CONTINUING DEADLOCK ON PETCHABOON HMONG

C O N F I D E N T I A L BANGKOK 000360

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

GENEVA FOR RMA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2017
TAGS: PREF PREL PHUM TH LA
SUBJECT: CONTINUING DEADLOCK ON PETCHABOON HMONG

REF: A. 06 VIENTIANE 1205


B. 06 VIENTIANE 1232

C. 06 VIENTIANE 1234

D. VIENTIANE 0012

Classified By: Susan Sutton, Political Counselor, Reasons 1.4
(B, D).


1. (C) Summary. The recent arrest and threatened deportation
to Laos by the RTG of 152 Lao-Hmong is a reflection of the
larger, and so far intractable Petchaboon Hmong situation. A
sizeable majority of the approximately 7,500 Hmong at
Petchaboon are likely from Laos. Most have gone to the
Petchaboon site, not because of fighting or persecution in
Laos, but because they want access to any future U.S.
resettlement program. Many have been encouraged to do this
by Hmong-Americans, who have their own agendas. The
remainder are likely long-stayers in Thailand who left Laos
sometime after the Vietnam War, but there are also certainly
some who have recently fled Laos because of fighting or
persecution. For various reasons, Thailand has adopted a
tough approach to the Petchaboon situation. Until recently,
the Lao government has refused to engage with the Thai or
anyone else on the Petchaboon Hmong, though constructive Lao
engagement on this problem is essential to any resolution.


2. (C) UNHCR has worked hard on this issue, but the RTG has
so far refused UNHCR access to the Petchaboon group and
traditional UNHCR screening would require significant
resources that UNHCR does not have at this point. Any
possible USG involvement in resettlement of the Hmong is
complicated by the material support issue. The new and
recent Lao willingness to engage on the Petchaboon issue with
the Thai and to accept Lao-Hmong deportees opened the door
for the well-publicized deportation of one group in
mid-November and led to the current issue of the 152 Hmong at
Nong Khai. Strong international opposition seems to have
stopped the Thai from moving forward with deportations for
the time being. Any solution to the overall Petchaboon Hmong
issue will likely require some combination of credible
screening of the population in Thailand, credible monitoring
of any returnees to Laos and assurances that they will be
treated humanely, reduction of the Hmong-American "pull
factor," and a commitment by resettlement countries to accept
those found to be refugees. End summary.


3. (SBU) The complex Petchaboon Hmong situation, which began
in mid-2005 when large numbers of Hmong began to move to a
site in Thailand's northern Petchaboon Province, continues to
defy easy resolution. The recent Thai arrest and threatened
deportation of 152 Lao Hmong should be seen against the
backdrop of the larger Petchaboon Hmong issue, though the
group's arrest occurred in Bangkok. UNHCR and other
international organizations, Post, other Embassies, NGOs and
the RTG have engaged on this issue on a regular basis since
its inception. Since that time, various factors, which
continue to exist, have combined to make a solution elusive.

Who Are the Hmong at Petchaboon?
--------------


4. (C) MSF, which is providing medical care and food to the
Hmong, estimates that the current Petchaboon population
numbers about 7,500. This represents a considerable increase
in recent months over the approximately 6,000 Hmong who were
at the site during the first year. While there cannot be
complete certainty about who these Hmong are and why they
went to the Petchaboon site, the preponderance of reports
from the beginning have suggested that the group can be
broken down into three parts: a) Persons who entered
Thailand sometime after the Vietnam War and went from other
parts of Thailand to Petchaboon where they had been living in
the hope of gaining access to any U.S. post-Wat Tham Krabok
resettlement program. The number (this and the following
numbers are rough estimates) of persons in this group is
about 500; b) Persons who entered Thailand recently from
Laos, but who were well-settled in Laos and have gone to
Petchaboon with the same objective as the first group. The
number in this group is about 6,000; and c) Persons who also
crossed recently into Thailand from Laos but who have
legitimate refugee claims because they are fleeing fighting
or persecution (see ref A). The number in this group is
about 1,000.

Why Has This Problem Been Intractable?
--------------


5. (SBU) The normal approach to resolving a situation like
Petchaboon would be to seek a tripartite agreement among
Thailand, Laos, and UNHCR that would entail interviewing the
Petchaboon Hmong to identify those with legitimate refugee
claims. Those screened out would be returned to Laos with
UNHCR monitoring and assistance to ensure that they are not
mistreated and can resume normal lives. For those determined
to be refugees, UNHCR would seek a durable solution, either
local integration in Thailand or third-country resettlement.
Since Thailand in only rare cases has assented to local
integration, UNHCR would have to gain the agreement of other
countries to resettle the refugees. This comprehensive
approach was used successfully in the past with Laos to
address post-Vietnam War refugee issues.


