Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAMAKO374
2007-04-03 14:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bamako
Cable title:  

KIDAL FORUM BRINGS CLOSURE TO TUAREG REBELLION

Tags:  PREL PGOV EFIN ECON ML 
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VZCZCXRO3054
RR RUEHLMC
DE RUEHBP #0374/01 0931413
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 031413Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7175
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0323
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 0286
RUEHLMC/MCC WASHINGTON DC 0054
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAMAKO 000374 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV EFIN ECON ML
SUBJECT: KIDAL FORUM BRINGS CLOSURE TO TUAREG REBELLION

REF: A. 06 BAMAKO 00591


B. 06 BAMAKO 01032

Classified By: Political Officer Glenn Fedzer
for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAMAKO 000374

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV EFIN ECON ML
SUBJECT: KIDAL FORUM BRINGS CLOSURE TO TUAREG REBELLION

REF: A. 06 BAMAKO 00591


B. 06 BAMAKO 01032

Classified By: Political Officer Glenn Fedzer
for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (C) Summary: The Kidal forum, organized to bring
closure to a Tuareg uprising in May, 2006, brought together
senior Malian government officials, including the President
and Prime Minister, Tuareg leaders, and representatives from
a broad range of donor countries to address the persistent
poverty and isolation that are believed to be the root causes
of the region's instability. The March 22-24 meeting also
provided Malian President Toure (ATT) an opportunity prior to
the upcoming Presidential election to demonstrate that the
Tuareg "problem" was resolved. Air lift support provided to
the Malian Government and the diplomatic community for the
Forum by the Special Operations Command proved to be a highly
visible, and deeply appreciated, testament to USG support for
peace in Northern Mali. Real outcomes may be elusive, but
when challenged with "why are these promises different," the
Prime Minister cited the presence of senior officials and
diplomats (many only able to attend due to the USG-provided
airlift) as the clearest demonstration that this time, the
Malian and international commitment is sincere. End Summary.



2. (U) The Kidal Forum, with invitations extended to
Ambassadors, heads of development agencies, and senior Malian
officials, was held March 22-24 in Mali's most remote, and
inaccessible, regional capital. Kidal is the home of several
thousands of Mali's Tuareg minority, and has been the focal
point of two major rebellions and some minor uprisings
against the central government since independence, the last
in May of 2006 (reftel A). Travel from Bamako to Kidal
normally requires three days by 4x4; routine commercial air
service is unavailable, and the gravel air field lacks even
the most basic ground support facilities.


3. (C) The ostensible objective of the Forum was to promote
a Malian ten year development plan for the north (centered on

Kidal but extending to Tessalit, Gao, and Timbuktu),put
together in a few weeks before the forum by officials in the
Ministry of Planning and Territorial Development. The plan
incisively analyzed the obstacles blocking development in
northern Mali, but lacked clear oversight mechanisms or
funding commitments from the central government. The Forum
was also intended--and for the moment may have succeeded--in
putting to rest the May 2006 Tuareg uprising. The President
deftly used the Kidal Forum as a highly public, and well
publicized, platform to assert that he had peacefully
resolved the conflict, an important bit of "theater" just
prior to the first round of Mali's presidential election,
scheduled for April 29th.


4. (C) USG Airlift support was the critical difference in
making the Forum effective. Tuaregs in the past have
indicated a lack of confidence in the Malian government's
capacity--and will--to implement assistance programs in the
north. Without the significant USG-facilitated outside
participation to lend credence to Malian Government
intentions, the forum may have failed as an instrument of
reconciliation. Members of the Diplomatic and International
community were unequivocal in their appreciation of the USG,
noting it was the only way they would have been able to
participate. "All the world," as one Malian official put it,
could see US commitment to the region with the arrival in
Kidal of the C-130 carrying the Prime Minister and other
Malian ministers and members of the diplomatic corps.


5. (C) Donors remained lukewarm to the 10 year development
plan as presented, and elected neither to endorse it directly
nor pledge any financial backing, but they did use the forum
as an opportunity to publicly highlight their current efforts
in the region--and make clear that peace was necessary for
these programs to continue. The European Union, in
conjunction with Canada, the United States, and Switzerland,
also opted to make a joint statement emphasizing general
support for the development of the north, and the need for
peace to sustain that development.


6. (U) The major complaint articulated by Malian
participants in the forum was the need for improved
transportation links--road, air, and river--(reftel B),but
Tuaregs also noted the lack of education, health care, water
and economic opportunities. For many Malian officials,
diplomats and representatives of international organizations,
the trip was their first to Kidal. A southern Malian,
admittedly dismissive of complaints from the north in the
past, said the trip opened his eyes to the deep isolation and

BAMAKO 00000374 002 OF 002


poverty confronting residents of the region. The town of
Kidal does have electricity and water for part of each day,
but lacks even a single paved road. Underlining the need for
greater institutional support to promote development in the
region, the US Ambassador and the Malian Minister of
Investment took the opportunity to inaugurate a micro-credit
operation receiving capital and training from USAID.


7. (C) Comment: A senior Malian military officer present
at the Kidal Forum claimed that President Toure was briefed
three courses of action after the May uprisings:
counterattack, negotiate, or negotiate and then counterattack
after the election. The officer claimed President Toure
committed himself to peaceful negotiations, and remained
sincere in efforts to keep the Tuaregs in the Malian orbit
without resorting to military options. The Kidal Forum as an
element of that approach appears to have reduced tensions in
Northern Mali for the moment, with the USG C-130
indispensably contributing to that outcome. Should
development efforts lag, violent outbreaks may reoccur, but
donors at least can better appreciate the obstacles to such
efforts-and the Malians' need of foreign assistance to
overcome them.
McCulley