Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BANGKOK3378
2007-06-18 09:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: NEW VIOLENCE STATISTICS; MORE

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER ASEC PINR KHUM TH 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHBK #3378/01 1690930
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 180930Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7705
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4402
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 7299
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 3263
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 9415
RHHJOBU/JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 003378 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/MLS, S/CT, INR (VINCENT)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ASEC PINR KHUM TH
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: NEW VIOLENCE STATISTICS; MORE
DEADLY AMBUSHES

REF: A. BANGKOK 03092 (PATTANI MOSQUE PROTEST)

B. BANGKOK 01675 (RISING USE OF PARAMILITARY FORCES)

C. BANGKOK 01572 (SECTARIAN PASSIONS RISING)

D. BANGKOK 01390 (UPDATED VIOLENCE STATISTICS FOR
2006)

E. 06 BANGKOK 05230 (UPDATED VIOLENCE STATISTICS)

F. 06 BANGKOK 01134 (CRUNCHING THE NUMBERS)

Classified By: Political Counselor Susan M. Sutton. Reason 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 003378

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/MLS, S/CT, INR (VINCENT)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ASEC PINR KHUM TH
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: NEW VIOLENCE STATISTICS; MORE
DEADLY AMBUSHES

REF: A. BANGKOK 03092 (PATTANI MOSQUE PROTEST)

B. BANGKOK 01675 (RISING USE OF PARAMILITARY FORCES)

C. BANGKOK 01572 (SECTARIAN PASSIONS RISING)

D. BANGKOK 01390 (UPDATED VIOLENCE STATISTICS FOR
2006)

E. 06 BANGKOK 05230 (UPDATED VIOLENCE STATISTICS)

F. 06 BANGKOK 01134 (CRUNCHING THE NUMBERS)

Classified By: Political Counselor Susan M. Sutton. Reason 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary. While the number of violent attacks and
deaths in Thailand's southernmost provinces have not
dramatically risen in 2007, the casualty rate through April
has increased, suggesting a qualitative shift in the
violence. Indeed, the insurgents appear to be more confident
in their attacks on security patrols, with at least three
instances since May where separatists "wiped out" an entire
government unit. End Summary.

NO MAJOR INCREASE IN ATTACKS
--------------


2. (C) As an update to refs (D-F) analysis of violence
statistics, we recently received Prince of Songkhla
University Professor Srisomphop's latest report. Covering
the period from January through April 2007, this report
(which includes slight revisions to some 2005 and 2006 data)
highlights a continuation of 2006 trends: no dramatic
increase in the number of incidents (as often claimed in the
media) but more focused and brutal attacks.


3. (C) According to this update, 2173 people have been killed
in separatist violence since 2004, with 3633 people wounded.
While the average number of attacks per month in 2007 (181)
is an increase over 2006 (149 incidents),it is consistent
with 2005 (180). The average number of deaths per month in
2007 (62) is slightly higher than the last three years (56,
48, and 57, in reverse chronological order). The most
dramatic shift, however, lies in the average number of
injuries per month: from January to April of this year, an
average of 158 people were wounded each month. In 2006 this

number was only 98; in 2005, 89; and in 2004, 63.


4. (C) Of note, the percentage of victims who are Buddhist
also appears to be rising slightly. While the number of
Buddhists injured has traditionally been greater than Muslims
injured (and the number of Muslims killed greater than
Buddhists),in the first four months of 2007, Buddhists led
in both categories. Of those injured, 65 percent were
Buddhists. Of those killed 59 percent were Buddhists.
(Note: this interim report did not provide specific
breakdowns on the backgrounds of victims, i.e. civilians vs.
security forces and other officials.)

BOLDER SEPARATIST ATTACKS ON PATROLS
--------------


5. (C) Coordinated raids across the three provinces (and in
certain districts of Songkhla),attacks on economic targets,
and particularly brutal murders (e.g. beheading Buddhist
monks) have occurred since at least 2004. Likewise,
insurgents have consistently focused attacks on elements of
the state, such as teachers and the security forces. Several
recent attacks, however, suggest that the separatists are
increasingly confident and gradually improving their tactical
prowess.


6. (C) For example, separatists have long sniped at small
Army or police patrols, particularly on isolated backroads.
Over time, these fire fights have grown longer, with the
insurgents not always withdrawing after first contact, even
against larger units. On March 21, a patrol of 10 soldiers
was ambushed in the Bacho district of Narathiwat. One
soldier was killed and two wounded in a nearly 10-minute
firefight. An even larger contingent of troops was similarly
attacked on April 23 in the Sungai Padi district of
Narathiwat, with at least 18 soldiers wounded after a
sustained fire fight


BANGKOK 00003378 002 OF 002



7. (C) The mostly deadly--and dramatic--innovation in
insurgent tactics has been the combination of IEDs and
set-piece ambushes on moving security patrols. Again, the
use of buried IEDs against both mobile and static government
targets is not new, but several recent incidents show the
deadly effectiveness of focused IED attacks against an
isolated security unit, followed by a sustained fire fight


8. (C) On May 9 a seven-man Royal Thai Army (RTA) Special
Forces (Psyop) unit left a village in the Rangae district of
Narathiwat. This unit had been working in the area for
several months, and, unlike many regular RTA units, included
soldiers conversant in the Malay-Muslim Yawi language.
Shortly after their departure, a well-placed and timed IED
detonated under their pick-up truck, flipping the vehicle in
the air. While some details remain unclear, all seven
soldiers were found dead beside the wreckage, with gunshots
to the head. Only two days later, two policeman in a
checkpoint in the same district were attacked by six
separatists in a truck. The insurgents threw a burning can
of kerosene into the police bunker, forcing the officers out
where they were killed and their bodies burned.


9. (C) Such incidents have not been limited to Narathiwat.
On May 31, eleven rangers were similarly killed in Banang
Sata district of Yala, when their truck was hit by a roadside
IED. RTA leaders told reporters that those that survived the
blast were either shot point-blank or strangled by their
attackers. Most recently, on June 15, a seven-man RTA patrol
was hit by an IED on a back road in the same district.
Initial reports indicate that the seven were killed in the
blast and subsequent fire fight. Two separate police patrols
have similarly been attacked in the Yaring district of
Pattani, although in both incidents, insurgents failed to
kill the entire unit.

WHILE "REGULAR" VIOLENCE CONTINUES
--------------


10. (C) The vast majority of deaths in the south remain
attributable to singleton killings, often in brutal fashion.
Notable incidents in the last few weeks include the murder of
police officer on June 7 in Rusoh district of Narathiwat.
The policeman, who was dropping his wife off at the local
market, was surrounded by eight pistol-wielding separatists
in the busy marketplace and executed. On June 11, insurgents
walked into a local school's breakroom in Srisakorn,
Narathiwat and calmly shot two teachers eating lunch.
Photographs of their bodies on the floor graced the cover of
local newspapers the next day.

COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) Srisomphop's statistics remain a useful sanity check
on more sensational analysis in the media (sometimes aided by
RTG officials),but the rise in the number of injuries per
month is worrisome. Separatists have slowly and naturally
improved their ability to effectively kill security
patrols--indeed several of our contacts have been warning for
years that the RTG was likely to have entire unit wiped out
someday. This spike in Army and police casualties could lead
to calls for more aggressive (and potentially heavy-handed)
tactics, or just as dangerous, an increased unwillingness
among local units to leave base, effectively ceding more
territory to the insurgents.
BOYCE