AZERBAIJANI-RUSSIAN COORDINATION ON PUTIN'S GABALA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 000728

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - PARA 13 CLASSIFICATION CORRECTED

SIPDIS

FOR EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR AJ RU
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJANI-RUSSIAN COORDINATION ON PUTIN'S GABALA
PROPOSAL

REF: A. BAKU 00720


B. BAKU 00219

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Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Donald Lu per 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) Summary: The GOAJ publicly and privately has admitted
that it had discussions with Moscow regarding potential U.S.
- Russian use of the Gabala radar station before Putin made
his June 7 announcement on the sidelines of the G8 Summit in
Heiligendamm, but the precise nature of this dialogue is
unclear. The GOAJ's public and private explanations largely
coincide, emphasizing that prior Azerbaijani-Russian
discussions were limited. We have lingering questions,
however, about how closely Baku and Moscow coordinated their
positions before Putin's June 7 announcement. End Summary.

Azimov Confirms GOAJ Discussed Missile Defense with Russia
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2. (C) In a June 8 meeting with the Charge d,Affaires,
Deputy FM Araz Azimov confirmed that President Putin had
called President Aliyev earlier this week to discuss missile
defense. Azimov said that Putin's announcement had come as a
complete surpise to him and that FM Mammadyarov had to
confirm this information directly with President Aliyev
because the Ministry had been unaware of the phone
conversation between the two presidents. Based on his
discussion with Mammadyarov, Azimov said he believed that
Aliyev probably did not respond in exactly the manner that
Putin described; Azimov believed that Aliyev most likely had
told Putin something along the lines of "we want this problem
to be solved." Azimov also noted that Aliyev,s instructions
to Mammadyarov on the Gabala proposal were "not to hurry up,"
instructions Azimov interpreted as a clear signal that Aliyev
had not given final agreement to Putin,s proposal.


3. (C) Azimov concluded that Aliyev most likely had welcomed
Russia,s desire to solve its differences with the United
States over missile defense but had not made any commitments
to the Gabala proposal. (Note: Azimov is often vague and
difficult to pin down in his conversation style. While this
largely is because Azimov prefers speaking at a more
theoretical level, we also believe he sometimes intentionally
employs ambiguous language to provide the GOAJ maximal
maneuvering room as his listeners may not be 100 percent sure
what he intended. We also note that Azimov was providing
third-hand information, some of it based on his personal
interpretation of a third-hand conversation.)


4. (C) Azimov also confirmed that Lavrov had "briefly
touched on" Gabala during his May 21-22 visit to Baku, but
did not go into detail. Azimov said Gabala had also come up
during his own consultations in Moscow in early May, when his
Russian counterparts briefed him on their discussions with
the U.S. on missile defense. Azimov,s counterparts
characterized the planned Polish and Czech systems as "the
third deployment" and told him the U.S. had plans to deploy a
missile defense system in a fourth region. The Russians told
Azimov that the U.S. had identified the South Caucasus as the
fourth region, and asked whether the U.S. had ever broached
the subject with him. Azimov said he then briefed the
Russians on discussions with the U.S. in the early and late
1990s regarding the status of Gabala. At the time, Azimov
said, the U.S. had urged Azerbaijan to retain Gabala but work
out a deal with Russia that would ease its security concerns.
Azimov noted that Azerbaijan had done precisely that in 2002.


5. (C) Azimov said that his instructions from FM Mammadyarov
on this issue were that "we should be ready to talk,
consult." He added that Mammadyarov had approved his June 7
statements to the press. Azimov said Azerbaijan,s public
line on the Gabala issue was and would continue to be:
"Azerbaijan owns Gabala and cooperates with Russia. If
anything new is suggested, let,s talk."


6. (C) Azimov asked that missile defense be added to the
agenda of the July 9 bilateral security consultations. He
would like a briefing on the current proposals for the Poland
and Czech Republic systems, as well as a briefing on the
technical possibilities for Gabala radar station. Azimov
noted that President Aliyev must be well-prepared for these
important decisions. (Comment: Embassy encourages the
Department to add missile defense to the July 9 agenda.
Azimov is the key decision-maker in the MFA on security
issues, and has a long, detailed knowledge of the history and
capacity of Gabala radar station.)