6. (C) The RTG has so far adopted a tough stance towards the
Petchaboon Hmong situation, as demonstrated by its refusal
from the start to permit UNHCR access to the group and
unwillingness to engage in any structured dialogue with UNHCR
and interested countries on a solution. The RTG has also
stated that its preference is to deport the Petchaboon Hmong
who are from Laos. At the same time, it has recognized that
some have legitimate refugee claims. The RTG thinks that
formal UNHCR involvement with the population would raise
expectations that a large U.S. resettlement program is in the
offing and draw even more Hmong from Laos into Thailand.
From the experience of the past 18 months, this fear is
reasonable.


7. (C) Apart from the pull factor worry, there is also a
feeling of exhaustion among Thai officials: they see
Thailand as having dealt with Hmong refugees for about 30
years and wonder when it will end. They also know that most
of the Petchaboon Hmong who have crossed into Thailand
(illegally under Thai law) are not fleeing fighting or
persecution but seeking U.S. resettlement. Thai officials
therefore see this as a challenge to the RTG's control of its
own borders. While the RTG is uneasy and unhappy with the
Petchaboon situation, it has been unable to come up with a
solution. It is also sensitive to international community
concerns. In the end, if it were possible, the RTG might
look favorably on a comprehensive approach with UNHCR
involvement, simply because it would resolve a problem that
the RTG itself has found intractable.


8. (C) Until recently (see below),the Lao government had
refused to acknowledge that any of the Lao-Hmong at
Petchaboon are from Laos. It had not engaged on the issue
with the RTG or with UNHCR. Despite the recent shift in the
Lao government position, Lao assent to a formal, tripartite
agreement with the RTG and UNHCR that entails a comprehensive
solution is likely not in the cards, nor is Lao agreement to
a reopened UNHCR office in Laos.


9. (SBU) UNHCR screening of the large Petchaboon Hmong group
would require significant resources, which UNHCR would likely
request from donor countries. UNCHR would have to deploy
additional international staff, recruit more local personnel
and interpreters, set up and train interview teams, update
country of origin information, ensure uniform application of
standards, and establish an appeals procedure. Further,
there is little reason to begin such an effort unless there
is sufficient commitment from resettlement countries to take
those determined to be refugees. Given the limited
resettlement quotas of other resettlement countries, U.S.
participation would be essential.


10. (C) The USG has so far stated that while it will consider
individual Hmong cases referred for U.S. resettlement, there
would be no large resettlement program for the Petchaboon
group. Complicating the issue from the USG perspective is
the issue of material support. It is likely that a
signficant portion of those Petchaboon Hmong who might
receive UNHCR refugee status -- those who fled Laos because
of fighting or persecution -- might be ineligible for U.S.
resettlement because they provided material support to or
were combatants for organizations that could be considered
terrorist groups under current U.S. law. As previously
reported, interim Prime Minister Surayud asked the Ambassador
hypothetically in early December whether the U.S. could help
with resettling the Petchaboon Hmong when the Ambassador
requested that the RTG not deport the 152 at Nong Khai.


11. (C) A signifcant contributing factor to the Petchaboon
problem, which has heightened the difficulty of finding a
solution, is the encouragement by Hmong-Americans to Hmong in
Laos to cross into Thailand to seek resettlement even though
they are not fleeing fighting or fear persecution. From a
variety of reports, it appears that Vang Pao, persons
associated with him, or other Hmong-American groups, for
reasons that are not clear to us, have played a promiment
role and actively encouraged Lao-Hmong to cross into
Thailand. In so doing, these persons are attempting to
hijack the normal refugee resettlment process for their own
purposes. Their activities are well-known to the RTG. In
addition, individual Hmong-Americans, who may simply want
their relatives to gain a chance for a better life in the
U.S., could be acting on their own and telling their
relatives in Laos to go to Petchaboon.


12. (C) These activities by Hmong-Americans, even if
well-intentioned, have also had the unfortunate and
significant negative side-effect of preventing UNHCR and the
international community from getting to and assisting those
Hmong in Petchaboon who are true refugees in need of
assistance. If the Petchaboon population consisted only of
these persons, it would be much smaller and a solution easier
to find. Any resolution of the Petchaboon problem will
require strong and continuing USG dissuasion of Vang Pao or
other Hmong-American groups and broad and continuing outreach
to the Hmong-American community that they should not be
encouraging Lao-Hmong who do not have legitimate refugee
claims to cross into Thailand.

