Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAKU280
2007-03-07 12:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baku
Cable title:  

AZERBAIJAN: PRESIDENT ALIEV ASKS FOR MORE SIGNS OF

Tags:  PREL PGOV AJ RU IR PINR MARR ENRG 
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FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2530
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 BAKU 000280 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT TO DAS BRYZA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV AJ RU IR PINR MARR ENRG
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN: PRESIDENT ALIEV ASKS FOR MORE SIGNS OF
USG SUPPORT

Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 BAKU 000280

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT TO DAS BRYZA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV AJ RU IR PINR MARR ENRG
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN: PRESIDENT ALIEV ASKS FOR MORE SIGNS OF
USG SUPPORT

Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. In a February 12 meeting with Assistant
Secretary Of Defense for International Security A/S Rodman,

SIPDIS
President Aliyev said the regional situation was "developing
very rapidly," and called for "more public signs" from the
USG of the strengthened bilateral relationship, as a show of
support for Azerbaijan's independence. He expressed concern
about Russia's and Iran's increasingly aggressive regional
efforts, but said that Azerbaijan would remain independent of
these two neighbors and would continue its efforts towards
Euro-Atlantic integration. President Aliyev contrasted the
regional pro-West strategic group of Azerbaijan, Turkey and
Georgia with what he described as Armenia's pro-Russian and
pro-Iran strategic alliance, adding that he was
"disappointed" in USG non-support of the
Kars-Akhalkalaki-Baku Railway project. A/S Rodman assured
Aliyev that Azerbaijan's independence, sovereignty and
territorial integrity were in the USG's strategic interests,
and that the US would work towards increasing its cooperation
in all fields. Most noticeable during this meeting were
Aliyev's highlighting of his concern about increased
strategic pressure from both Russia and Iran, and the
directness of his request for increased signs of support from
the West and from the USG in the face of this increased
pressure. Aliyev pointed out that even Belarus was shaken by
Russia,s energy blackmail, and now wanted to join GUAM.
Aliyev invited Defense Secretary Gates to Azerbaijan. END
SUMMARY.


2. (C) On February 12 Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs Peter Rodman, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Eurasia James MacDougall, Deputy

SIPDIS
Assistant Secretary of State Michael Coulter, NEA/I Office
Director Barbara Leaf, and Ambassador Derse met with

President Ilham Aliyev.

REGIONAL SECURITY
--------------


3. (C) A/S Rodman's opened by telling President Aliyev that
Azerbaijan's independence, sovereignty and territorial
integrity were important strategic interests of the United
States, and that the bilateral security relationship was
important to the USG for that reason. He had come here to
listen, exchange views, and engage in a 'give-and-take'.
President Aliyev said that the US and Azerbaijan had a good
partnership in security, counter-terrorism and other spheres,
and was sure that this good partnership would continue. He
had been informed that the Rodman delegation had had good
meetings with the Ministers of Defense and National Security.
The GOAJ had a "great relationship" and ongoing cooperation
with the US in many fields, to include energy and security,
with all of these fields being interconnected. In response
to A/S Rodman's citation of Secretary Rice's letter to
President Aliyev as fully representative of the USG position,
Aliyev said that he had been quite grateful for the
Secretary's letter, which covered all the areas of bilateral

SIPDIS
cooperation, and agreed with the Secretary that the US and
Azerbaijan shared common goals.


4. (C) Aliyev, pointing out that Azerbaijan is the only
country bordering both Iran and Russia, said the general
regional situation was "developing rapidly" and was currently
"stable, but fragile." When Russia was weak, disorganized
and dependent on aid, dealing with it was easier, but now
Russia was "trying to become a superpower" once again, and
the danger was increasing. It is "still a necessity" to
strongly support Azerbaijan's independence; those former
members of the Soviet Union that want to become independent
must be supported, Aliyev said. Azerbaijan was increasingly
important for Europe both as a source of energy and as a
transit country for Caspian energy. Azerbaijan is the only
acceptable source for European energy, but Russian pressure
on Azerbaijan is growing. The situation with Iran's nuclear
program is unclear, and causes serious concern for the GOAJ,
which is on the "front lines - we will definitely suffer if
something happens." Azerbaijan expects more pressure from
Russia and Iran, which will be hard to resist, "but we are
firm on our policy even if we continue to be on our own
struggling for our future." Presently, there was much
Iranian and Russian intelligence activity in Azerbaijan. The
conflict with Armenia was another source of regional tension.
However, even given the above, Aliyev said that Azerbaijan