GOAJ Public Statements Also Acknowledge Coordination

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7. (C) In the days since Putin's June 8 announcement, there
have been several official GOAJ statements on the proposal.
The statements have addressed at least two issues. On the
question of the level of coordination between Baku and Moscow
before Putin's announcement, official statements have walked
the line of acknowledging that both sides conducted
discussions, while striving to show that coordination between
Moscow and Baku was limited. Russian Embassy DCM Oleg
Krokhin told Emboff on June 8 that the initiative was
discussed "one to two months ago" between Azerbaijan and
Russia "at high levels," and that the idea had been
"thoroughly worked out" beforehand -- reftel A. (NOTE: It was
originally reported that the idea had been "thoroughly worked
out" by both sides, but follow up questions with Embassy
translator for the June 8 meeting indicate that Krokhin's
meant that the idea had been "thoroughly worked out" on the
Russian side.) On the question of Azerbaijan's opinion of
Putin's proposal, official statements have been upbeat, while
noting that any potential negotiations between Washington and
Moscow would have to be closely coordinated with Baku.
President Aliyev, Foreign Minister Mammadyarov, and Deputy
Foreign Minister Araz Azimov -- in reverse order -- have been
the key GOAJ officials to address these two questions.
Mammadyarov and Azimov were the first officials to comment;
Aliyev did not go on record until June 10, while he was in
Moscow on the sidelines of an informal CIS Heads of State
meeting.

Azeri Public Statements
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8. (C) Azimov -- representing the initial GOAJ statement on
Putin's proposal -- on June 7 stated that "We are exchanging
views on the subject both with the USA and Russia in a
bilateral format . . . Azerbaijan is ready to hold bilateral
and trilateral talks on the issue with the USA and Russia. .
. In any case, Azerbaijan should definitely be involved in
discussions on the use of the Gabala radar station." Azimov
also publicly acknowledged that Lavrov and Mammadyarov
discussed the Gabala proposal during Lavrov's May 21-22 visit
to Baku. Azimov, however, did not amplify the nature of
Mammadyarov and Lavrov's discussions.


9. (C) Mammadyarov's June 8 statement focused on
Azerbaijan's readiness to conduct further discussions with
the U.S. and Russia, while emphasizing that Azerbaijan's
national interests need to be taken into account.
Mammadyarov noted, "We are ready for bilateral or trilateral
talks on the use of the Gabala radar station. Azerbaijan is
ready to consider the issues like whether there will be a new
contract, how it will be and the form of cooperation there.
I do not believe that this issue will cause any difficulty
with any country. Because Azerbaijan's foreign policy and
position have been first of all build on its national
interests." Sounding a positive note, Mammadyarov also
observed that "joint use of the Gabala radar station by
Russia and the US can lead to higher stability in the region
and make actions in the region predictable."


10. (C) President Aliyev provided his first comments in a
June 10 television interview while in Russia. Aliyev
acknowledged that he had had a telephone conversation with
Putin, while downplaying the substantive nature of their
discussion. Commenting on Putin's proposal, Aliyev stated,
"This issue is not new. However, it was not discussed in
detail in Baku. Nor was it discussed in detail in a
telephone conversation with the Russian president."


11. (C) Aliyev's statement on potential joint U.S. - Russian
use of the Gabala radar station focused on how the new
strategic benefits this type of cooperation could bring to
Azerbaijan. Aliyev's upbeat commentary suggests the GOAJ
perceives that if managed well, U.S. - Russian cooperation at
Gabala could be a tool for enhancing Azerbaijan's regional
importance and maximizing its leverage with the U.S. and
Russia. Aliyev said: "I do not regard this offer as a
possibility to gain (a) one-time benefit. This is a new
element of strategic relations between Russia and the United
States. . . Baku has never been guided with one-time
benefits. I am being guided with the long-term strategic
relations with Russia and the United States." Aliyev
continued, "The possible joint use of the Gabala radar
station could also become a new element of strategic
relations and security and help to resolve certain problems
more quickly."
Comment

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12. (C) We believe the level of Baku's prior coordination
with Moscow and Baku's receptivity to U.S. - Russian access
to Gabala largely coincide. On the issue of Baku's
discussions about missile defense with Moscow before Putin's
June 7 announcement, Baku seeks to emphasize that these
discussions were limited in nature.


13. (C) While Azerbaijan is a strong security partner, we
believe the level of discussions between Moscow and Baku
before Putin's announcement may have been greater than the
GOAJ is acknowledging. While there is a basic information
gap on what specifically Azerbaijani and Russian officials
discussed before Putin's statement, we suspect the GOAJ may
not be telling us the full story. We believe this because of
(a) Azimov's quick and upbeat response to Putin's
announcement on the evening of June 7; (b) Azerbaijan's
broader interest in not telling the U.S. about the full
extent of personal and interstate relations between
Azerbaijan and Russia; and (c) Putin and Aliyev's close
personal ties (reftel B).


14. (C) While we are unlikely to ever fully know what
Azerbaijan and Russia may have discussed before Putin's June
8 statements, we believe sustained engagement with the GOAJ
is critical. Briefing DFM Azimov on U.S. missile defense
options during the scheduled July 9-10 bilateral security
dialogue is a critical next step.
LU