PRELIMINARY INFORMATION ON THE IRANIAN DIASPORA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 000392

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2017
TAGS: EFIN MASS PINR PREL SCUL IR AJ
SUBJECT: PRELIMINARY INFORMATION ON THE IRANIAN DIASPORA
COMMUNITY IN AZERBAIJAN (C-TN7-00225)

REF: STATE 031483

BAKU 00000392 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S/NF) Summary: According to the Azerbaijani State
Migration Service, the Iranian diaspora community in
Azerbaijan numbers approximately 10,000 and is made up
predominantly of ethnic Azeris, Talysh and Persians. Despite
the appreciable number of Iranians living in Azerbaijan,
especially in the capital Baku, there are no significant
diaspora social, cultural, religious, business, or political
organizations, let alone leaders, who enjoy a large
following. A number of groups claiming to represent the
interests of "southern Azerbaijanis" have offices in Baku,
but appear to have little support among either the
Azerbaijani or Iranian communities and are heavily monitored
by Azerbaijani and Iranian security services. The Islamic
Republic of Iran (IRI) maintains a large presence in
Azerbaijan and, operating out of Iran's diplomatic posts and
cultural centers, keeps a careful eye on the diaspora
community, including the 700-800 Iranian students resident in
Azerbaijan. Although some prominent Azerbaijani opposition
politicians have adopted the cause of "southern
Azerbaijanis," there appears to be little coordination
between these politicians and the somewhat fractured
"southern Azerbaijani" diaspora groups with offices in Baku.
Neither the Iranian nor the Azerbaijani government seems
willing to allow the explosive unification issue to derail
bilateral relations. End summary.

An Overview of the Iranian Diaspora
--------------


2. (C) According to the Azerbaijani State Migration Service,
the Iranian diaspora community in Azerbaijan numbers
approximately 10,000 and is made up predominantly of ethnic
Azeris, Talysh and Persians. Despite the appreciable number
of Iranians living in Azerbaijan, especially in the capital
of Baku, there are no significant diaspora social, cultural,
religious, business, or political organizations, let alone
leaders, who enjoy a large following. This lack of
non-governmental, organized activity is likely due to heavy
government scrutiny, both in the IRI and Azerbaijan, as
neither government is keen on separatist agitation in its
respective country. It is also important to note that the
vast majority of Iranian ethnic Azeris, both in Iran and
Azerbaijan, consider themselves to be Iranians first, ethnic
Azeris second.


3. (SBU) While the majority of Iranians living in Azerbaijan
are not politically active, a number of organizations
claiming to represent the views of Iran's ethnic Azeri
community have emerged. Founded primarily by ethnic Azeri
refugees or assylees now living in Europe and North America,
these organizations are motivated by a strong desire to see
"South Azerbaijan" reunified with Azerbaijan. Of these
groups, the most significant in terms of size and influence
include the World Azerbaijanis Congress (Dunya
Azerbaycanlilari Kongresi) and Southern Azerbaijan National
Awakening Movement (Guney Azerbaycan Milli Oyanis Herekati).
Headed by Dr. Javad Derakhti (an ethnic Azeri holding Swedish
citizenship),the World Azerbaijanis Congress claims to have
6,000 members active in 14 countries. Similarly, the
Southern Azerbaijan National Awakening Movement, headed by
Professor Mahmudali Chehraganli (an ethnic Azeri now living
in the US),claims to have an active membership numbering "in
the thousands," also active in over 14 countries. Also
claiming to represent the views of Iran's ethnic Azeri
community, GunAz Television (GunAz is short for Guney
Azerbaijan or South Azerbaijan),a Chicago-based satellite
station operated by Ahmad Obali (an ethnic Azeri and
naturalized US citizen),is also a player in the ethnic Azeri
movement (although GunAz Television's influence is hotly
debated both in Iran and Azerbaijan).


4. (C) All three organizations maintain resident offices in
Baku and have supported small-scale actions to include
protests at the Iranian Embassy, usually demanding greater
cultural autonomy for Iran's ethnic Azeris. These groups
have largely failed to seize the initiative and transform
their passions into a political movement in either Iran or
Azerbaijan. "Unification" is a politically charged issue in
both countries, and Azerbaijani and Iranian security services
keep a careful eye on "southern Azerbaijani" organizations in
both countries to ensure they do not overstep political

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bounds. The groups also seem hampered by a lack of
coordination. Despite frequent international conferences and
other mobilization efforts, no one organization or leader of
the 20-plus organizations all claiming to represent the
interests of Iran's ethnic Azeri minority has emerged.


5. (C) A handful of influential Azerbaijani opposition
politicians have seized upon the ethnic Azeri issue in Iran,
attacking the Aliyev government for not speaking out more
forcefully on the behalf of their ethnic brethren in Iran.
Long associated with and sympathetic to Mahmudali Chehraganli
and his South Azerbaijan National Awakening Movement, Isa
Gambar of the Musavat Party and Ali Kerimli of the Popular
Front Party have reportedly provided moral, financial, and
media support over the years. (Gambar's Yeni Musavat
newspaper frequently runs stories sympathetic to the plight
of ethnic Azeris in Iran.) Another opposition politician,
Etibar Mammadov of the Azerbaijan National Independence
Party, has also been a supporter of the ethnic Azeri
movement, organizing and hosting the September 2006 "National
Movement of South Azerbaijan" conference in Baku.
Ultimately, however, the issue of Iran's ethnic Azeris has
yet materialize into a political movement, let alone serve to
unify Azerbaijan's divided opposition.