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is proud that it can determine its own destiny, and will
"never surrender" its independent policies, as shown by its
defiance of Gazprom this last winter.

"MORE SIGNS OF SUPPORT"
--------------


5. (C) Given the above regional strategic realities, Aliyev
said that Azerbaijan needed more USG support for its
independence. Steps have been taken to strengthen the energy
corridor westwards; but cooperation on the Euro-Atlantic
alliance was just as important as energy. Now was the time
for the US and Azerbaijan to increase cooperation on programs
strengthening Azerbaijan's independence and potential.
Aliyev said his job as President was to "minimize potential
risks," to Azerbaijan and "one way" is to "strengthen
relations with the US." In this regard, he noted that
Azerbaijan needs "new methods." He noted that "we try to
maintain good relations with Russia, but our interests do not
coincide." With the US "they do coincide." Azerbaijan "gives
hope" to Ukraine and Kazahkstan, and Azerbaijan's success
will be Georgia's and the Southern Energy Corridor's success.


6. (C) In response to Aliyev saying that the GOAJ wanted
"more signs" from the USG of the strengthened bilateral
relationship, A/S Rodman asked what signs Aliyev wanted.
Aliyev said that he wanted more high-level visits and public
events, such as the just-concluded EPC with its large USG
delegation and "a broad agenda of cooperation," to show
neighboring countries "that our relationship is strong." He
pointed out that Defense Secretary Rumsfeld had visited
Azerbaijan twice, and he told A/S Rodman that he was hereby
inviting Secretary Gates to visit Azerbaijan. A/S Rodman,
pointing out Defense Secretary Gates' background as a Russian
expert, said that Gates had strongly encouraged Rodman's
Azerbaijan visit, and said that he would pass along the
invitation.

PUTIN'S SPEECH
--------------


7. (C) A/S Rodman said he had just traveled from Munich,
where he had attended the Security Conference at which
Russian President Putin had spoken strong words that not only
criticized the U.S. but shocked the Europeans. European
leaders' reactions to his speech were quite negative, and if
Putin had thought he could somehow drive a wedge between
Europe and the US with such talk, he was mistaken. The USG
was keenly aware of Azerbaijan's precarious security
situation, located as it was between Russia to the north and
Iran to the south and the West realized that Azerbaijani
stability was crucial.


8. (C) Aliyev, after joking that "we are the only country
that has both these neighbors - what did we do wrong?" -
said that Azerbaijan was proud of its ability to maintain its
independence from these two and to be able to determine his
own future. He said that Putin's speech was something that
he should have said "in the kitchen" among friends, but not
something to be said in a public forum. Putin had always
criticized U.S. "domination" in private bilateral talks, so
Aliyev was aware of Putin's true beliefs. "I have known
Putin for three years and he was always like this. Two years
ago he wouldn't have said it, but now he thinks he is
Superman." Putin had made great efforts to become a
respectable G-8 member, but after these public comments there
can be no more public pretense that "everything was ok," and
he can't continue as before. Putin's public comments that
the USSR's collapse was a "tragedy" perforce meant that he
saw Azerbaijan's independence as a tragedy. Aliyev said that
the Soviet ideology was coming back in Russia. As such,
Azerbaijan's Euro-Atlantic orientation was increasingly
important.


