Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BANGKOK3755
2007-07-09 08:44:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

EMBASSY DISCUSSIONS WITH RTG ON HMONG AND NORTH

Tags:  PREF PREL TH LA KS KN 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBK #3755/01 1900844
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 090844Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8138
INFO RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 3330
RUEHVN/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 3894
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1840
C O N F I D E N T I A L BANGKOK 003755 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

GENEVA FOR RMA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2017
TAGS: PREF PREL TH LA KS KN
SUBJECT: EMBASSY DISCUSSIONS WITH RTG ON HMONG AND NORTH
KOREAN REFUGEE ISSUES

REF: SECSTATE 88585

Classified By: AMBASSADOR RALPH BOYCE, REASON 1.4 (B, D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L BANGKOK 003755

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

GENEVA FOR RMA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2017
TAGS: PREF PREL TH LA KS KN
SUBJECT: EMBASSY DISCUSSIONS WITH RTG ON HMONG AND NORTH
KOREAN REFUGEE ISSUES

REF: SECSTATE 88585

Classified By: AMBASSADOR RALPH BOYCE, REASON 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary. During a July 2 discussion with MFA PermSec,
Ambassador encouraged RTG establishment of a screening
mechanism for all Lao Hmong asylum seekers and movement of
the Nong Khai Hmong to a more suitable location. The PermSec
responded that the RTG was in a standoff with the Lao
government on the Hmong issue. He said the Nong Kong Hmong
would not be deported to Laos, but they would also not be
allowed to resettle to third countries anytime soon. Embassy
Political Counselor subsequently made points similar to those
of the Ambassador in a separate meeting with the Thai NSC
Deputy Secretary General. Political Counselor noted the
availability of USG funding to assist in resolution of the
Hmong issues. The Deputy Secretary General said it was
current Thai policy to screen only those Hmong already
registered at Petchaboon. The RTG would "do something" for
those in this group who faced danger if returned to Laos, but
would not talk publicly about it. Political Counselor
expressed appreciation for RTG agreement to USG refugee
resettlement processing for additional North Koreans. The
USG hoped that the RTG had made a final decision that such
cases would not have to go first to the ROK since that was
not workable. Political Counselor also raised recent reports
that the Thai military had not permitted some Burmese fleeing
their country to enter Thailand. End summary.

Ambassador Discussion with MFA PermSec
--------------


2. (C) Drawing on reftel points, Ambassador raised Hmong
refugee issues on July 2 with MFA PermSec Virasakdi Futrakul.
Noting that he was acting on instructions, Ambassador
encouraged RTG establishment of a screening system for Lao
Hmong in Petchaboon Province and consultations with UNHCR on
screening. He also encouraged Virasakdi to extend the
screening to all Hmong asylum seekers in Thailand, not just
those already registered by the RTG in Petchaboon. While
expressing appreciation for the temporary asylum given to the
Hmong at the Nong Khai Immigration Detention Center,

Ambassador encouraged the RTG to transfer the group to
another location with more humane living conditions.


3. (C) Virasakdi responded that the RTG felt it was between a
rock and a hard place. The Lao government was saying that
the RTG had no right to permit Hmong to be resettled to third
countries. There was an implied threat behind this position:
if the RTG permitted departures to other countries, the Lao
would not take back any of the Hmong. Virasakdi reiterated
the RTG position that the Nong Khai group would not be
deported. At the same time, they would not be allowed to
resettle to third countries anytime soon. Virasakdi noted
that the RTG was working on a Hmong screening system. He
said he had argued to the Thai National Security Council that
screening should be extended to new Hmong arrivals, but the
RTG had not yet made a decision on the issue.


4. (C) Ambassador did not have an opportunity to raise the
North Korean refugee issue directly with PermSec Virasakdi.
Subsequently, Embassy sent over written points to Virasakdi
which: expressed appreciation for the RTG's approval of USG
resettlement processing of additional North Korean refugees;
noted that during earlier RTG consideration of this issue,
some in the RTG were pressing for USG resettlement processing
of North Korean refugees to occur in South Korea and proposed
this formally to the ROKG; stated that the USG did not think
this proposal was workable given that North Koreans become
South Korean citizens upon arrival on South Korean soil and
are not eligible for resettlement to a third country; and
expressed hope that the RTG had made a final decision on this
issue.

