Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAMAKO587
2007-05-31 16:34:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bamako
Cable title:  

REBEL LEADER IYAD AG GHALI ON BAHANGA, ALGIERS

Tags:  PREL PGOV KDEM ML 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1522
RR RUEHPA
DE RUEHBP #0587/01 1511634
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 311634Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7496
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0329
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAMAKO 000587 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM ML
SUBJECT: REBEL LEADER IYAD AG GHALI ON BAHANGA, ALGIERS
ACCORDS AND AQIM

REF: A. BAMAKO 00544

B. BAMAKO 00582

C. 06 BAMAKO 01243

Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson, Embassy Bamako, for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAMAKO 000587

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM ML
SUBJECT: REBEL LEADER IYAD AG GHALI ON BAHANGA, ALGIERS
ACCORDS AND AQIM

REF: A. BAMAKO 00544

B. BAMAKO 00582

C. 06 BAMAKO 01243

Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson, Embassy Bamako, for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1.(C) Iyad ag Ghali, the leader of the Tuareg rebel Alliance
for Democracy and Change (ADC),met with the Ambassador on
May 30 to discuss the case of Ibrahim Bahanga, the status of
the "special" military units, security in the north, and ag
Ghali's planned departure from Mali. Soft-spoken and
reserved, ag Ghali showed nothing of the cold-blooded warrior
persona created by the Malian press. Seemingly tired, he
said President Amadou Toumani Toure had already accepted his
request for an assignment to the Malian Embassy in either
Egypt or Saudi Arabia. Ag Ghali said the GOM viewed fugitive
rebel Ibrahim Bahanga as a "lost cause" following Bahanga's
May 11 battle with the Malian military. He hinted, however,
that he was nevertheless keeping up with Bahanga's
whereabouts. He reported that the GOM had agreed in
principle to create three "special" military units in
accordance with the Algiers Accords, but planned to stand up
only one unit for the time being. Discussions over the
unit's commander - either Hassan Fagaga or Moussa Bah or
others - are still on-going. Ag Ghali said Tuaregs were
willing to accept an increased Malian military presence in
the north and also requested greater U.S. involvement. He
said that while few if any northern Malians agreed with
AQIM's extremist ideology, AQIM was determined to remain in
Mali. He recommended "targeted special operations" that
could disturb AQIM operations in the north, but noted that
such operations may not be sufficient to remove AQIM
completely from Malian territory. End Summary.

--------------
Ag Ghali Wants Out
--------------

2.(C) Iyad ag Ghali, the Tuareg rebel leader and head of the
Alliance for Democracy and Change (ADC),visited the Embassy
on May 30 to meet with the Ambassador and poloffs. The
wide-ranging meeting lasted slightly more than an hour.
Contrary to the image of a cold, calculating opportunist
advanced by the Malian press and members of the Malian

government, ag Ghali appeared soft-spoken and unassuming. He
said he traveled with his family from Kidal to Bamako in May
to "re-establish" his contacts with Malian authorities and
accelerate the implementation of the Algiers accords. He is
also attending meetings of the High Council of Collectivities
(HCCT),to which he was recently re-elected.

3.(C) Ag Ghali confirmed rumors of his plans to depart Mali,
saying he was tired of the problems in the north and tired of
being blamed for them each time they arose. He said he
intends to step back from his role in the ADC and that
President Amadou Toumani Toure (ATT) has already accepted, in
principle, his request to be assigned to a position without a
portfolio at the Malian Embassy in Egypt or Saudi Arabia. Ag
Ghali was vague on the ADC's future following his departure.
He suggested the ADC could be converted into a political
association which was, he said, the ADC's original intention.

--------------
Bahanga's Rebellion
--------------

4.(C) Ag Ghali said continued mistrust between the GOM and
Tuaregs is the main factor hampering the implementation of
the Algiers accords. He reported that this mistrust eased
somewhat following the ADC's quick condemnation of Ibrahim
Bahanga's May 11 battle with Malian forces in the northern
town of Tinzawatene (ref A). Ag Ghali confirmed previous
reports that ADC leaders had put Bahanga's name forward as
one of Kidal's eight representatives to the HCCT in March in
hopes of providing Bahanga with a fresh start (ref B). "He
needed," said ag Ghali of the notoriously unpredictable
rebel, "a new occupation."

5.(C) Ag Ghali felt Bahanga appeared to take to the idea of
being an elected official rather than a rebel, saying he even
campaigned in Kidal for the HCCT elections. Indications of
Bahanga's restiveness, however, materialized prior to Mali's
April 29 presidential election when Malian troops apparently
searched Bahanga's camp in Tinzawatene. Ag Ghali attributed

BAMAKO 00000587 002 OF 003


Bahanga's actions to a personality conflict between Bahanga
and the Malian military officer Ali Gamou. Malian soldiers
commanded by Gamou apparently had another confrontation with
Bahanga in Tinzawatene in early May, prior to the battle on
the 11th. According to ag Ghali, Bahanga believed the Malian
military was singling him out for harassment. Nigerien
Tuaregs associated with the Mouvement des Nigeriens pour la
Justice (MNJ) apparently encouraged Bahanga to fight back.

