Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAKU766
2007-06-20 06:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Baku
Cable title:  

PRELIMINARY INFORMATION ON THE IRAN-ARMENIA

Tags:  ENRG EPET ETRD PGOV PINR PREL IR GG AM AJ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0278
PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHKB #0766/01 1710659
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 200659Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3275
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN PRIORITY 1304
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHDIR/IRAN RPO DUBAI PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 BAKU 000766 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2017
TAGS: ENRG EPET ETRD PGOV PINR PREL IR GG AM AJ
SUBJECT: PRELIMINARY INFORMATION ON THE IRAN-ARMENIA
RELATIONSHIP

BAKU 00000766 001.2 OF 007


Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief Joan Polaschik for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 BAKU 000766

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2017
TAGS: ENRG EPET ETRD PGOV PINR PREL IR GG AM AJ
SUBJECT: PRELIMINARY INFORMATION ON THE IRAN-ARMENIA
RELATIONSHIP

BAKU 00000766 001.2 OF 007


Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief Joan Polaschik for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).


1. (U) This cable has been cleared by Embassy Yerevan.


2. (C/NF) Summary: According to the Armenian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, the Armenian diaspora community in Iran
numbers approximately 300,000 and is centered in and around
the cities of Tehran and Esfahan. An officially recognized
religious minority under the Iranian constitution, the
Armenian community in Iran is reportedly treated well by the
Iranian government, with its primary concerns associated with
Iran's deteriorating economic situation. As the Republic of
Armenia's only reliable outlet to the outside world during
the period following independence, Iran continues to play an
important role in Armenian affairs. Armenia's relationship
with Iran is driven primarily by energy and trading
interests, and the well-being of its large diaspora
population in Iran. Iran's policy towards Armenia appears to
be motivated by its own energy needs, an interest in
developing a north-south energy and transportation corridor,
and a desire to influence other Caucasus countries. There
are no impediments to travel for citizens of either country,
and over 3,000 Iranian students (primarily Iranian Armenians)
reportedly study in Armenia. End summary.

Fundamentals of Iranian-Armenian Relationship
--------------


3. (C) During a May 21-25 regional visit to Embassy Yerevan,
Baku-based Iran Watcher met with a wide range of Armenian
government officials, academics, and members of the NGO
community to discuss Iranian-Armenian relations and Iranian
interests in the Caucasus. During meetings at the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs (MFA),Armen Melkonian (Middle East
Department Director) and Vahagn Afyan (Iran Desk Officer)

said that the Armenian diaspora community in Iran numbered
approximately 250,000 to 300,000, and is centered in and
around the cities of Tehran and Esfahan. An officially
recognized religious minority under the Iranian constitution,
the Armenian community in Iran is reportedly treated well by
the Iranian government, according to Melkonian. Stating that
he was not aware of any mistreatment of the Armenian
community or significant outflow of Armenians living in Iran,
Melkonian also said that if Iranian Armenians chose to leave
Iran, it was most likely for economic reasons. Sergey
Sargsyan, a researcher at the Spectrum Center for Strategic
Analysis (a respected local NGO/think tank),echoed these
points, attributing the insecurities of Armenians in Iran to
the economic and legal difficulties they faced there.
According to Sargsyan, most Iranian Armenians who chose to
leave Iran did so because of the deteriorating economic
situation (exacerbated by the Ahmadinejad government,
Sargsyan suggested) or due to legal problems. Concerning
legal issues, Sargsyan said that in Iranian courts, in "just
about every court case" involving an Armenian and a Persian,
"the Persian was sure to win."


