this
country. At present, available funding consists largely of
a meager ($31,000 in FY-06) DHRF fund. Accordingly, the
Embassy's Mission Strategic Plan for FY-2009 contains
proposals for two ESF-funded projects of $300,000 each; the
proposed projects are designed to strengthen the capacity and
autonomy of the National Assembly and judiciary, respectively.


6. (C) To be sure, Jammeh's authoritarian tendencies
represent a major constraint on our efforts to advance our
human rights agenda. In our approaches to senior Gambian
officials, many signal their personal concern over the
negative human rights trend here. At the same time, they
also indicate that they are in no position to mount any
initiatives to bring about reversal of that trend, as
Jammeh's dominance of his government's decision-making is so
thorough as to leave no room for any such initiative.

LACK OF PRESSURE FROM OTHER DONORS
--------------


7. (C) Another major constraint on our lobbying on human
rights is the lack of pressure from key donors, Taiwan, in
particular. Over the past year, Taiwan has displaced
Britain, the former colonial power, as the leading bilateral
donor here, providing an estimated $20 million or more in
aid. While my Taiwanese counterpart claims to be concerned
over Jammeh's backsliding on human rights, the risk of
alienating Jammmeh and possibly causing him to consider
reaching out to the PRC rules out any significant Taiwanese
pressure on the Gambian President. The British High
Commission uses its dialog with the GOTG to flag human rights
issues, and most of its annual assistance of around $10
million goes to improve governance -- e.g., payment of
Commonwealth judges' salaries, reform of public finance. The
European Union is the leading multilateral donor; resident
European Commission officials have indicated that, while the
human rights situation here is worrisome, it is not grave
enough as yet to warrant warning the GOTG of possible
repercussions for assistance. Finally, as indicated below,
Jammeh is cultivating two potential key donors, Iran and
Venezuela, that can hardly be expected to exert any pressure
on the Gambian leader over human rights matters.


ANOTHER UNWELCOME TREND -- COURTING OF IRAN AND VENEZUELA
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Jammeh's angry, resentful reaction to the suspension
of MCA eligibility also included overtures to Iran and
Venezuela; he personally invited the respective leaders to
the Gambian-hosed African Union Summit in July 2006. Chavez
and Ahmadinejad duly accepted the invitation and used the
Summit to deliver predictable anti-U.S./Western statements.
In subsequent months, Jammeh has exchanged visits with
Ahmdinejad and travelled to Venezuela, while GOTG officials
and their Iranian and Venezuelan counterparts have signed an
array of cooperation agreements in economic and other fields.
The GOTG recently opened an embassy in Tehran, and Iran is
expected to reciprocate within the next month or so. GOTG
officials indicate no plans for a similar exchange of
diplomatic missions with Venezuela, whose embassy in Senegal
covers The Gambia, while the latter's embassy in Washington
has responsibility for Venezuela.

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9. (C) Beyond defiance of Washington and the West generally
and photo ops with the Iranian and Venezuelan leaders,
Jammeh's overtures are obviously designed to generate
economic and other assistance. Despite denials by Gambian
officials, there are credible reports that Chavez extended a
$30 million grant during Jammeh's recent visit and that Iran
has to date provided grants totalling $10 million. GOTG
officials seek Iranian and Venezuelan involvement in the
development of The Gambia's hoped-for oil resources. We are
as yet unable to verify vague reports of Iranian arms
shipments to The Gambia, but various contacts report that a
15-man Iranian military team is providing "special forces"
training to personnel of the Gambian President's militia unit
at his home village of Kanilai.