6. (C) By far the largest Iranian diaspora group with
virtually any organization in Azerbaijan is the Iranian
exchange student population. Represented predominantly by
ethnic Azeri and Persian students, the Iranian exchange
student population is relatively small, estimated at between
700 and 800 students. (Armenia, in contrast, hosts an
Iranian student population in excess of 3,000.) Motivated
primarily by an interest to escape the rigid academic and
political conditions in their home country, Iranian exchange
students studying in Azerbaijan do not appear to favor any
one university or academic discipline.


7. (S/NF) SIMO reporting suggests that the Iranian
intelligence apparatus closely monitors this population.
Despite efforts by the Baku Iranian Cultural Center to
organize an Iranian Students Association and compel
membership, this effort does not appear to have gained any
traction. Cognizant of Iranian intelligence scrutiny,
Embassy contacts report that most Iranian students prefer
informal student networks that maintain contact by email or
mobile telephone text messaging. (We are not aware of any
student newspapers, websites or blog sites.) Anecdotal
evidence suggests that the fears of Iranian exchange students
do not appear to be unfounded; according to a number of
Embassy contacts, Iranian intelligence has reportedly stepped
up its monitoring of the exchange student population, a large
influx of male exchange students - most often in their late
20s and early 30s - having started studies in the first-year
programs of a number of local universities in the past year.

The Iranian Official Presence in Azerbaijan
--------------


8. (C) While the activities of the Iranian diaspora
community in Azerbaijan are at best disorganized and
sporadic, the same cannot be said of the IRI's official
presence in the country. Staffing its key diplomatic and
cultural center postings with ethnic Azeris, Iran's diplomats
and cultural affairs officers have undertaken a very active
and effective public relations campaign in Azerbaijan.
Focusing their efforts primarily on influencing the
Azerbaijani populace, Iran's diplomats ruthlessly exploit any
opportunity to show the US - or Azerbaijani western
integration efforts - in a negative light. Iran's former
Ambassador to Azerbaijan, Afshar Suleymani, was a formidable
presence in the Azerbaijani media, often appearing on
Azerbaijani television stations and always speaking in
Azerbaijani. Iran's new ambassador in Baku, Naser Hamidi
Zare, also an ethnic Azeri who previously served as Iranian
Consul General to the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan, is a
lesser known quantity, having kept a relatively low media
profile during his tenure in Nakhchivan.


9. (S) Also operating out of Iran's diplomatic posts and
cultural centers, Ministry of Intelligence and Security
(MOIS) and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
operatives reportedly focus their efforts on monitoring the
Iranian ethnic Azeri community, exploiting media and other
tools to present the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) in the
best possible light, and attracting young Azerbaijanis to

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visit or study in Iran. They also keep close tabs on the
activities of Iranian exchange students and any cultural and
political groups active in issues affecting Iran's ethnic
Azeri community. Bonyads such as the Imam Khomeii
foundation also serve to advance Iranian intersts, but
reportedly focus their efforts primarily on Azerbaijan's
large refugee and internally displaced persons population
(providing aid, educational, medical, and religious
services). The Baku branch of Iran's Melli Bank (the only
branch office in the Caucasus) provides the financial support
necessary to facilitate cultural and other activities. We
are exploring the role Melli Bank and Azerbaijani banks play
in facilitating the transfer of remittances between the
diaspora community and Iran.


10. (C) The Iranian government, rather than diaspora groups,
dominates Iranian broadcasting in Azerbaijan. Enjoying
favorable (mountainous) terrain and a vast array of powerful
transmission and jamming towers located along the 432
kilometer Iranian-Azerbaijani frontier, Iran's primary
broadcasting effort comes in the form of Seher Television.
Broadcast in the Azeri language, Seher Television is capable
of reaching nearly every major Azerbaijani population center,
to include Baku. The Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan with
its 179 kilometer shared border is especially vulnerable to
Iranian broadcast efforts; Seher Television and at least
eight FARSI-language stations are broadcast daily. Beyond
its television and radio broadcasting efforts, Iran also
employs internet blog sites, first appearing during the Sanat
controversy, when Iran seized upon an allegedly anti-Islamic
article published in a Baku newspaper. To date, the Embassy
is not aware of any Iranian outreach efforts involving the
use of mobile telephone text messaging. The IRI actively
jams inbound television and radio broadcasting, to include
Voice of America's Azerbaijani-language broadcasts (the
"spillover" which Embassy contacts report can be picked up by
Iranians living in the inter-border region).

Complex Relations and other Limitations
--------------


11. (S) Comment: Given the high degree of government
scrutiny - both Iranian and Azerbaijani - applied to the
Iranian diaspora community, as well as the intense government
pressure not to allow the "unification" question to derail
bilateral relations, Azerbaijan's significant Iranian
diaspora community plays an understandably quiet role in
public affairs. The mostly ethnic Azeri community's ability
to seamlessly blend into Azerbaijani life also makes it hard
to pinpoint its activities, social groups, or financial
activities. We will continue to explore the questions raised
in reftel and will report further information as available.
End comment.
DERSE