9. (C) Quoting Bismarck that "Russia is never as strong or as
weak as it appears," A/S Rodman agreed that Putin's speech
revealed his true beliefs and "fifteen years of resentment."
The US will deliberate over Putin's speech and not overreact.
Rodman quoted Defense Secretary Gates' conciliatory
statement in Munich after Putin's speech - "One Cold War was
quite enough." Putin's remarks insulted Europe, to include
his characterizing the OSCE as a "vulgar instrument of U.S.
domination" - a comment that particularly amused the French
head of OSCE. On the whole, Putin's speech helped move

BAKU 00000280 003 OF 006


Europe closer towards the USG position, and even Germany
seems to be a little more cognizant of the perils of relying
on Russian gas.


10. (C) President Aliyev agreed that USG-GOAJ cooperation was
vital, for Azerbaijan's independence and for regional
development. The two cooperate on energy, security,
counter-terrorism and political areas; he repeated that the
time had come to increase cooperation on defense matters.
With Russia's growing aggressiveness, Azerbaijan's good
relations with the West will cause greater friction with its
northern neighbor. The one remaining area of good
cooperation between the US and Russia is in the Minsk Group
process, in which Russia is a co-chair. Increased strain in
the Russia-Azerbaijan relationship decreases the possibility
of any N-K solution. There is no confluence of interests
between Russia and Azerbaijan, but there is between the US
and Azerbaijan. If tensions increase between the US and
Russia, it will be worse for everyone, including Azerbaijan.
In response, A/S Rodman said that the first step toward
bettering bilateral relations is to understand the situation
properly, and the USG does, "although we can't act
perfectly." The USG is seeking to strengthen its ties with
Azerbaijan.

ENERGY
--------------


11. (C) President Aliyev stressed Azerbaijan's importance as
both a producer and as a potential transit country for
Caspian energy. "If there had been no BTC pipeline, Georgia
would be under Russian control by now, and Azerbaijan fifty
percent under Russian control." Senator Lugar's November
27, 2006 speech to the German Marshall Fund conference in
Riga, Latvia (note: in which the Senator referred to the
centrality of energy security and to energy security as a
NATO Article 5 Commitment) indirectly highlighted
Azerbaijan's growing importance. Azerbaijan's energy
projects were growing, and Azerbaijan could start sending gas
to Europe as early as this year. Azerbaijan will be soon be
involved in serious negotiations with Greece and Italy. He
had offered to start an energy dialogue with the EU in 1994,
but it had chosen then to rely on Russia. (COMMENT: FM
Mammadyarov later told the Ambassador that the PM had
reported positive meetings in Ashgabat, and that Mammadayarov
planned to send a signal that he would visit Ashgabat if
invited - upcoming septel. END COMMENT).


12. (C) Aliyev said that the GOAJ was "doing its job,"
working on energy security, democracy and economic
development, and "I am proud, after 15 years, that we proved
they (Russia) cannot act like bullies. All CIS applauded us,
because we damaged the myth of dependence." Small CIS
countries seeking to gain independence must be supported, and
Azerbaijan's actions have given hope to the these countries.
Azerbaijan's refusal of Gazprom gas has "destroyed the myth"
of Russian omnipotence, and now there is hope that Kazakhstan
and Turkmenistan will send their energy westwards, something
that will be possible only through Azerbaijan. Kazakhstan
signed an EU Energy MOU only after Azerbaijan did.
Kazakhstan would like to ally itself with Azerbaijan and find
European markets for its energy, as opposed to being forced
to sell its gas cheaply to Russia, allowing Russia to sell
its own gas at much higher prices to Europe. As for
Turkmenistan, despite its unjustified claims to Azerbaijani
offshore fields, the GOAJ would send its Prime Minister to
the February 14 inauguration of Gurbanguly Berdimukhamedov.

