AZERBAIJAN: THE DEVELOPMENT AND EXERCISING OF AVIAN AND

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAKU 000331

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12598: N/A
TAGS: ECON EAGR KFLU TBIO CASC AJ
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN: THE DEVELOPMENT AND EXERCISING OF AVIAN AND
PANDEMIC INFLUENZA RESPONSE PLANS


SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION.

REF: A) State 022991 B) Baku 265


1. (U) Summary: In response to the risks posed by the Avian
Influenza threat, on March 4, 2006 the GOAJ introduced and began
implementing an Action Plan for Prevention and Containment of HPAI,
under the coordination of the Azerbaijani Commission on Avian
Influenza. The Commission included all relevant Ministries, under
the chairmanship of Deputy Prime Minister Yagub Eyyubov. A working
group has been established by the Ministries of Health, Agriculture,
and Ecology and Natural Resources. The Joint Plan incorporates the
main recommendations of the WHO and FAO/OIE missions, and provides a
good basis for strengthened actions on the animal and human health
sides, although greater efforts are still needed to integrate,
reconcile, address gaps and avoid overlaps between activities
planned by the different ministries. END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) The GOAJ Action Plan for Prevention and Containment of
HPAI includes the following main actions: (i) banning of the import
of live birds and poultry products from countries at risk (Turkey,
Russia, and Iran among others); (ii) requirements that poultry farms
follow strict sanitary-epidemiological and veterinary regulations;
(iii) increased monitoring of bird deaths and illnesses and human
influenza; (iv) a public awareness campaign through the mass media
to keep the population informed; (v) restriction of chicken sales to
controlled shops and supermarkets; (vi) banning of wild bird hunting
and sales; (vii) bird shootings for research purposes in major hot
spots and protected areas; (viii) vaccination of chickens against
Newcastle disease, which is endemic in Azerbaijan and which presents
symptoms similar to Avian Influenza (AI); and (ix) disinfection of
vehicles passing the borders with neighboring countries.


3. (SBU) The overall responsibility for animal health lies with the
State Veterinary Service (SVS) in the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA).
The SVS was formerly a semi-autonomous State Veterinary Committee,
but was paced under the MOA by Presidential Decree in October 2004.
A new veterinary law that envisages the further streamlining of the
State Veterinary Service was promulgated in November 2005, with work
ongoing on the supporting regulations. A preliminary reform
strategy has been prepared, which includes privatizing the field
veterinary service departments and contracting some public health
veterinary measures to private veterinarians. The SVS is
responsible for monitoring and control of 6 epizootic and epidemic
diseases (recently reduced from 11),border controls, meat and
livestock product inspection, and disease diagnosis and prognosis.
It has a total staff number of around 4,290, including some 770 in
district and municipality-level veterinary departments; 2,500 in
field veterinary service departments; and about 560 laboratory
staff. There are currently one republican, 12 zonal and 46
district-level diagnostic laboratories. The SVS is abolishing
district-level diagnostic laboratories.


4. (SBU) The Ministry of Health has prepared an emergency action
plan which incorporates the main WHO recommendations. The plan
mainly refers to clusters of activities and to the responsible
agencies, but does not have other elements of a plan in terms of
resources, logistics, and command and control of activities. This
plan cannot be considered a joint animal and human influenza plan
since it admittedly contains only scant reference to human health.
A human influenza preparedness and action plan is also under
preparation. In short, all these plans recently completed or under
preparation largely remain to be streamlined and consolidated.


5. (SBU) Early February 2006 assessment missions by WHO and FAO/OIE
diagnosed the country surveillance and containment capacity as weak
on both the veterinary and human health sides. The main issues
identified included: (i) the need to strengthen inter-ministerial
coordination and to integrate initial action plans developed by the
veterinary and human health authorities; (ii) critical supplies are
insufficient, inadequate and unevenly distributed; (iii) training
for HPAI is ad hoc and needs to be stepped up significantly; (iv)
HPAI diagnostic capacity is insufficient, particularly on the human
side -while veterinary services recently purchased new diagnostic
equipment (Real Time Polymerase Chain Reaction),but capacity for
sampling, preparation, and interpretation of results is weak; (v)
insufficient quantity, quality and use of Personal Protective
Equipment (PPEs) and disinfecting equipment; (vi) deficiencies in
the infrastructure of laboratories, affecting their bio-safety;
(vii) inadequate isolation capacity and patient care facilities (no
Intensive Treatment/Care Unit) of the HPAI management hospital
(Hospital 7 in Baku); (viii) lack of protocols and guidelines
(assessment, investigation, containment, culling, compensation,
treatment of patients with influenza-like illness); (ix)
insufficient stockpile of antiviral drugs and a usage strategy needs
to be developed; (x) no systematic vaccination against seasonal
influenza of personnel at risk; and (xi) weak supply of clear and

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consistent information, creating confusion and reduced trust in
public institutions. The Bank and other donor partners are working
actively with the Government to address these issues.


6. (SBU) In March 2007, USAID still found surveillance and
containment capacity to be weak in Azerbaijan. The main issues
include: (i) samples handling, packaging (it is not clear if the
appropriate capsules, containers are used); (ii) lab staff incapable
to operate the equipment due to lack of training; (iii) limited
number of veterinary services in the regions, an average of one vet
expert per six or seven villages; (iv)no active surveillance, the AI
working group doesn't monitor every single village; (v) weak
laboratory performance quality control (Despite internationally
accepted norms, the GOAJ doesn't verify every second sample at the
internationally recognized AI laboratories, by that omission missing
chances to raise Azerbaijan's credibility.).


7. (SBU) Comment: Although an official AI Action Plan has been
approved by National Avian Influenza Commission on March 4, 2006, a
common strategy to be pursued by all ministries and other
stakeholders involved has not been developed. At the moment there
are two separate documents: (i) the above mentioned AI Action Plan
to Prevent and Control HPAI prepared by the Ministry of Agriculture,
and (ii) a document developed by the Ministry of Health on the basis
of the WHO assessment mission. The two documents incorporate the
main recommendations of the WHO and FAO/OIE missions, and provide a
good basis for strengthened actions on the animal and human health
sides, although greater efforts are still needed to integrate,
reconcile, address gaps and avoid overlaps between activities
planned by the different ministries. END COMMENT.

HYLAND