Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BANDARSERIBEGAWAN72
2007-02-27 03:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Cable title:  

BRUNEI VIEWS ON MIDEAST ISSUES

Tags:  PREL BX IR IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8338
RR RUEHBC RUEHCHI RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHKUK RUEHLH RUEHPW
RUEHROV
DE RUEHBD #0072/01 0580341
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 270341Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3733
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUCNISL/ISLAMIC CONFERENCE COLLECTIVE
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN 000072 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2022
TAGS: PREL BX IR IZ
SUBJECT: BRUNEI VIEWS ON MIDEAST ISSUES

REF: A. STATE 3592

B. STATE 19372

C. STATE 14071

Classified By: Ambassador Emil Skodon for reasons 1.4 (B,D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN 000072

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2022
TAGS: PREL BX IR IZ
SUBJECT: BRUNEI VIEWS ON MIDEAST ISSUES

REF: A. STATE 3592

B. STATE 19372

C. STATE 14071

Classified By: Ambassador Emil Skodon for reasons 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Government of Brunei (GOB) appears to
be viewing Mideast issues increasingly through the prism of a
broader Sunni-Shia divide. Over the course of a long
conversation with Dato Shofry, the Acting Head of the GOB
external intelligence service, Shofry expressed concern about
increasing Iranian influence reaching as far as Southeast
Asia. He said the GOB was worried about prospects for Iraq
becoming a training ground for international terrorists, and
warned that if the USG pulls out of Iraq it will likely be
abandoned by the rest of the international community as well.
The GOB is encouraged by the Secretary's active engagement
in the Middle East Peace Process, which besides advancing the
cause of peace helps to counter negative views of the U.S.
among the world's Muslims. Shofry made a strong pitch for
encouraging more students from Muslim-majority countries to
study in the U.S., as the best long-term investment we could
make in the future of U.S. relations with the Islamic world.
End Summary.


2. (SBU) A range of Mideast-related issues were among the
topics I covered in a February 13 one-on-one lunch with
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) Permanent
Secretary Dato Shofry bin Abd Ghafor. Shofry, who spent many

SIPDIS
years in New York as Brunei's UN Permrep, is currently
dual-hatted as the Acting Head of the GOB external
intelligence service, the MFAT External Research Bureau. In
that role he is responsible for overseeing the preparation of
briefings on foreign policy issues for the Sultan, Crown
Prince, Foreign Minister, and other top GOB officials.

--------------
IRAQ
--------------


3. (C) Drawing on ref A and other sources, I summarized for
Shofry the new Iraq strategy announced by the President in
January and its progress to date. He commented that the GOB
understood the rationale behind the "surge strategy,"
particularly its non-military elements of bolstering moderate
political leaders and improving economic conditions. Brunei
hoped our new approach would be successful, as the GOB was

worried about Iraq becoming a training ground for terrorists
who would eventually expand their operations beyond its
borders. Shofry was, however, unsure whether depending on
the Iraqis to take responsibility for their own future
constituted "a policy or a hope," given that the divisions
within Iraqi society appeared increasingly intractable and
its leaders incapable of bridging those differences.


4. (C) Shofry quizzed me about the likelihood that calls
from the U.S. Congress for a phased troop withdrawal would
result in the adoption of a mandatory timetable. After I
explained why the President was averse to announcing a
definitive pre-determined drawdown schedule, Shofry warned
"If you go, everyone goes." He doubted that any members of
the coalition would remain committed to Iraq in a meaningful
way absent a strong U.S. military presence, and commented
"They are there because they care about the U.S., not because
they care about Iraq." Shofry also implied that prospects
were dim for a multinational force drawn from Muslim
countries to take the place of the current coalition, given
widespread pessimism about Iraq's internal security. In
short, Shofry said, once the U.S. was gone from Iraq the
world would no longer care about the Iraqis -- not
necessarily a bad thing, he mused, since it might force the
Iraqis to face up to their problems and take action to find
solutions.

--------------
IRAN
--------------


5. (C) I told Shofry that there was at least one country
that would not lose interest in Iraq and would, in fact, seek
to fill the void if the international community pulled out.
That country was Iran. Shofry acknowledged the threat of
more Iranian intervention in Iraq, and said Teheran's
apparent drive to play more of a leadership role in the
Muslim world was deeply worrying for Brunei. He was
concerned that an increasingly hostile divide between Sunnis
and Shia in the Middle East could spill over into Southeast
Asia and lead to instability here.


