Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAMAKO1006
2007-09-12 11:09:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bamako
Cable title:  

GUNFIGHT IN THE DESERT: A TUAREG DESCRIBES COMBAT

Tags:  PGOV MOPS PTER MARR ML 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5233
RR RUEHPA
DE RUEHBP #1006/01 2551109
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 121109Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8090
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0339
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAMAKO 001006 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2017
TAGS: PGOV MOPS PTER MARR ML
SUBJECT: GUNFIGHT IN THE DESERT: A TUAREG DESCRIBES COMBAT
AGAINST THE AQIM

REF: A. 06 BAMAKO 1243

B. BAMAKO 0960

C. BAMAKO 0995

Classified By: POLITICAL OFFICER GLENN FEDZER FOR
REASONS 1.4 (B),(D),and (E)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAMAKO 001006

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2017
TAGS: PGOV MOPS PTER MARR ML
SUBJECT: GUNFIGHT IN THE DESERT: A TUAREG DESCRIBES COMBAT
AGAINST THE AQIM

REF: A. 06 BAMAKO 1243

B. BAMAKO 0960

C. BAMAKO 0995

Classified By: POLITICAL OFFICER GLENN FEDZER FOR
REASONS 1.4 (B),(D),and (E)


1. (C) Tuareg leader Dayti ag Sidimou described the fire
fight between Tuareg tribesmen and the Al Qaida of the
Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM) that occurred October 23, 2006 (reftel
A) to Embassy officers. Sidimou says that he was present and
wounded during the encounter, and reported that Tuareg forces
in pursuit of AQIM were instead ambushed themselves, with
five Tuaregs killed and two captured. Sidimou elaborated on
the equipment, tactics, and forces available to both sides,
and believed that the AQIM suffered six fatalities. Sidimou
later negotiated the release of the two prisoners, and
accused a member of the Malian Directorate for State Security
(DGSE),Commandant Ould Bou Lamana (reftel B),of tipping off
AQIM to the Tuareg pursuit. Sidimou expressed frustration
that Algeria and other foreign powers failed to helped the
Tuaregs in their fight against the Salafists, and asked that
the United States work with the Tuaregs directly instead of
through the Malian Government.


2. (C) Dayti ag Sidimou from Tessalit is one of four Tuareg
members newly elected to the Malian National Assembly, and
one of the founding officers of the Alliance for Democratic
Change (ADC) (reftel C). A member of the Idnane tribe, he is
not close to either ADC leader Iyad ag Ghali or the Tuaregs
currently in conflict with the Malian Government, Ibrahim
Bahanga and LTC Hassan ag Fagaga.

--------------
TACTICS AND FORCES
--------------

3. (C) Sidimou reports that he was part of the force of
approximately 104 Tuaregs that tracked AQIM through the
desert for five days until the engagement on 23 October. The
Tuaregs were equipped with seven Toyota pickup trucks, two
12.7mm machine guns, and AK-47 Assault rifles. The convoy
traveled in three groups in column, with each group racing at
top speed to reach the next destination. The group taking

the first position would rotate after each day's driving,
with the unit guide always traveling with the first group.
If contact were made, the first group was prepared to strike
out to the right, the second group to the left, and the rear
group would take the center of the line.


4. (C) 23 October, the Tuaregs had tracked the AQIM to a
well near Tekrat (in the Timbuktu region near Araouane)
overlooked by a small rocky hill. At 10 AM, the two lead
trucks veered to the right out of sight of their companions,
where a number of Tuaregs dismounted. The remaining vehicles
(minus one that had broken down near the well) followed the
tracks up to the base of the hill.


5. (C) At that point, Sidimou said that AQIM opened fire
with two 14.5 mm machine guns mounted on trucks that had been
hidden within the rocky formations. He reported that their
forces initially consisted of six trucks, with 2-3 trucks
arriving later in the battle. The AQIM trucks mounted a
total of two twin barreled 14.5 mm anti-aircraft machine guns
and four 12.7 mm machine guns. Sidimou estimated an average
of eight AQIM fighters on each truck, totaling some 65
fighters AQIM engaged. AQIM forces were led by Mochtar bel
Mochtar, but consisted of a mix of Algerian, Mauritanian,
Nigerien, Nigerian, Moroccan, Chadian, and Malian Berabiche
(ethnic Arab) followers. Sidimou said the 14.5 mm fire went
over their heads, and the group retreated to a zone of rocks
and dunes roughly three kilometers away and exchanged
long-range machine gun fire. One of the Tuareg 12.7mm
machine guns malfunctioned almost immediately, but the other
functioned throughout the fight. The trucks that had dropped
the Tuaregs off on the right of the hill joined this group
when the firing started.


6. (C) After a stand-off of nearly an hour, the Tuaregs
behind the dunes advanced in mass and took some fire that
damaged their trucks, but then noted that AQIM had fled the
scene. They discovered five of the Tuaregs who had
dismounted on the right of the hill were dead (all from rifle
fire) and two others captured. Sidimou later negotiated for
their release, and noted that they provided valuable
information on AQIM upon their return to Tuareg ranks.
Sidimou later recanted this, saying the two were "too
traumatized" to say much.

--------------
AFTERMATH: BLAME TO GO AROUND

BAMAKO 00001006 002 OF 002


--------------


7. (C) Sidimou claims that ethnic Arab Berabiche in
Timbuktu, especially DGSE operative Commandant
(Major-equivalent) Ould Bou Lamana, provided advanced warning
to the AQIM. When asked if the central government was aware
of Lamana's activities, Sidimou said "how can they not be,"
and indicated that no one could maintain his position in the
system without the Government fully aware, and accepting, of
his interactions with AQIM.


8. (C) The failure of the Tuareg attack was also attributed
to the failure of other Tuaregs, particularly the Ifogas
tribe of Iyad ag Ghali, to join in the fight. As a
consequence, and in the face of Bahanga's attack on the
government, the ADC may be unraveling (reftel C).


9. (C) Sidimou was highly critical of Algeria and "the
West" for failure to support the Tuaregs in their efforts to
eliminate AQIM, and suggested that if the USG wanted to
eliminate the terrorists, they deal directly with the
Tuaregs, rather than try to work through the Malian
Government.


10. (C) AQIM, for their part, appear to have distanced
themselves directly from Tuareg smuggling, but may have
leadership issues. Sidimou claims that bel Mochtar's
leadership had created a rift within AQIM, with forces
camping in two separate locations. A prior assault by
Tuaregs may have temporarily fixed this problem, as the
Tuaregs believe they faced nearly all of AQIM's forces on
October 23rd. Sidimou also said that Al Qaida leaders in
Afghanistan had sent a leader in August 2007 to take over the
leadership of the AQIM, a post Mochtar refused to relinquish.



11. (C) Comment: We can leave to others further tactical
assessments of the fight between the AQIM and Tuaregs, but at
heart the conflict remains one for commercial dominance.
Sidimou, despite his new-found role as a politician, is also
well-known as a smuggler, yet now calls for a peaceful
resolution of the conflict between Bahanga and the Malian
government around Tinzawaten. He may be sincere, but the
fighting between AQIM and the Tuaregs in October may have
secured for Sidimou what Bahanga felt was threatened by the
Malian military's northern expansion: control of local
smuggling networks. For now, Sidimou says that the AQIM
leaves Tuareg convoys alone--and he adds that they appear to
be well-funded with U.S. dollars to buy food and fuel AQIM
needs to continue operations.
McCulley