4. (C) Overall, Armenia's foreign policy with Iran appears
to be driven primarily by energy and trade, and the desire to
ensure the welfare of its large diaspora population in Iran.
According to Melkonian, because Iran provided Armenia with
its only reliable outlet to the outside world during the
period following independence (due to instability in Georgia
and the closure of the Turkish and Azerbaijani borders due to
the Nagorno-Karabakh war),Armenia had to develop a good
working relationship with its larger neighbor. Despite
improved stability in Georgia, Melkonian said that Georgia's
strained relations with Russia continue to be a concern for
Armenia. Therefore, Melkonian said that a "pragmatic
approach" with Iran remained essential in light of these
concerns and the continued closure of the Turkish and
Azerbaijani borders. Characterizing Armenia's relationship
with Iran as a "long-term strategic relationship," Vahram
Nercissyants, economic advisor to President Kocharian, said
that while Armenia would prefer to deal with a more liberal
government in Tehran, Armenia would continue to deal with
whichever government was in power. Nercissyants later said
that Iran could not be trusted as a strategic power and that
Armenia would continue to rely on Russia to protect it as
long as a perceived Turkish threat persisted.


5. (C) Characterizing Iranian-Armenian relations as "even,"
Sargsyan said that Iran's foreign policy with Armenia also

BAKU 00000766 002.2 OF 007


revolves primarily around energy and trade issues. Sargsyan
believes that beyond securing the electrical power Iran needs
in its northwestern provinces during the summer months, Iran
continues to see Armenia as a good export market for its
consumer goods. Sargsyan believes that Iran's primary
motivation for maintaining good relations with Armenia rests
on its desire to build a north-south energy corridor (linking
Iran, Armenia and Georgia) with which to export natural gas
to Europe. According to Sargsyan, Iran sees the development
of this corridor as a "top priority" and that its efforts in
the region as a whole must be viewed through this prism.
Complementing this energy corridor, Sargsyan said that Iran
is also interested in building a north-south transport
corridor with which to improve its ability to import and
export goods. Sargsyan suggested that other common interests
played a role. Saying that both Iran and Armenia feared the
emergence of a "Turkish Belt" (Turkey linked to Azerbaijan
via Georgia, Turkey thereby capable of projecting its
influence into the Caucasus and Central Asia more easily),
Sargsyan believes Iran is using the unresolved
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to maintain pressure on Azerbaijan
and hinder the spread of Turkic influence.

Energy Cooperation
--------------


6. (C) Energy plays a crucial role in the Iranian-Armenian
relationship. Areg Galstyan, Deputy Minister of Energy,
characterized Iranian-Armenian relations in the energy sector
as "excellent." According to Galstyan, the volume of energy
exchanges (or swaps) between the two countries has increased
in volume with the completion of a second power transmission
line. Under this long-standing power swap agreement, Iran
supplies Armenia with electricity during the winter months
(when Armenian energy needs are at their highest and Armenian
hydro production is low),and Armenia resupplies the same
amount of electricity back to Iran in the summer months when
Iranian demand peaks and Armenian demand is lower.


7. (C) Concerning the nearly-complete 42KM natural gas
pipeline under construction linking Iran and Armenia,
Galstyan said that he did not anticipate it being operational
until September at the earliest. When this new pipeline
comes into operation, it will expand the existing energy
barter agreement, as Armenia pays for the Iranian gas by
sending a greater volume of summertime electricity back
south. He also spoke about the so-called "second phase" of
the pipeline project, now underway, which will make it
possible to transport gas from the Iran-Armenian pipeline
north as far as Yerevan and the nearby Hrazdan gas-thermal
power plant. Galstyan said that 200KM of the existing 230KM
pipeline will have to be upgraded in order to connect the two
pipelines because the existing pipeline is only 300-500MM in
diameter in most sections (approximately 200KM),while the
new pipeline from Iran has a diameter of 711MM. Moreover,
the existing pipeline connection is old, in poor repair, and
was originally built to ship gas north-to-south, which will
now have to be reversed. Until the second phase pipeline
reconstruction (connection to Yerevan/Hrazdan) is complete,
the Iranian gas is difficult to use; Armenia can pipe only
small quantities through the unreconstructed connector
pipeline, and use a bit more to supply local demand in the
lightly-populated southern province of Syunik.


