BRUNEI FAVORS UN LEAD ON BURMA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN 000322

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MLS:ACOPE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL BM BX
SUBJECT: BRUNEI FAVORS UN LEAD ON BURMA

REF: A. STATE 148530

B. BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN 288

Classified By: DCM Justin Friedman, reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) The GoB believes that the efforts of UN Special
Representative Gambari are and should continue to be central
to the international community's attempt to bring Burma
toward dialogue and national reconciliation. China's
leverage is probably overrated, in the GoB view. While the
Bruneians believe there should be no backtracking from ASEAN
on the firm stance it has taken on the recent regime crack
down, they will want ASEAN to continue constructive
engagement with Burma to keep the regime from slipping into
further isolation. The GoB expects the ASEAN Charter to be
signed next month and Burma to participate fully in the ASEAN
summit. END SUMMARY.

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UN EFFORTS CENTRAL
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2. (C) Drawing on ref A points, Ambassador, accompanied by
DCM, discussed the state of play in Burma with Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Trade Deputy Permanent Secretary Datin
Hajah Maimunah Elias on October 25. Ambassador briefed that
the new steps on sanctions President Bush announced were
designed to target senior regime officials and not/not harm
ordinary Burmese. The goal of the sanctions was to press the
regime to engage in a real dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi
(ASSK) and ethnic groups leading to a real process of
national reconciliation and democratization. Stressing that
it was important for all parties to keep the pressure on the
regime, Ambassador told Datin Maimunah that ASEAN has an
important role to play in encouraging positive movement and
we were interested in what next steps Brunei was seeking.


3. (C) Datin Maimunah responded that the GoB's priority is
for ASEAN collectively to urge the regime to continue the
process of national reconciliation and to support UN Special
Representative Gambari in his efforts. Maimunah was
encouraged by the regime's opening of dialogue with ASSK and
allowing Gambari to return so quickly to Burma. She
cautioned that the Burmese military see themselves as the
only entity in Burma holding the country together and thus
"the military must be part of any solution" for long term
transition and stability in Burma.


4. (C) Maimunah commented that Senior General Than Shwe was
extremely prickly about ASSK, and would walk out of the room
if her name was mentioned. Maung Aye was similarly a hard
liner. She said that there were indications the military may
be split on what to do about ASSK, but they were united that
the military should rule Burma.

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CHINA LEVERAGE OVERRATED
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5. (C) Maimunah noted that China would likely prefer to keep
quiet its efforts to encourage the Burma regime to engage in
genuine dialogue. She cautioned that China does not have the
leverage with the regime that others believe. The regime
could easily respond to increased pressure by shutting off
the Chinese, causing China to lose face. Isolating the
regime would likely backfire, as the military has the
resources to survive even in further isolation. Only the
general population would suffer. Maimunah said that the GoB
does not believe sanctions are a useful tool, particularly if
they affect the general population.

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ENGAGEMENT ONLY WAY FORWARD
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6. (C) The Ambassador asked for the GoB view of signaling
ASEAN's continued "no business as usual" stance with Burma by
such measures as limiting the regime's participation in
upcoming ASEAN-led summits and ASEAN members reducing the
level and frequency of mil-mil contact with the regime.
Maimunah responded it was not clear that such steps would be
productive. The GoB believes that continued constructive
engagement with the Burmese allows ASEAN to convey its views
to the regime and put across the point of the need for
genuine dialogue. She posited that Than Shwe is feeling the
pressure of current ASEAN and UN steps and that engagement

BANDAR SER 00000322 002 OF 002


was the best way to channel that pressure into positive steps
and avoid a regime retreat into isolation. Maimunah said
that the ASEAN Charter signing was still on track with Burma
expected to fully participate in the Summit.

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UNCOMFORTABLE WITH SINGAPORE'S FORWARD LEANING STANCE
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7. (C) Within ASEAN, Maimunah noted, Singapore is leading the
discussion on next steps. When we asked about whether Brunei
supported the Singaporeans, Maimunah was measured, saying
only that Brunei was "fully supportive of Singapore in
expressing support for the UN and its envoy, Gambari." The
Singaporean Ambassador to Brunei, in a conversation with the
Ambassador on October 23, was less sanguine about the Brunei
view of Singapore's leadership. He observed that the GoB
seems to believe that Singapore had gotten out a bit too far
in front of the rest of ASEAN and was pushing too hard on
Burma. The GoB is uncomfortable about straying from the
ASEAN tradition of non-interference in internal affairs,
probably, he surmised, because its own domestic situation was
hardly an impeccable democracy or above reproach. In his
view, the GoB believes that the recent "concessions" by the
Burmese, such as appointing a so-called liaison to ASSK, were
genuinely encouraging signs of progress and should be
recognized as such.


8. (C) Finally, the Singaporean Ambassador noted that the
Bruneians did not appear completely satisfied with the ASEAN
consensus position of leaving attempts to solve the Burmese
political crisis solely in the hands of UN Special Envoy
Gambari. The GoB, he thought, believes there was still room
for ASEAN to play an independent role. He hastened to add,
however, that the GoB had offered no specific recommendations
in that regard, but rather confined itself to asking
rhetorically if ASEAN should not be doing more on its own
initiative.


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COMMENT: No Backsliding, but Cautious on Next Steps
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9. (C) While the GoB fully supported ASEAN's strong statement
on Burma in September (ref B),the way forward remains
unclear to the GoB as it perceives that even the Chinese do
not appear to have the kind of leverage needed to force rapid
change. Clearly, some of the GoB hesitancy to press harder
and faster for change in Burma is the result of an assessment
that opening the ASEAN door for intervention in members'
domestic affairs could turn an unwelcome eye on Brunei's own
less-than-democratic practices. We expect Brunei to quietly
urge consensus around moderation and dialogue with the
Burmese aimed at keeping the regime engaged and on a slow
path toward reducing human rights violations over time, but
not/not forcing the military out of power any time soon.
SKODON