What Has Caused the Current Crisis?
--------------


13. (C) The precipitating factors for the recent deportations
or threatened deportations of Hmong to Laos were on both the
Lao and Thai sides. The Lao government shifted its policy
toward the Petchaboon group several months ago. It told the
RTG that it would be willing to accept back small groups of
Lao-Hmong after it had received their names and other
identifying information and confirmed that they were from
Laos. A Thai National Security Council (NSC) staffer told
Refcoord recently that he believed the reason for the change
was a Lao government decision, after last year's leadership
reshuffle, to seek general improvement of relations with
neighboring countries, including Thailand. As a result, the
Lao agreed to the outstanding Thai request to engage on the
issue.


14. (C) At the same time, on the Thai side, Thai NSC chief
General Winai Phattiyakul left his position and took on new
duties after the military coup in September. His
replacement, Prakit Prachaonpachanuk, is not as skilled as
Winai and lacks Winai's broader political sense and
appreciation of the international community's views on
refugee issues in Thailand. In addition, the new Thai
Immigration chief has taken a tougher approach on some
refugee issues. The recent increase in the numbers of the
Petchaboon Hmong might also have heightened concern on the
Thai side. As one NSC staffer recently said in a meeting
with Embassy personnel, "The Hmong keep coming. What are we
supposed to do?"


15. (C) With the door opened by the Lao, and with new key,
tougher-minded RTG personnel in place, the RTG deported 53
Hmong to Laos on November 15. Ref A stated that there are
some reports that this group was comprised of economic
migrants and that they received assistance from the Lao Red
Cross upon their return. On November 17, the group of 152
Lao-Hmong, about two-thirds of whom have UNHCR refugee
status, were arrested in Bangkok, taken to Nong Khai, and
threatened with deportation. It is uncertain why the RTG
chose this group; it may be partly happenstance, that this
group was identified by immigration authorities and arrested,
much as groups of North Koreans have been recently. They
were not located in Petchaboon and the fact that many have
UNHCR refugee status made certain a strong international
reaction. What is clear is that the RTG, at least initially,
saw this group as no different than the rest of the
Petchaboon Hmong, despite their UNHCR status.


16. (C) The strong international community reaction, as well
as opposition to deportation by the Thai Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA),has slowed the momentum towards deportation of
the 152 Hmong. UNHCR has referred those in the group with
UNHCR refugee status to third countries, including the U.S.,
for resettlement. It appears at this point, though it is not
yet certain, that the Thai government may permit resettlement
as an alternative to deportation to Laos. PM Surayud
reportedly approved resettlement if the Lao Government
agreed. The PM has also apparently endorsed the MFA position
that a third party must be involved to monitor the return of
any Hmong.

Larger Petchaboon Issue Remains
--------------


17. (C) Even if there is a favorable resolution for the group
of 152, the larger Petchaboon Hmong issue will remain. Given
the strong international community reaction against
deportation of the 152, the RTG may desist, for the time
being, from further deportations. The willingness of the Lao
government to engage on this issue, even if only with the
RTG, is a positive sign. Thai MFA and NSC sources have told
Refcoord that the Lao government has agreed in principle to
third party monitoring of any returned Hmong, if the third
party is "friendly." (Note: One possible neutral player is
ICRC, although ICRC recently told UNHCR that it did not want
this job. Representative McCollum, in meetings with senior
Lao officials in late December, advocated using the ICRC to
monitor the Hmong already resettled within Laos -- a
suggestion none of the Lao officials rejected (Refs B-D).
IOM, which is signing an MOU with Laos, may be another
possibility.) It remains to be seen, however, whether this
will translate at some point into a credible returnee
monitoring system, and whether the Thai will be insistent on
having such a system in place prior to any returns. Another
important question is whether the RTG will agree to more
formal discussions with UNHCR and interested countries on a
solution to the Petchaboon situation.


18. (C) A resolution of this issue will need to include:
screening on the Thai side, with at least some UNHCR
participation, of the Petchaboon Hmong prior to any returns
to Laos; monitored returns to Laos of the screened out with
assurances that they will be treated humanely; reduction of
the "pull" factor being generated by Hmong-Americans; and
agreement by resettlement countries to accept screened-in
refugees.


19. (U) This message was cleared by Embassy Vientiane.

BOYCE