REDUCED STANDING IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD
--------------


10. (C) Although only 42, Jammeh has ruled The Gambia since
1994, and his craving for recognition as a veteran African
statesman was doubtless the leading motivation for his
hosting the "midterm" African Union Summit in June/July 2006.
However, the intervening year has witnessed, if anything,
erosion in Jammeh's regional standing. In the sub-region,
his meddling in Senegal's Casamance rebellion has only added
to long-standing strains with Senegalese President Wade. Our
contacts say that ties with Ghana remain cool because of the
still-unsolved killing here of 40 or so Ghanian youths in
July 2005. (NOTE: According to credible sources, the victims
were would-be emigrants to Spain and were killed by Gambian
police who suspected them of being rebels. END NOTE) The
Mauritanian Ambassador confided to Ambassador that, despite
the traditionally close Gambian/Mauritanian relationship,
recently elected Mauritanian President Abdellahi had so far
adopted an arms-length attitude toward Jammeh. The
Mauritanian Ambassador spoke of concern in Nouakchott over
Jammeh's erratic behavior -- e.g., his self-proclaimed powers
to cure HIV/AIDS, asthma, and diabetes. Jammeh was
conspicuous by his absence from both the ECOWAS and AU
Summits in January, and it is uncertain whether he will
attend the upcoming "midterm" AU Summit in Accra.


11. (C) Our sense is that former Nigerian President Obasanjo
was the African leader with the greatest influence over
Jammeh. At crucial junctures, then-President Obasanjo served
as an effective mediator with Jammeh, attending the October
2005 Senegalese/Gambian summit that defused a severe
bilateral crisis over transportation and border issues. In
February 2006, Obasanjo sucsessfully mediated between the
Gambian leader and his political opposition, brokering an
agreement that restored dialog among Jammeh's ruling party
and the opposition parties. With Obasanjo's departure from
the Presidency, it remains to be seen whether his successor
-- or another African leader -- can take over the role of
Jammeh's mentor and mediator.

HOW RELIABLE A PARTNER?
--------------


12. (C) Jammeh's erratic behavior on both domestic and
foreign policy means that his cooperation and support for
U.S. initiatives in the region and elsewhere cannot be taken
for granted. In the past, his staunch support for the Global
War on Terrorism translated into concrete support for
U.S.counter-terrorism (CT) efforts. A key GOTG interlocutor
on CT issues, the National Intelligence Agency's (NIA) head,
has assured us of his -- and Jammeh's -- commitment to
continued CT cooperation. Nonetheless, as the GOTG's ties
with Iran, in particular, evolve, the prospect of fallout on
our CT relationship cannot be ruled out. (NOTE: In fact, past
months have witnessed a slowdown in our CT cooperation, but
this appears to be due to internal disarray at the NIA, not
Iranian or other external influences. END NOTE)


13. (C) Nor can we rule out the possibility of the GOTG's
emerging Iranian connection affecting the U.S./Gambian
military relationship. At present, senior GOTG civilian and
military officials indicate that they value our modest

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military cooperation program, centered on IMET, and urge its
expansion. (NOTE: In fact, as part of U.S. efforts to promote
democratic values within the Gambian military, our IMET
progam registered a small increase, from $75,000 to $115,000,
in FY-07. END NOTE) The GOTG, citing the Gambian contingent
of 200 troops (and 100 police officers) serving with AMIS in
Darfur, continues to request peacekeeping-related training
and equipment assistance. We have replied that we can make
no commitments and that the Gambians' case for such
assistance would be strengthened were they to expand the size
of their Darfur contingent. The GOTG, in turn, has
conditioned its willingness to supply additional forces on
donor agreement to provide the Gambians with six APCs, among
other assistance.

PROMOTING THE GAMBIA'S DEVELOPMENT
--------------


14. (C) Notwithstanding their President's anti-U.S./Western
sentiments, Gambians also continue to indicate appreciation
for our efforts on behalf of the country's development and
poverty alleviation. With the suspension of MCA eligibility,
the centerpiece of our efforts is the 100-strong Peace Corps
contingent here, but our other initiatives, ranging from
grass-roots Self Help projects to our girls' scholarship
program, are also applauded. Bilateral investment and trade
links remain exceedingly modest; U.S. investment here totals
no more than $5 million or so, while annual two-way trade --
most of it U.S. exports -- amounts to several hundred
thousand dollars. At the same time, the U.S.Trade and
Development Agency's (USTDA) involvement here has given a
boost to our economic links. In recent years, USTDA has
financed two feasibility studies here, involving construction
of a petroleum storage terminal and a coal-fired power plant.
The Gambia retained eligibility for the Africa Growth and
Opportunity Act (AGOA) program in 2007, but we conveyed to
the GOTG Washington's warning that retaining eligibility
would hinge on an improved record on human rights and
governance. As it is, The Gambia has yet to take much
advantage of its AGOA eligibility, with AGOA-qualified
exports to the U.S. less than $100,000 annually.