6. (C) I expressed some surprise at this, given the
preponderance of moderate Sunnis among Southeast Asian

BANDAR SER 00000072 002 OF 002


Muslims. Shofry maintained that Shia influence (a term he
used interchangeably with "Iranian influence") was growing in
the region. This was due to Teheran's sponsorship of study
by young Southeast Asians in Qom and other Iranian religious
centers, its backing for Iranian-trained Islamic teachers in
Southeast Asia, and its appeal to young Muslims who admired
the outspoken way Iran unabashedly championed the cause of
Islam and "stood up" to the West. Shofry said there were no
practicing Shia among Bruneians, but the growing number in
neighboring countries was a worry to the GOB. He claimed
that 15 million Indonesians were either Shiites or close
Iranian sympathizers. When I asked where he had gotten that
number, Shofry replied that this was what the GOB had been
told by "our friends" (a reference to the external services
of other ASEAN countries).


7. (C) Drawing on refs B and C and other sources, I briefed
Shofry on USG policy toward Iran and urged the GOB to ensure
that it was adhering to the terms of UNSCR 1737. He replied
that the GOB took seriously its responsibility to adhere to
UNSCR decisions, including this one, and would take the
necessary steps to enforce its applicable provisions. Shofry
urged the USG to calibrate carefully its strategy regarding
Iran's nuclear program. He warned that the Iranian
population would "circle the wagons" and rally around its
leaders if it came to believe that western powers were only
interested in placing pressure on the regime and were not
offering constructive alternatives to Iran's current, suspect
nuclear energy program.

--------------
MEPP AND U.S. RELATIONS WITH ISLAMIC WORLD
--------------


8. (C) Shofry said the GOB was encouraged by Secretary
Rice's active personal reengagement in the Middle East peace
process. Besides the obvious advantage of raising hopes for
a lasting settlement between the Palestinians and Israelis,
public engagement in the peace process was the single most
important step the USG could take to improve its popular
standing in the Islamic world and counter the widespread view
that the Global War on Terror was a cover for a Global War on
Muslims.


9. (C) In reply to my question about other measures the USG
could take to improve relations with Muslim-majority
countries, Shofry commented that much of the problem was due
to Muslims identifying America only with the policies of the
current Administration; rightly or wrongly, most Muslims saw
those policies in a negative light, and from there it was
only a short intellectual leap to being negative about
America itself. In his view, the USG should offer vastly
more support for people-to-people exchanges, so Muslims could
learn first-hand that there was much more to the U.S. than
the policies of any given Administration.


10. (SBU) I pointed out that in the last year the USG had
sponsored nearly fifty Bruneians for foreign trips to
interact with American counterparts, either to the U.S. or to
the International Law Enforcement Academy in Bangkok. Shofry
acknowledged the usefulness of such short-term programs, but
thought the real bang-for-the-buck lie in encouraging more
Muslim students to pursue higher education in the U.S. He
made a strong pitch for education fairs and other promotional
activities by American universities to attract Bruneian
students, arguing that anyone who lived among the warm and
generous population of the United States for a period of
years might continue to oppose USG policies, but would e
highly unlikely to harbor hatred for the county itself.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) The normally soft-spoken Shofry's visceral concern
about the implications of a growing and increasingly violent
Sunni-Shia divide was striking, especially given that Brunei
appears so far removed from the effects of this schism (the
constitution of Brunei defines its state religion as "Islam
according to the Shafeite sect," i.e., one of the main Sunni
schools of Islamic law). Equally striking was the manner in
which he used the terms "Shia" and "Iranian" interchangeably,
leaving little doubt that he saw Teheran as the aspiring head
of the Shia world. The GOB's traditional preference for
conciliation and the need to avoid any appearance of taking
sides against a fellow Muslim country will preclude it from
taking an active role in pressuring Iran, but Shofry's
comments leave little doubt that the GOB is concerned about
the potential spread of Iranian prestige and influence. End
Comment.
SKODON