UPDATE ON MAY 11 ATTACK AT TINZAWATENE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAMAKO 000554

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV ML
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON MAY 11 ATTACK AT TINZAWATENE

REF: A. BAMAKO 00505


B. BAMAKO 00524

C. BAMAKO 00369

Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson, Embassy Bamako, for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1.(C) Summary: Tuareg sources close to Alliance for
Democracy and Change (ADC) dissident Ibrahim Bahanga provided
further information on Bahanga's May 11 attack against Malian
military forces in Tinzawatene (refs A and B). Kidal based
sources report 4 Malian government soldiers killed and 13
wounded. Bahanga reportedly lost 6 men along with 5 wounded.
If these numbers are correct, the Malian military suffered
greater losses on May 11 than it did on May 23, 2006, when
the ADC attacked military outposts in Menaka and Kidal. On
May 21 ADC leaders again condemned Bahanga's actions, and the
ADC also reportedly issued an order to its often
unpredictable number two, former army deserter Col. Hassan ag
Fagaga, to act "responsibly" during the aftermath of the
Tinzawatene attack. While ADC leaders Iyad ag Ghali and
Ahmada ag Bibi have publicly distanced themselves from
Bahanga, Fagaga's sentiments remain unclear. End Summary.

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Aftermath of Tinzawatene Attack
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3.(C) According to sources based in Kidal, four Malian
government soldiers were killed in the attack along with 13
wounded. Many of these were apparently ethnic Tuareg. The
wounded are reportedly in Kidal. One serious case was
evacuated to Point G hospital in Bamako. On May 23 the
Malian military's Director of Public Affairs said he was
unsure of the number of military casualties but suggested
that three Malian soldiers had been killed. Of these, one
was an ethnic Tuareg, another an ethnic Arab/Moor and a third
was from southern Mali. Kidal sources said six of Bahanga's
men were killed along with five wounded. Reports indicate
that all of Bahanga's wounded were from Niger rather than
Mali and were transported to the Algerian town of Tamanrasset
and are now in the custody of the Algerian military, who are
providing medical treatment. After the May 11 skirmish,
Bahanga and his group, which is believed to include 12 to 15
individuals, fled to the Nigerien town of Assamakka and then
to the Air mountains. The Malian military reportedly
followed Bahanga as far as Assamakka. Malian Tuareg sources
claim that Bahanga has linked up with members of the
Mouvement des Nigeriens pour la Justice (MNJ),including
Agali Alambo and Captain Cherif Mohamed.

4.(C) Prior to the attack, Bahanga was reportedly attempting
to set up a personal fiefdom in Tinzawatene, the home of his
in-laws, to control the local smuggling trade. ADC spokesman
Ahmada ag Bibi reiterated to the Embassy on May 21 that the
ADC condemned Bahanga's actions and said Bahanga had isolated
himself from other Malian Tuaregs. Ag Bibi stated that ADC
leader Iyad ag Ghali also condemned the attack. Less clear
is the reaction of former army deserter and fellow ADC leader
Col. Hassan Fagaga. According to ag Bibi, the ADC has
instructed Fagaga to act "responsibly" - in other words, not
to follow Bahanga's lead or attempt to incite further unrest
in the north.

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Comment: ADC Condemns Attack, Tells Fagaga to Behave
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5.(C) If casualty figures of 4 dead and 13 wounded Malian
soldiers are correct, the Malian military paid a heavier
price during its battle with Bahanga than it did during the
ADC's May 23, 2006, attack on military outposts in Menaka and
Kidal. We have not received any clear indications of how, or
if, the Malian government intends to respond. One
possibility suggested by some Tuaregs in Kidal is the
deployment of all-nomad military units (called for by the
Algiers accords) to frontiers with Algeria and Niger to
prevent Bahanga or any of his men from re-infiltrating Malian
territory. It is unclear, however, whether any all-nomad
units, when and if they are created, will be sufficiently
equipped or organized to undertake border patrols.

6.(C) Despite Bahanga's March 18 election as one of Kidal's
eight representatives to Mali's largely ceremonial High
Council of Territorial Collectivities (ref C),many in
southern and northern Mali regard Bahanga as a criminal and a
bandit. The battle on May 11 likely cemented this
perception. If there is a positive side to the attack, it is
that Bahanga appears to have isolated himself from fellow

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Kidal Tuaregs. On the other hand, Tuareg sources are
hesitant to write Bahanga off as a political player and note
that Col. Hassan Fagaga, who is officially the ADC's second
in command, was also regarded as isolated when he deserted
from the Malian army prior to the May 23 attacks in Menaka
and Kidal. After he deserted, however, Fagaga remained in
Mali. It is difficult to envision Bahanga having much
influence on Kidal Tuaregs when he is several hundred
kilometers away in Niger. This could make Fagaga, once
again, the man to watch. The ADC's warning to Fagaga to
remain calm suggests that ADC leaders have made similar
calculations.
McCulley