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: PRO-U.S. ENVIRONMENT
--------------


15. (C) As a moderate Muslim country in a turbulent region,
The Gambia remains fertile ground for our public diplomacy
efforts. There is a discernible pro-U.S. feeling in the
society that is striking -- and notably warmer than that
vis-a-vis the former colonial power, Britain. Gambians from
all walks of life, both elites and the public at large, make
no secret of their admiration of America's democracy, its
economic and technological prowess, and its culture of
openness and change. Jammeh himself, despite his resentment
toward the USG, seeks to cast himself as a friend of the U.S.
The Gambia's recent hosting of the much-publicized Miss
Black USA Scholarship Pageant, a ten-day extravaganza
involving dozens of participants from the U.S., was Jammeh's
personal initiative. For a country so small, a remarkably
large number of Gambians have extensive experience in the
U.S. Numerous GOTG officials have pursued university
studies in the U.S. The military is replete with with
officers that received training in the U.S. under IMET. The
upshot is that, for many Gambians, positive views of the U.S.
are based, not on a distant, utopian image, but on the
reality of daily life in the U.S. While there is anti-U.S.
criticism in the press, particularly in the government's
mouthpiece, the "Daily Observer," it and other journals also
routinely give positive coverage to Embassy activities,
e.g.inauguration of USG-funded development projects, offiical
receptions, etc.

REASONS TO STAY ENGAGED
--------------


16. (C) With its population of 1.5 million, annual per
capita income of $365, and severely resource-strapped
government, The Gambia has limited capability to influence
U.S. interests for good or ill. Amidst the strained

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bilateral ties, I nonetheless see various compelling reasons
for our continued engagement here. One is the USG's
universal commitment to foster respect for human rights and
democratic norms, promote sustainable development, and
provide humanitarian assistance. Another centers on the
U.S.-led Global War on Terrorism; despite its meager
resources, the GOTG has shown that it is capable of serving
as an effective partner in that War -- despite the current
uncertainty about Jammeh's reliability on that score. A
third reason relates to the key U.S. interest in promoting
regional peace and stability; the GOTG helps advance that
interest by contributing to peacekeeping operations, most
recently, sending troops to Darfur and prior to that,
Liberia. As a fourth reason, there is the reservoir of
pro-U.S. feeling here -- a resource to draw upon in our
efforts to build popular support fo our initiatives
targetting African and Muslim audiences.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATION: NOT THE FIRST "ROUGH PATCH"
-------------- --------------


17. (C) As a final point, this is not the first "rough patch"
in the U.S./Gambian relationship. Jammeh originally came to
power via a military coup in 1994 and the result was a
nosedive in bilateral ties, as the U.S. responded by imposing
the required sanctions on the military junta. Our
relationship began to improve following Jammeh's re-election
in 2002 in a contest deemed credible by the international
community. The Gambian leader then took various steps to
reach out to the U.S.: concluding an Article 98 Agreement
with the U.S. (the second African country to do so),sharply
reducing links with a heretofore key patron, Libya, adopting
a more moderate and pro-Western foreign policy generally, and
proving to be a useful partner in the Global War on
Terrorism. He also took steps to improve the GOTG's human
rights record. Our contacts believe that the mercurial
Jammeh will again reach out to the U.S. at some point,
perhaps when -- as widely predicted -- his new-found Iranian
and Venezuelan patrons start to lose interest in their
Gambian client.




STAFFORD