BRUNEI SUPPORTS UNPRECEDENTED ASEAN ACTION TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN 000288

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM BM BX
SUBJECT: BRUNEI SUPPORTS UNPRECEDENTED ASEAN ACTION TO
PRESSURE BURMESE REGIME

REF: SECSTATE 137644

Classified By: DCM Justin Friedman, Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) The Ambassador delivered reftel demarche separately to
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MoFAT) Permanent
Secretaries Dato Shofry Ghafor and Pengiran Dato Osman Patra

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on October 2. Both indicated that Brunei fully supported the
ASEAN position on Burma, noting that ASEAN had crossed a line
abandoning its usual scrupulous avoidance of commenting on
internal affairs of a member state. Osman said the he was
concerned that the Burmese regime could threaten to scuttle
the November ASEAN summit and signing of the ASEAN Charter in
response to this new pressure from ASEAN, but commented that
this would be a self-defeating abandonment of the lifeline
ASEAN has given Burma out of isolation. Notwithstanding this
potential risk, Osman was confident that ASEAN would create a
human rights body through the Charter and that, so far, Burma
had not been obstructing the process of creating this new
body. These key GoB officials believe that China is best
positioned to affect behavioral change in the Burmese regime.
END SUMMARY.

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BRUNEI FULLY ON BOARD WITH ASEAN ON BURMA
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2. (C) On October 2, the Ambassador, accompanied by DCM,
delivered reftel points separately to MoFAT Permanent
Secretaries Dato Shofry Ghafor and Pengiran Dato Osman Patra.

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Shofry was acting Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade in
the absence of Prince Mohamed (Minister) and Pehin Lim Jock
Seng (Minister II). The Ambassador welcomed the strong
statement by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers in New York and
stressed the need to keep pressure on the Burmese regime,
particularly as the regime's strong-arm tactics have
temporarily reduced the widespread public protests on the
streets in Burma and the generals might be tempted to
conclude that they could return to business as usual. Shofry
commented that a call by Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien
Loong to Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah was critical in bringing
Brunei fully on board with the strong statement issued by the
ASEAN ministers in New York. Shofry noted that while the
ASEAN principle of non-interference in the internal affairs
of member states was sacrosanct, the situation in Myanmar
compelled ASEAN to act.


3. (C) Similarly, Pengiran Dato Osman, the Permanent
Secretary who runs ASEAN policy at MoFAT and is Brunei's lead

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on ASEAN Charter negotiations, observed that ASEAN had
crossed a line with the statement. Osman, who was in New
York at the time, noted that the final statement was balanced
by giving the Myanmar regime a way out if it focused on the
need for national reconciliation and cooperated with UN envoy
Gambari. Osman commented that Singapore, as ASEAN chair,
should take the next step by issuing a strong follow up
statement at the upcoming ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting if
Burma fails to respond to ASEAN's call for dialogue.

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IMPACT ON ASEAN CHARTER AND NOVEMBER SUMMIT?
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4. (C) Pengiran Dato Osman expressed concern that the Burmese
may miscalculate and try to pressure ASEAN to back down by
threatening the scuttle the November Summit and Charter
signing. Osman noted that the previous ASEAN statement on
Burma made in Kuala Lumpur (at the July 2006 ARF meeting) had
been intended to give Burma the time and breathing space it
needed to work out its internal problems. He said that
scuttling the summit would be self-defeating as ASEAN has
been the regime's lifeline out of isolation, giving Burma
access to ASEAN's 10 dialogue partners who would not
otherwise agree to meet with the regime at a high level
bilaterally. Osman felt that this lifeline was too important
to the regime to give up. The Ambassador commented that the
Burma regime has triangulated among ASEAN, China, and India
to minimize the impact of its international isolation, and a
strong ASEAN stance could at least reduce its room for
maneuver. Osman responded that now ASEAN members were
frustrated at ASEAN's inability to deliver progress in
Myanmar's internal behavior, commenting that only the Chinese

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and perhaps India have real clout with the regime.


5. (C) Osman informed us that Brunei will host on October 3
what he expects to be the last ASEAN meeting to finalize
language on the ASEAN Charter, including the Human Rights
mechanism. He said that there was full consensus that the
Charter will create a human rights body by stating that there
"shall" be a body "in conformance with ASEAN goals and
principles" but the specific terms of reference for the body
will be left to be agreed by Foreign Ministers after the
Charter signing. Osman said that the UN Universal
Declaration on Human Rights and the UN Convention on the
Rights of the Child will be the core benchmarks for the terms
of reference. He noted that the Burmese had been fully
engaged in the Charter negotiations and had not/not blocked
the creation of the Human Rights body in previous sessions.

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COMMENT
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6. (C) Both Shofry and Osman expressed the sentiment that
ASEAN members felt miffed by the Burmese regime's refusal to
accept a visit by the ASEAN chair. This may have been the
key tactical error by the regime that eventually led to ASEAN
members lining up against another member on an internal issue
for the first time. Both were candid that Burma's snub of
its ASEAN partners had demonstrated the lack of leverage
ASEAN has over the regime. Shofry expected that ASEAN
members could be convinced to support an EU-sponsored
resolution at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva if it did
not go beyond what ASEAN had said in New York. However,
speaking personally and not officially, both believed that
beyond rhetoric, only China was best positioned to affect
behavioral change in the Burmese regime.


7. (C) Given its own lack of democracy, Brunei is
traditionally loath to endorse criticism of domestic action
by other regimes. It appears that the call by PM Lee was a
key factor for moving Brunei beyond its traditional reticence
in this case. We should keep this in mind as we continue to
encourage ASEAN to take additional measures to pressure
Burma, and if need be, urge the Singaporeans to have their
Prime Minister continue his personal diplomacy with the
Sultan.
SKODON