TWO REGIONAL GROUPS
--------------


13. (C) Speaking generally, President Aliyev said regionally
there were two "mutual support groups" forming, and he
contrasted Azerbaijan's reaching out to the West along with
Turkey and Georgia on the one hand against what he called
Armenia's strong strategic alliance with Russia and Iran on
the other hand. In the energy forum, Azerbaijan has built
pipelines to the West, cooperating with Georgia and Turkey.
At the time these pipelines were being built Azerbaijan did
not want to avoid Armenia, but, he said, had no choice given
"Armenian military aggression." However, Iran is building a
gas pipeline to Armenia, a virtual Russian client state.
Armenia has sold large sectors of its gas infrastructure to
Gazprom. But "Azerbaijan is not Armenia, which supports

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Russia against even its own interest." Azerbaijan has
engaged in significant military support to the West, both in
Afghanistan and Iraq, but Armenia sent troops to Iraq only
after Azerbaijan did so. It is Armenia that has a common
defense pact with Russia. Aliyev said that he saw potential
regional divisions occurring, and it was important for the
West to evaluate countries' stances and alliances.

ARMENIA & THE RAILWAY
--------------


14. (C) Continuing, Aliyev asked rhetorically "what does it
mean" that whereas the USG supported the BTC oil pipeline and
SCP gas pipeline, it "vetoed participation" in the
Kars-Akhalkalaki-Baku Railway, due to Armenian pressure in
the US Congress. He had discussed this matter with the
Georgian and Turkish Presidents in Tbilisi on February 8
during the signing ceremony for the new railway. The three
saw the USG position as "disappointing," and Aliyev asked
rhetorically if Armenia were more important to the US than
Turkey and Georgia, and, a little later, "why does the US
defer to the interests of Armenia over those of three real
and true partners to the US?" He pointed out that only
"Russia and Armenia" were opposed to the railroad. Aliyev
said he tries not to focus on this topic, but "our people ask
questions," and Russia was sure to try to make political hay
out of the USG position. Nevertheless, the GOAJ will go
ahead and build the railroad without US assistance.


15. (C) A/S Rodman acknowledged Aliyev's concerns, adding
that the US political system was complex and that
Congressional and Administration priorities sometimes
differed. However, A/S Rodman said that the USG and
Azerbaijan shared a common regional strategic view. Section
907 had been a "strategic obstacle," but Azerbaijan could
"count on President Bush." A/S Rodman said that while he
couldn't make predictions about Congress or the future
President, he was struck by the fact that in the Congress
there was increasing clarity about Russia and Iran. The USG
wants to intensify its strategic dialogue with Azerbaijan,
and the upcoming political-military talks at the State
Department in Washington in April would be an important step.


16. (C) President Aliyev said that he was eager to see signs
of increased cooperation. The strategic situation was
different than it was three to five years ago. There were
many threads in the current situation, to include Iran's
nuclear program and Russia's new assertiveness. In a related
vein, the situation in the CIS was changing rapidly,
especially in Belarus and Ukraine, due largely to Russian
policy. Whereas Russia was smart with Ukraine, its policy
towards Belarus and Azerbaijan was stupid. Within the CIS,
"we were the only ones who showed it was possible not to
surrender to Russia." If Gazprom had offered every CIS
country gas at the "market price" of USD 235 per thousand
cubic meters, it could claim that these deals were strictly
commercial. However, Gazprom's offer of gas at preferential
rates to states that aligned their policies to those of
Russia belied this claim. Gazprom made a mistake in seeking
to pressure Azerbaijan, and its hamfisted policies actually
helped Azerbaijan. Concerning Belarus, Aliyev said that
President Lukashenka had told him that Belarus wanted to join
GUAM.

IRAN
--------------


17. (C) Iran Officer Director Leaf told President Aliyev that
senior people in the State Department and the USG were
following the situation in Iran very closely, and were seeing
signs that President Ahmadinejad was under attack from many
of Iran's conservative leaders. Many were saying
Ahmadinejad, who has been reckless in his foreign policy
direction, has become politically weaker of late, but she was
interested in hearing President Aliyev's observations.
Aliyev said that he had not met with Ahmadinejad for a while,
but the last time they met he was "very aggressive, very
confident." However, "a lot has happened since then."