6.(C) Ag Ghali said 13 Malian Tuaregs had fled to Niger with
Bahanga, in addition to the Nigerien members of the MNJ.
When asked if he knew Bahanga's current whereabouts, ag Ghali
said Bahanga was, as of three or four days ago, near the
Malian border in Niger. Although he didn't openly say it, ag
Ghali appeared to be keeping up with Bahanga's movements. Ag
Ghali felt that, as far as the Malian government was
concerned, Bahanga was a "lost cause." He indicated
disappointment with Bahanga's decision-making, but did not go
so far as to indicate whether he had also given up on
rehabilitating his mercurial ADC colleague. He did say that
Bahanga did not share ideological ties to AQIM Algerian
Salafists operating in northern Mali, but could turn to AQIM
for tactical reasons if he finds himself cornered. Ag Ghali
said he was not overly concerned about adventuresome young
Tuaregs joining up with Bahanga but admitted that the risk
remained.

--------------
"Special" Units Still Under Construction
--------------

7.(C) Ag Ghali said he hoped his presence in Bamako would
accelerate the creation of the "special" military units
created by the Algiers accords. He said the GOM was hesitant
to stand up the units due to fears that re-integrated Tuareg
soldiers would use the training and equipment provided to
re-play the 23 May 2006 attacks on military outposts in
Menaka and Kidal. Ag Ghali said he was working with Malian
authorities to allay these concerns.

8.(C) According to ag Ghali, the GOM is moving forward with
the creation of one "special" unit, of Tuaregs and others, to
be based in Tin-essako. He said the GOM and Tuaregs were in
the process of deciding who would command this unit. One
potential scenario under consideration involves naming Col.
Hassan Fagaga as the overall commander of the "special"
units. Because Fagaga is widely regarded as unreliable by
the Malian military (based on a hand gesture he made at this
juncture in the conversation, Ag Ghali seemed to indicate he
joined the Malians in this assessment),he would likely be
restricted to Kidal and play little to no operational role.
A second, operational commander based in Tin-essako would
actually lead the unit. Moussa Bah, another ADC leader, is a
potential candidate for this post.

9.(C) Stumbling blocks include the role of the "special"
units within the Malian military, the level of resources and
training allotted to the units, and the selection of unit
commanders. ADC members are apparently concerned that the
GOM is minimizing the "special" units' role within both the
Malian military and northern Mali. Ag Ghali noted that the
GOM currently intends to provide the first "special" unit
with only three vehicles.

--------------
AQIM Influence in Northern Mali
--------------

10.(C) Ag Ghali said one of AQIM's weak points was that not
many people in northern Mali buy into its extremist ideology.
He said that the ADC and northern Tuaregs had repeatedly
asked AQIM (then known as the GSPC) to leave northern Mali in
2006, even going to the point of encouraging the Algerian
Salafists to take advantage of the amnesty program offered by
the Algerian government. AQIM refused, arguing that the
territory it occupied belonged to neither Mali, nor the ADC,
nor the Tuareg people, but to God. Ag Ghali said that after
the two fire-fights between the ADC and AQIM in October 2006
(ref C),AQIM tried to undermine the ADC with an information
campaign that distributed Arabic language leaflets describing
AQIM's doctrine and goals to local nomads.

11.(C) Ag Ghali estimated that the AQIM had little to no
support amongst the native populations of northern Mali, but
that dislodging the group remained difficult. He repeatedly

BAMAKO 00000587 003 OF 003


said that, in his view, the only way to impact AQIM was
through "targeted special operations." He said that while
surgical strikes could seriously disrupt AQIM, defeating AQIM
would be difficult due in large part to the vast area of
empty space they inhabit.

--------------
Security and Economic Development
--------------

12.(C) Ag Ghali outlined three security challenges facing
northern Mali: banditry, discontented rebels like Bahanga,
and AQIM. He said the "special" units could handle the first
problem on their own but that Bahanga and the Nigerien MNJ
complicated matters. We need, he said, the Malian government
to handle Bahanga and AQIM. Ag Ghali reported that Tuaregs
were prepared to accept an expanded Malian military presence
in the north. He also requested U.S. assistance for the new
"special" units.

13.(U) Ag Ghali raised the need for increased economic
development in northern Mali several times. He described the
continued lack of economic development as northern Mali's
most pressing challenge and urged the U.S. to undertake more
training and job creation programs for Tuareg youth.

--------------
Comment: A Few Positives but More Unknowns
--------------

14.(C) The ADC appears committed to the idea of mixed Tuareg
and non-Tuareg "special" units attached to the Malian
National Guard. They also are amenable to expanding the
Malian military's footprint in northern Mali - long a serious
point of contention between northern populations and the
central government. Ag Ghali's request for increased U.S.
involvement in northern Mali is also noteworthy. The
discussion also revealed several points of concern. The GOM
appears to have made little progress toward implementing the
Algiers accords since the March 23-24 Kidal development
forum, having been consumed instead with preparing for the
April 29 presidential elections. Further progress likely
depends on the composition of President Toure's new
government, which may not be named until late August or early
September. As a result, the accords implementation process
is stalled, the steering committee overseeing the
implementation process is in disarray and the Algerian
Ambassador who brokered the deal and served as the key
mediator has returned to Algiers to serve in a new position.
Ag Ghali said that tells his ADC colleagues to wait until
after the elections - apparently meaning both the April 29
presidential election and the July 1 and July 22 legislative
elections. The patience of many ADC members, however, is
clearly wearing thin. Another area of concern is life after
Iyad. While some believe ADC spokesperson Ahmada ag Bibi is
ag Ghali's most likely successor, others doubt whether ag
Bibi can hold the ADC together. One would expect that Fagaga
and Bahanga have their own views on who should lead the ADC
once ag Ghali is gone.
McCulley