AZERBAIJANI DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KHALAFOV ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAKU 000734

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR DAS BRYZA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV ENRG BPIS AJ TU
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJANI DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KHALAFOV ON
IRAN AND TURKMENISTAN

REF: BAKU 696

Classified By: Charge Donald Lu, REASONS 1.4 (B,D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Deputy Assistant to the Vice President for
National Security Advisor Joseph Wood and Ambassador Derse
met with Azerbaijani Deputy Foreign Minister Khalaf Khalafov
on May 30. Khalafov, responsible for Caspian delimitation
and policy toward Iran and Turkmenistan, affirmed
Azerbaijan,s support for UN sanctions against Iran but
stressed the Security Council must be united for sanctions to
be most effective. Stressing Azerbaijan,s complex
relationship with Iran, Khalafov urged dialogue rather than
confrontation over Iran,s nuclear programs.
Khalafov outlined Azerbaijan,s plans to re-establish
relations with Turkmenistan, focusing first on "non-dispute"
issues such as humanitarian and economic issues, including
the establishment of an intergovernmental commission. END
SUMMARY.

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IRAN-AZERBAIJANI RELATIONS
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2. (C) Khalafov, who is Azerbaijan's chief negotiator on the
Caspian demarcation issues, and is responsible for Iran
policy within the Azerbaijani MFA, described
Azerbaijani-Iranian relations as being different at different
points in time. Speaking in Azerbaijani, Khalafov said that
Azerbaijan was trying to build relations in order to
"minimize the negatives" from the Iranian side, and that
Azerbaijan is "carrying out political dialogue in order to
normalize political relations." He said that Azerbaijan was
always factoring in Iran when it formulates its policies and
that there are sometimes negative effects as a result.


3. (C) Khalafov said that Iran continues to export Islamic
revolution to Azerbaijan overtly through educational and
cultural means, particularly through providing formal Shi'ite
Islamic education to young Azerbaijani men. Additionally,
Khalafov cited Iranian support for Armenia as something that
also had a direct, detrimental effect on Azerbaijan's
national security. He said that both these factors have
"increased over the years." He said while Sunni extremism is
rising worldwide,
Iran is also doing its part to support Islamic radicalism in
the north Caucasus and Georgia.


4. (C) Azerbaijan is also concerned about Iran's nuclear
program. Khalafov said that Azerbaijan acknowledges Iran,s
right to peaceful nuclear development in line with
international norms and standards. However, he quickly
conceded that Iran had gone well past peaceful nuclear
development. Khalafov said that "if the situation continues
to develop as it is, then it will not be good for
Azerbaijan." He lamented the statements of Iranian President
Ahmedinejad, noting that his statements against Israel "do
not contribute to stability, because Iran has the ability to
act on their statements."


5. (C) Khalafov was also concerned about Iran's role in the
Middle East and the Middle East Peace Process, nothing that
Iran,s goal was to "create problems with the Sunni
countries." He described Iran as pushing "artificial
policies they are trying to use in the context of the Middle
East." In regard to Russia, he said that Iran's position
creates a great deal of opportunities for Russia in the
region, and quickly noted that it therefore was important for
Azerbaijan to strengthen its alliance with the United States
and Europe in security, political, economic and social areas.
He said that it was not in Russia's national interests that
Iran develop nuclear weapons.


6. (C) In regard to a third round of United Nations
sanctions, Khalafov opined that Iran does not comprehend the

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effect that sanctions will ultimately have on it, and said
that Azerbaijan favored a third round of sanctions on Iran.
He also was quick to stress that it would be important for
the United Nations Security Council to be unified on this, as
this would send a more powerful and ultimately productive
message to Iran than the sanctions themselves. Khalafov said
that Azerbaijan "feels a big responsibility" to implement
UNSCR 1747 and that Azerbaijan
would implement these sanctions as best as it could. He also
noted that "Azerbaijan has warned Iran of the consequences
that may follow" sanctions.


7. (C) Khalafov said that the influence of Ahmedinejad was
not as great as people would believe. Based on the structure
of the Iranian state, Khalafov said that the President is
simply a puppet in the hands of the religious leaders, and
carries out their policies. He said that much of the
internal issues in Iran results with dissatisfactions with
Ahmedinejad and not necessarily with the clerical system.


8. (C) Khalafov was also quick to stress that while
Azerbaijan is a strategic partner of the United States,
Azerbaijan is not interested in provoking Iran and that
dialogue should be maintained whenever possible. He said
that the situation within Iran "could be advantageous" and
that "not everyone supports the government; there is
opposition." He added that "work needs to be carried would
with the 'hope sources' to deal with the Iranian nuclear
issue."

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TURKMENISTAN
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9. (C) The discussion then turned to Turkmenistan, and
Khalafov gave a fairly comprehensive briefing on Azerbaijani
Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov's recent trip to
Turkmenistan (reftel). In addition Azerbaijan,s plans to
take on "non-dispute" issues initially (reftel),Khalafov
said that the re-establishment of Azerbaijani-Turkmenistan
relations would focus on humanitarian issues, reopening the
Turkmenistani embassy in
Baku, economic issues, Caspian dialogue and the establishment
of an intergovernmental commission. He also noted that it
would be important that Kazakhstani-Turkmenistani relations
be strengthened, and he told Wood that "Azerbaijan and the
United States have to work closely to get Turkmenistan and
Kazakhstan to work more closely together." He said that the
Kazakhstani and Turkmenistani presidents were "still more
Russia-oriented,
but there is room."


10. (C) Deputy Assistant to the Vice President Wood has not
had an opportunity to clear on this message.
LU