8. (C) Galstyan also discussed other energy initiatives
being considered, to include the possibility of a new power
transmission line linking Iran, Armenia, and Georgia, two
hydro power plants on the Arax (or Araz, as it is called in
Azerbaijan) River, and the possible construction of an oil
refinery in southern Armenia, at Meghri. Concerning the
possibility of a new power line, Galstyan said that all three
countries had signed a memorandum of understanding on this
account in 2006, with Georgia interested in exporting the
surplus hydro power it generated during the summer months.
To fund this project, Galstyan said that a German loan for
the new 400KW line was being discussed. With regard to the
two hydro power plants to be built on the Arax River,
Galstyan confirmed that such a project was under
consideration. He also said that the hydro power plants
would be jointly financed and constructed with Iran.
Concerning the possible construction of an oil refinery in
southern Armenia (as has been floated in the local media),
Galstyan said that Russian companies were interested in such
an initiative, and that any such project would be much more

BAKU 00000766 003.2 OF 007


of a Russian-Iranian project than an Armenian one. He
professed to know very little about the proposal, about which
he was fairly dismissive. He observed that, if built, the
new refinery would likely produce double Armenia's annual
demand. Galstyan noted that while Armenia had not been
approached by Iran concerning the possibility of building a
new natural gas pipeline linking Iran with the Georgian Black
Sea coast, he said that Armenia would be open to the transit
income.


9. (C) Pol/Econ Chief and Iran Watcher reminded Galstyan of
the very serious Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) concerns that such
a project would provoke for the U.S. We noted that the new
pipeline projects now coming on stream were a gray area to
interpret under U.S. sanctions law, in that they represented
nothing more than an energy swap between Armenia and Iran,
and that (understanding Armenia's very difficult geopolitical
circumstances in securing energy) the U.S. had to this point
not moved to invoke sanctions against the Iran-Armenia
pipeline. However, a project that enabled Iran to ship
natural gas to a third country and from there to world
markets would be a vastly different thing, and a huge problem
for us.


10. (C) Yerevan Comment: Galstyan is among Embassy
Yerevan's most valuable interlocutors. He brings an
engineer's mindset to the technical problem of ensuring that
Armenia has the most robust and flexible energy
infrastructure possible. He also has an admirable and
sincere vision for regional energy cooperation, which he
believes would be a good thing in its own right for all
parties, as well as a confidence-building measure to help
bring peace with Armenia's neighbors, Turkey and Azerbaijan.
In the Turkey/Azerbaijani context, his regional vision is
precious and rare for its startling lack of animus against
Armenia's traditional enemies. This attitude is more
problematic when applied to Iran. However, he and his
superiors (to the top of the Armenian government) all know of
our objections to Iranian engagement, and have promised at
least to be fully transparent with us regarding their plans.


11. (C) According to Igor Zakharov and Armen Arzumanyan of
PA Consulting, a USAID contractor charged with assisting the
Armenian government with energy reform initiatives, the
proposed oil refinery at Meghri would greatly exceed Armenian
internal demand. By their estimations, the new refinery
would produce approximately 1 million tons of diesel oil
annually while Armenian internal demand was only 500,000 tons
per year. They pointed out that since there is no railroad
currently linking Iran with Armenia, a pipeline would have to
be built to transport the oil from Iran to the new refinery
(they also noted the absence of any oil pipeline linking
Meghri with Yerevan). In their estimation, this project was
most likely a joint Iranian-Russian idea. Concerning the new
42KM natural gas pipeline linking Iran and Armenia, they
believed that a September completion was possible, but not
likely. Furthermore, they did not believe that it would be
used for transit purposes (subject to upgrades on the 230KM
pipeline to Yerevan) because once linked, the pipeline could
deliver a maximum of 2.3 billion cubic meters per year, while
estimated Armenian demand for 2007 exceeded 2 billion cubic
meters. In their view, if Iran wanted to supply natural gas
to Europe via Armenia, a new natural gas pipeline exclusively
for this purpose would have to be built.