Thai NSC Deputy Secretary General on Hmong and North Korean
Refugee Issues
-------------- --------------
--------------


5. (C) Political Counselor met with NSC Deputy Secretary
General Tawin Pleansri on July 5 to discuss Lao Hmong, North
Korean, and Burmese refugee issues. Political Counselor said
the USG understood that the Lao Hmong issue and dealing with
the Lao government were difficult. She noted that the move
of the Petchaboon Hmong to a new site seemed to be going
well. The USG understood that the RTG was working on a
screening system. This was a welcome development. She
encouraged drawing on the model of the Provincial Admissions
Boards (PABs) established for Burmese refugees and consulting
with UNHCR. Political Counselor urged that the RTG screen
all Hmong asylum seekers, not just those already registered
at Petchaboon. The USG would consider providing training
assistance for a screening system. The USG also would
consider funding the MSF assistance program in Petchaboon.


6. (C) Political Counselor emphasized that some Hmong were
genuinely in need of refugee protection. The Hmong minors
irregularly deported by the Thai to Laos in December 2005
were a case in point. The USG hoped that it was not RTG
policy to deport to Laos those who faced the threat of
mistreatment. At the same time, the USG recognized that some
Hmong were economic migrants or came to Thailand seeking
third country resettlement. The USG had repeatedly told the
Hmong-American community that there would not be another
large Hmong resettlement program. Political Counselor also
encouraged Tawin to move the Nong Khai Hmong to a location
with more humane living conditions and to handle any such
move carefully and with advance notice to the Hmong so they
would not panic.


7. (C) Tawin responded that it was current RTG policy to
screen only those Hmong already registered at Petchaboon.
The RTG had to look carefully at the larger picture. If
screening were applied to all Hmong, the RTG would have to
establish a similar screening system for North Koreans. The
RTG believed that only a small percentage of the Petchaboon
group faced political persecution if deported to Laos. The
RTG was currently setting up a screening system. The RTG
would cooperate with the Lao government to return those
screened out to Laos. Tawin emphasized that, at the same
time, the RTG would "do something" for those who would face
danger if sent back. However, the RTG would not talk
publicly about this. (Note: Tawin did not explain what "do
something" meant. Presumably it means such persons would not
be sent back to Laos.) The RTG was planning on providing
training to the screeners, who would be RTG officials only.
While expressing appreciation for the offer of USG assistance
for training screeners, Tawin said it was not needed. The
NSC representatives later welcomed, however, U.S. assistance
through MSF to the Hmong in Petchaboon and potentially to
help relocate the group in Nong Khai.


8. (C) Tawin said that the RTG was looking for another
location for the Nong Khai Hmong, especially the women and
children. He said, "trust me," the group would not be
deported. The RTG intended to move them to another
Immigration facility where they would be held until the
acrimonious atmosphere with the Lao government on this group
abated.


9. (C) In response to a question on the status of the Vang
Pao arrest case, Political Counselor stated that the accused
were innocent until proven guilty. The case would likely not
go to trial until 2008. There could be lengthy proceedings.
So far, the Lao government response had been restrained.
However, the Lao seemed to have taken some small positive
steps in response.


10. (C) Political Counselor expressed appreciation for the
RTG decision to permit additional processing of North Koreans
for U.S. resettlement. She noted that some in the RTG seemed
to have wanted to require that such cases be sent first to
South Korea. This could not work under South Korean law and
so was unacceptable to the USG. Political Counselor
expressed hope that the RTG had made a final decision on the
issue. The USG would continue to handle the North Korean
refugee issue discreetly. It was notable that after about
one year, the number of North Korean refugees in Thailand
interested in U.S. resettlement was relatively small.

Burma Refugee Issue
--------------


11. (C) Political Counselor noted recent reports that the
Thai military had not permitted two groups of Burmese
refugees, totalling 300 persons, to enter Thailand. She
stated that the PABs seemed to be working well and expressed
hope that new Burmese arrivals fleeing fighting or political
persecution would be permitted to enter Thailand and have
their cases heard by the PABs. Burmese military activities
against ethnic groups were continuing. This was a factor
behind the cross-border movements.


12. (C) Tawin responded that he had not seen the reports.
The PABs were intended to hear the cases of new arrivals. At
the same time, resettlement programs in the Burma border
camps had created a pull factor which was bringing more
Burmese into Thailand. The RTG had held some initial
discussions with UNHCR on improving the PAB process,
including using new UNHCR methods, including prescreening,
for dealing with mixed migration movements that included both
legitimate refugees and economic migrants.
BOYCE