PRESIDENT ALIYEV CONFIRMS SUPPORT FOR THE GABALA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAKU 000721

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DEPT FOR EUR A/S FRIED

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2017
TAGS: PREL MARR MNUC OPRC PARM RU IR AJ
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT ALIYEV CONFIRMS SUPPORT FOR THE GABALA
RADAR PROPOSAL

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Donald Lu per 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: After briefing President Aliyev on his June
8 meeting with the Charge d'Affaires, Presidential Foreign
Policy Advisor Novruz Mammadov informed us that "in
principle, all is good." President Aliyev told Mammadov that
if the process of discussing Putin's proposal to bring the
Gabala radar station into the missile defense system
continues, Azerbaijan will support the process. In his
earlier discussions with the Charge, Mammadov emphasized the
risks that any missile defense cooperation would pose to
Azerbaijan's security. According to Mammadov, Iran believes
that Azerbaijan has been planning missile defense cooperation
with the United States for a long time; he fears that,
without the West behind it, Azerbaijan will be vulnerable to
retaliation from Iran. Mammadov said Azerbaijan would expect
the support of the United States in dealing with this threat.
End summary.

President Aliyev Supports
--------------


2. (C) Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Novruz Mammadov
phoned the Charge to communicate that he had met with
President Aliyev about the issue of the Russian Gabala Radar
proposal and that, "in principle, all is good" with the
President. President Aliyev told Mammadov that if the
process of discussing this proposal continues, Azerbaijan
will support the process.


3. (C) Mammadov added that he would not speak over an open
phone line about the dangers he had discussed earlier with
Charge (i.e., the risk of Iranian retaliation),but that
Azerbaijan would expect the support of the United States in
facing these threats. He added that while President Aliyev
supported discussion of the Gabala radar proposal, he was not
sure what the reaction would be in Azerbaijan to the
continued U.S. position favoring deployment of radar and
interceptor missiles in the Czech Republic and Poland.


4. (C) In an earlier June 8 meeting, the Charge briefed
Mammadov on USG reaction to President Putin's proposal that
the Gabala radar be incorporated into the missile defense
system. Drawing on NSA Hadley's June 7 press availability,
Charge emphasized that the United States viewed Putin's
proposal as a positive development, as it indicated that the
Russians recognized the global threat posed by missile
proliferation and are now willing to work with the
international community to counter this threat. Charge
underscored that the United States deeply values its
cooperation with Azerbaijan and respects its sovereignty and
integrity; as NSA Hadley said, Azerbaijan must be able to
make decisions and act in a sovereign way. The Charge also
encouraged Mammadov to stay in close touch with the Embassy
and to coordinate any public statements on this issue.

Reaction in Tehran
--------------


5. (C) Mammadov said that Putin's proposal is a "critical
issue" for Azerbaijan. Whether or not the Gabala radar is
incorporated into the Missile Defense system, the mere fact
of Putin's proposal will have serious implications for
Azerbaijan's security. Mammadov said that the Azerbaijani
Embassy in Tehran already had received inquiries from the
Iranian Government about Putin's proposal, suggesting that
Azerbaijan had been preparing to cooperate with the U.S. on
missile defense "for a long time." According to Mammadov,
Iranian President Ahmadinejad previously had discussed
missile defense with the Azerbaijani Government in hopes of
preventing any Azerbaijani cooperation with the United
States. Ahmadinejad has been pushing hard recently for
another state visit to Azerbaijan; Putin's proposal will only
make the Iranians try harder, as it will confirm the
Iranians' belief that they are the target of the proposed
missile defense system. Mammadov predicted that Iranian
pressure on Azerbaijan would only increase during the long
period of discussions required to address Putin's proposal.
With a wry laugh, Mammadov said that Iran will now "forget
about Israel" and turn its sights on Azerbaijan.


6. (C) Expounding on the complexities of Putin's proposal,

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Mammadov noted that the U.S.-Azerbaijani relationship is
quite different from the partnership that exists with Poland
and the Czech Republic. Azerbaijan's participation in any
missile defense system would increase the risks to its
security, as it does not have the protection of the NATO
alliance behind its decisions. Azerbaijan's proximity to
Iran makes it extremely vulnerable to Iranian pressures,
Mammadov said. Recalling the incident in 2001 when Iranian
gunboats threatened BP exploratory vessels in the Caspian,
Mammadov said that "no one" objected to this "inappropriate
interference." Yet in spite of these risks, Mammadov said
that Azerbaijan "cannot not participate" in the missile
defense system, as the system is designed to counter Iranian
missile threats. And Putin's June 7 statements, Mammadov
noted, already launched Azerbaijan into international
discussions of the missile defense system.

Dissatisfaction with the Russian Announcement
--------------


7. (C) Mammadov said that Azerbaijan "had information from
Lavrov" regarding Russia's proposal for the Gabala radar
station, but had been "put in a bad situation by the way
Putin acted." Mammadov hinted that Putin had put a very
different spin on his conversation with Aliyev, telling us
that the two presidents' conversation "had not been a
consultative discussion." Azerbaijan's position, Mammadov
said, has been "complicated by Putin's statements."
Acknowledging that he did not know whether the two presidents
had in fact discussed missile defense as Putin publicly
stated, Mammadov said "there most probably was a telephone
call, as Putin was not likely to lie." Mammadov again
confirmed that Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov had raised the
issue with Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Mammadyarov during
Lavrov's May 21-22 visit to Baku.
LU