Trade
--------------


12. (C) Gagik Kocharyan, head of the trade department at the
Ministry of Trade and Economic Development, characterized
trade with Iran as stable, though much lower in volume than
in the peak trading years of 1996-1997 when Iran was
Armenia's most important trading partner. According to
Kocharyan, Iran was now Armenia's sixth most important
trading partner, with higher quality goods from Russia,
Europe, and the U.S. having replaced many of the lower
quality consumer goods Armenia previously imported from Iran.
Kocharyan said that energy was the most important component
of Iranian-Armenian trade, with Armenia's energy swap with
Iran accounting for 40 percent of Armenian exports to Iran.
Beyond energy, Kocharyan said that Armenia's other primary
exports to Iran included cement, copper, and machinery. With
regard to Armenian imports from Iran, Kocharyan said that
diesel fuel, tar, raw materials for the chemical industry,

BAKU 00000766 004.2 OF 007


and fertilizers were Armenia's principle imports. As there
are no rail links connecting Iran with Armenia, Kocharyan
said that Armenia's road border crossing with Iran at Meghri
was the primary way by which Iranian goods entered Armenia
(Kocharyan acknowledged that some Iranian imports entered
Armenia overland from the Georgian ports of Batumi and Poti,
but these were "insignificant"). Kocharyan's principle
complaint about trade with Iran centered on limitations and
restrictions placed on the importation of Armenian goods to
Iran, the Iranian Ministry of Trade requiring that it
pre-approve all imports before transit. He said that while
Armenia and Iran had reached standardization agreements, they
were not yet operational. In Kocharyan's view, if trade were
to become more standardized using tools such as mutual
certificates, trade between the two countries would be
facilitated greatly.


13. (C) Albert Khachaturyan, head of the transportation
department at Sati International Transport, an Iranian
Armenian-owned shipping company based in Bandar Abbas, echoed
Kocharyan's complaints about trading with Iran. According to
Khachaturyan, trade with Iran is difficult because of
difficult Iranian customs practices and Iran's failing
infrastructure (port facilities and roads). As Sati uses
Iran principally as a transit country for goods originating
in China, the Far East, and the UAE, Khachaturyan said that
complex and changing Iranian customs rules affected his
company. For example, Khachaturyan said that it takes at
least one week to get permission to move a container from
Bandar Abbas to Yerevan. Khachaturyan said that plastics,
dry goods, and lower end consumer goods dominated Iranian
imports to Armenia, and that Armenian exports to Iran were
decreasing. Concerning transit goods from Iran to Georgia,
Khachaturyan said that it was far cheaper to ship a container
directly from Bandar Abbas to Poti than overland via Armenia,
with the overland cost was four times higher than by sea.
Khachaturyan said that his company also shipped goods
destined for Azerbaijan from Bandar Abbas, and that in
addition to his company, there were only two other "serious"
shipping companies that did business between Armenia and Iran.


14. (C) Accompanying Embassy Yerevan's EXBS Advisor to the
main border crossing with Iran at Meghri May 24-25, Iran
Watcher discussed trade-related issues with customs
officials, the mayor of Meghri, and U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) contractors. According to the U.S. DOE contractors,
approximately 400-600 trucks entered Armenia from Iran at the
Meghri crossing daily, primarily in the evening hours. (They
attributed increased nighttime activity to cooler nighttime
temperatures, helpful when undertaking a 1-2 hour border
crossing.) Iran Watcher personally observed a considerable
amount of transshipment at the border, Iranian goods being
unloaded into Armenian trucks for onward travel. The
majority of Iranian truck drivers we observed were ethnic
Azeris. Yerevan's EXBS FSN attributed this to the fact that
many Azeris had previously lived in the Republic of Armenia,
but were forced to leave when the conflict with Azerbaijan
worsened. Though he was not easily identifiable as a USG
employee, few Iranian ethnic Azeri truck drivers were willing
to speak with Iran Watcher in Azeri. (Note - It is unclear
whether the truck drivers were not interested in speaking
with Iran Watcher because they were uncomfortable speaking
Azeri in Armenia, whether they simply wanted to get on with
their journey, or for some other reason.) Able to view a
number of sections of the new 42KM natural gas pipeline from
the road, Iran Watcher saw that construction was still
ongoing.

