DEMARCHE DELIVERED: IAEA DIRECTOR GENERAL'S REPORT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 006133

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR ISN/RA RICHARD NEPHEW AND HEATHER VON BEHRAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2017
TAGS: PREL KNNP MNUC IAEA IR PARM AORC TH
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: IAEA DIRECTOR GENERAL'S REPORT
ON IRAN AND U.S. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON IRAN'S
NUCLEAR PROGRAM

REF: A. STATE 162558

B. STATE 157039

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission James F. Entwistle, reason: 1.4
(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: The RTG has called for Iran to cooperate
further with the IAEA, although Thailand appears unlikely to
complain strongly and publicly about the extent of Iran's
cooperation. A working level MFA contact told us Thailand
would abide by any UNSC resolutions ordering sanctions
against Iran. Current sanctions have made foreign banks
unwilling to transfer funds from the Thai MFA to the Thai
Embassy in Iran, and the RTG is contemplating having couriers
bring cash to Tehran to fund its operations. Our working
level MFA contact indicated she thought the recent USG
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran might reduce our
interest in pressing on Iran-IAEA cooperation. Local press
coverage of the NIE has been mixed. End Summary.


2. (C) The Ambassador raised ref A points with MFA Permanent
Secretary Virasakdi Futrakul on December 4. Virasakdi did

SIPDIS
not offer a substantive reply but said he would discuss the
matter within the MFA. We then met Thai Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA) Iranian desk officer, First Secretary Pimpiree
Pyramarn, on December 6 to discuss the points outlined reftel
regarding the November 2007 International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) Director General's report on Iran and the U.S.
National Intelligence Estimate on Iran's Nuclear Program.


3. (C) Pimpiree said Thailand was pleased with the overall
progress made by the IAEA to date on the Iranian nuclear
issue, but noted that Thailand's IAEA representative also
called in his official statement for Iran to further
cooperate and comply with the IAEA. While Pimpiree expressed
personal frustration with Iran's lackluster cooperation to
date, Pimpiree said it would be unprecedented and unlikely
that Thailand would publicly express strong dissatisfaction
towards Iran's cooperation with IAEA. At the same time,
Pimpiree was confident that Thailand would support any new
sanctions introduced by the United Nations Security Council
on Iran (in line with Thailand's support for previous
sanctions).


4. (C) Pimpiree said Thai officials in Vienna, more so than
Thai officials in Tehran, were closely monitoring the
Iran-IAEA workplan progress. Pimpiree advised that Thai
officials in Tehran were highly frustrated by and focused on
the more pressing issue of how to receive MFA funds at a time
when the Iranian government increased the Thai Embassy "rent"
and the cost of living in Tehran was rising due to sanctions.
Pimpiree said the Embassy was currently functioning off of
visa application fees, a solution she opined would not last
long.


5. (C) Pimpiree advised that Thailand had previously relied
on U.S. banks and later European banks to transfer money from
MFA accounts in domestic banks to Iran for salary payments
and other administrative needs. Citing the increasingly
stringent sanctions imposed by the United States, Pimpiree
claimed that the overseas banks were no longer willing to
transfer the funds to Tehran despite the funds being clearly
sent from one government entity to another. Pimpiree said
the MFA was actively working to find other banks to assist
with the transfers, but commented that the MFA may have to
facilitate hand-delivery of funds from a neighboring state in
a worst case scenario.


6. (C) Pimpiree said she believed Iran's cooperation in the
coming weeks would be very important and telling in terms of
its commitment to the IAEA workplan. Pimpiree advised that
outgoing Thai MFA officials assigned to Tehran expressed
concern about and asked Pimpiree to dialog with U.S. Embassy
counterparts on the likelihood of the United States invading
Iran. We advised that such action would be unlikely so long
as Iran makes positive progress with resolving outstanding
issues related to its nuclear program with the IAEA and the
United Nations.


7. (C) Despite the clear impact of the sanctions and concerns
about a possible U.S. invasion, Pimpiree expressed some
surprise that the United States was placing such importance
and focus on the Iran-IAEA issue, particularly in light of
the NIE assessment that Iran halted its nuclear weapon
program in 2003. We assured Pimpiree that the USG would
continue energetically to support the IAEA's work on Iran,
and to press for Iran to cooperate fully, reiterating that
the NIE indicated important ongoing concerns.

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8. (U) We plan to meet with Pimpiree again in late December
2007 to discuss Iran's follow-through on workplan
commitments, or lack thereof and implications. We also plan
to meet with officials of the MFA's Peace, Security and
Disarmament Division of the International Organizations
Department to discuss their views on the Iranian nuclear
issue, as the group shares responsibility for management of
the issue with the Iran desk at the MFA.


9. (U) While the NIE was not widely covered in the Thai
media, those outlets that did raise the NIE unanimously
voiced relief that the United States appeared less likely to
attack Iran. A commentary in the business-oriented Thai
language Post Today (12/9, circulation: 50,000) carried the
typical response: "(The NIE) is a big 'slap in the face' to
the Bush administration.... Even President Bush himself said
only three weeks ago that Iran's nuclear program may lead to
World War III. Washington may once again be seen as the
'distorter of information,' as it faces the same situation it
did with Iraq when no weapons of mass destruction were
found." The Post's sister paper, the English language
Bangkok Post (12/7, circulation: 60,000) took a more nuanced
view in its editorial: "If Mr. Bush now has scant supporting
data of an imminent nuclear threat from Tehran, the Iranian
authorities and the anti-Bush political groups also have
little reason to crow. For one thing, the NIE specifically
concluded that Iran had an active, covert programme to
develop nuclear weapons, which it now has paused, not
completely suspended."
BOYCE