Armenian Views on Iranian Interests in the Caucasus
-------------- --------------


15. (C) Sargsyan of the Spectrum Center for Strategic
Analysis was quite skeptical of Iranian intentions in the
Caucasus, suggesting that Iran pursues separate policies with
all three countries. Satisfied that Armenia's
"Complementarity" foreign policy was not a threat, Sargsyan
believes that Iran will most likely continue to pursue warm
relations with Georgia, mainly due to its interest in
developing a north-south corridor. That said, Sargsyan
believes that Iran remains somewhat wary of Georgia,
especially in light of its improved relations with Turkey and
NATO integration efforts, something Sargsyan says Iran
perceives as a potential military threat. Concerning
Azerbaijan, Sargsyan says that while Iran publicly states

BAKU 00000766 005.2 OF 007


that it supports the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, in
private, Iran does not recognize Azerbaijan as a legitimate
country. Using what he characterized as a "soft expansion"
policy, Sargsyan said that Iran uses religion in the southern
border regions of Azerbaijan to expand its influence,
something he feels the Azerbaijani government fails to
recognize.

Armenian Insights into Developments Within Iran
-------------- --


16. (C) According to Garnik Isagulian, National Security
Advisor to President Kocharian, there is great interest in
Iran for dialogue with the U.S. despite ongoing tensions over
its nuclear program. Born near Esfahan, Isagulian travels to
Iran regularly, most often for official purposes. Providing
an overview of his most recent ten-day visit (in which
Isagulian reportedly met with Tehran mayor Qalibif, the head
of the MFA's Institute for Strategic Studies, and the head of
Iranian state television Zarqami, among others),Isagulian
said that concerns about a possible U.S. military attack
served as a unifying factor for Iranians and allowed economic
issues to be overlooked. He said that the majority of
Iranians he talked with blamed Ahmadinejad for Iran's
deteriorating economic situation and that he thought the
government would collapse if there was not an external enemy
to blame. Isagulian said that the regime sees the
acquisition of nuclear weapons as its ultimate guarantor,
believing that if it does not obtain them, it will be done.
Isagulian suggested that if the U.S. were to address Iran's
regional security concerns, the regime might possibly
reconsider its nuclear programs. Isagulian said that he was
optimistic that relations between the two countries would
improve because the U.S. and Iran would eventually have to
talk. Isagulian suggested that if the U.S. and Iran could
overcome their differences, Iran could even become a major
base of support (non-military) for the U.S. in the Middle
East.


17. (C) Isagulian said that almost all of his contacts and
acquaintances in Iran watched foreign satellite television
programs and listened to U.S.-based Iranian musicians. He
said that the head of Iranian state television told him that
these programs were actively monitored and that state
television prepares its own programming to counter these
messages. Isagulian said that Zarqami was the son-in-law of
Supreme Leader Khamenei and described him as well read and
educated. Isagulian noted that prior to the start of their
meeting, Zarqami was watching a U.S.-based Iranian satellite
television program, something Isagulian believed Zarqami had
done for show. Still, Isagulian said that he believed that
Zarqami was personally open to foreign broadcasts into Iran.
Isagulian also commented that while the majority of ethnic
Azeris considered themselves to be Iranians, there was
discontent in northwestern Iran.


18. (C) Vahram Nercissyants, economic advisor to President
Kocharian, was born in Tehran and travels there regularly to
visit his father and other relatives. According to his
relatives, the economic situation in Iran has taken a turn
for the worse, leading many Iranian Armenians to purchase
property in Yerevan. Saying that the Iranian government goes
out of its way to accommodate the Armenian community,
Nercissyants believes that Iranian Armenians buying property
in Yerevan are not cutting their ties with Iran permanently,
simply seeking a safer place to put their capital.
Nercissyants also said that fear of a possible U.S. military
attack was not driving Iranian Armenian investment in the
Armenian real estate market.


19. (C) Recounting his childhood in Iran and his father's
lengthy employment by the USG, Nercissyants suggested that
the U.S. counter current Iranian fears about possible
fragmentation by reminding the Iranian people that it was the
Truman administration that safeguarded Iran's territorial
integrity in the face of Soviet and British designs.
Speaking to possible motivations behind the recent U.K.
hostage situation, Nercissyants said that the Iranian
government "likes to show its power by creating a problem and
then solving it." Nercissyants conceded, however, that Iran
policy was not within his portfolio, and that despite his
personal history and periodic family visits to Tehran, he did
not particularly keep up with current political/economic
issues between Armenia and Iran. (Note - Nercissyants spent

BAKU 00000766 006.2 OF 007


the great majority of his adult life in the U.S. and working
for the World Bank, before coming to his ethnic homeland to
advise the Armenian government on economic reform. He is a
staunch supporter of classic, liberal-economic, "Washington
Consensus" policies. End Note)


20. (C) According to David Hovannisyan, former Armenian
ambassador to Syria and now professor of oriental studies at
Yerevan State University, two groups within Iranian ruling
circles are wrestling for control over the country's future:
one group comprised of Ayatollah Yazdi and his followers, the
other led by Rafsanjani and his followers. Hovannisyan
believes the Rafsanjani camp had recently emerged dominant,
and is now in a position to shape strategic and foreign
policy direction. According to Hovannisyan, Supreme Leader
Khamenei had shifted his support to the Rafsanjani camp
because he had become increasingly concerned that President
Ahmadinejad's foreign and domestic policies (increasing
tensions with the West and his mismanagement of the economy)
were threatening the stability of the regime. Commenting
that Khamenei was now more influential than he was two years
ago, Hovannisyan said that he believed that the Supreme
Leader would play a more active role in foreign policy
decisions.

The Iranian Exchange Student Population and Possible Outreach
Opportunities
-------------- --------------


21. (C) According to MFA Iran Desk Officer Vahagn Afyan,
approximately 3,000 Iranian students studied at Armenian
universities. Saying that the majority of Iranian students
were Armenians from Iran, Afyan said that Armenia was an
attractive location for Iranian students because they could
pursue courses of study that they might not be able to in
Iran, the political and social climate in Armenia was much
freer, and, in the case of Iranian Armenian students, many
had relatives living in Armenia. According to Embassy
Yerevan CONS Chief, Yerevan's medical university had an
especially large Iranian exchange student population.


22. (C) We subsequently learned that Iran's Firdusi
University in the city of Mashad completed a renewable,
three-year cooperation and exchange agreement with the
Brussov Institute, Armenia's most prestigious, private
foreign language university. The agreement was signed during
the May 24-25 visit to Iran of Brussov's rector, Suran
Zolian. The agreement provides for exchanges of both
students and professors, but does not specify the numbers.
The Iranian students will reportedly come to Yerevan to study
or work within the Russian language department of the Brussov
Institute. Brussov offers FARSI instruction only as an
academic minor (second foreign language) to students focusing
on another foreign language. Embassy Yerevan confirmed this
with the Brussov vice-rector, through the help of a Yerevan
FSN who is a part-time member of the Brussov faculty.


23. (C/NF) Garnik Asatrian, head of oriental studies at the
new Aria International (Private) University, also a Yerevan
State University professor, and editor-in-chief of the
scholarly journal "Iran and the Caucasus," provided an
overview of Aria University's academic and exchange student
programs. According to Asatrian, the majority of exchange
students at Aria University come from Iran. Asatrian
introduced Iran Watcher to a number of his master's and
doctoral students, many with Iranian expertise (one an expert
on Baluch issues, for example). Saying that Iranian exchange
students and academics felt very comfortable pursuing their
academic endeavors in Armenia due to excellent
Iranian-Armenian relations, Asatrian expressed an interest in
facilitating academic conferences involving both U.S. and
Iranian academics. (Note - Hovannisyan at Yerevan State
University was also very interested in the prospect of
bringing together U.S. and Iranian academics) Both Asatrian
and Hovannisyan said that they would consider upcoming
opportunities to facilitate a meeting of U.S. and Iranian
academics and forward to Iran Watcher their proposals for
consideration.

Comment
--------------


24. (C) Given Iran's strong desire to develop a regional
energy and trade corridor, counter expanding U.S. influence

BAKU 00000766 007.2 OF 007


in the Caucasus, and growing sense of isolation due to
increasing tensions with the West, it is unlikely that Iran
will radically change its policy approach towards Armenia.
While noting that there had been no pressure from the Iranian
side, the MFA's Armen Melkonian said that President
Ahmadinejad has indicated a strong interest in visiting
Armenia again in the September/October timeframe.
DERSE