18. (C) Aliyev said he had met with Iranian Deputy Foreign
Minister for Asia and Oceania Affairs, and Iran's Special
Envoy in Caspian Sea Affairs Mehdi Safari the previous week,
who was very confident. They discussed Caspian delimitation,
although coming to no agreement. Safari told Aliyev that

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Iran was very active in the region, to include Iraq. Safari
was "very enthusiastic," saying that Iran's regional presence
was "becoming stronger." Safari told Aliyev that the USG was
trying to lower oil prices in order to hurt Iran, but wasn't
successful. Aliyev said that a confident and enthusiastic
Safari told him that "no one can do anything against us,"
which was not a good sign. Iran was a permanent potential
danger for Azerbaijan. Aliyev said that in Iran everything
depends on force from within, and that the Iranian people
must put pressure on their government for change. Aliyev
said he thought the Iranian political establishment was "more
united" than during Khatami's time, and didn't think
Ahmadinejad's position was in any danger and that the
conservatives won't move against him. Russia was also
supporting Iran, which was a dangerous policy.


19. (C) A/S Rodman said that the USG was seeking to deter,
not provoke, a conflict with Iran. "Iran was overconfident
now, and may have overplayed its hand." If they pursue their
nuclear program, they run the risk of facing further steps by
the international community, and it was up to the US, working
with its partners, to deflate this Iranian confidence. As
for Russian support of Iran, he quoted Defense Secretary
Gates' comments to Russian MOD Ivanov that this was very
short-sighted on Russia,s part. Concerning recent
initiatives against Iran in Iraq, A/S Rodman said the USG had
been patient for 18 months but finally had to respond to
Iranian attempts to destabilize Iraq. The USG has "pushed
back" inside Iraq, and positioned two Carrier Strike Groups
in the Persian Gulf. The USG and its European allies were
also seeking to bolster the Lebanese government in the face
of Iranian attempts to overthrow it. The USG seeks to solve
the Iranian nuclear issue through diplomacy, and if Iran
continues to disregard the will of the international
community as expressed by UN Security Council resolution
1737, it could well face additional sanctions. Leaf said
that the USG policy on Iran had both "public and non-public"
elements, and that there was increasing tempo to USG efforts
to put financial and economic pressure on the regime.

GULF SECURITY DIALOGUE
--------------


20. (C) DAS Coulter described the Gulf Security Dialogue
(GSD),a series of bilateral dialogues designed to reassure
our Gulf allies who were worried about Iranian hegemony, as a
topic that Azerbaijan might find interesting. The GSD was
based on six pillars designed to strengthen bi- and
multilateral security cooperation: 1) enhanced bilateral
defense cooperation, 2) regional security issues (such as
Iranian WMD and Lebanon),3) critical infrastructure
protection, 4) stopping terrorism and strengthening defense,
5) counter-proliferation, 6) peace and stability in Iraq. In
response, Aliyev said that Azerbaijan and the US are doing
many of these activities already. A/S Rodman said that GSD
was illustrative of the cooperation the USG had with its
allies who were concerned about Iranian bellicosity. Later in
the conversation, underscoring that "both Russia and Iran
will pressure Azerbaijan more; I can predict it will not be
easy to resist," especially given Russian and Iranian
intelligence activities in Azerbaijan, Aliyev said that "we
need to prepare a program" in addition to our ongoing work on
energy security, anti-terrorism, Caspian maritime security;
"we can frame a dialogue like you have with Arab" countries.

GEORGIA
--------------


21. (C) Aliyev said that Georgia also was a strategic key for
the West, and regional development depends on coordinated
policies. The only reason that Georgia has not suffered this
winter was because of Azerbaijan's help and support. SOCAR
investment in the Georgian port of Kulavi, and the presence
of Azerbaijani banks in Georgia, will increase bilateral
economic ties between the two neighbors. The Georgian
leadership had become more "down to earth, more focused on
regional cooperation." It is lucky to have Azerbaijan as a
friend.

NATO
--------------


22. (C) Aliyev said that November 2006 was his second visit
to NATO headquarters in Brussels. His speech followed that

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of 15 different Ambassadors to including the US Ambassador.
The visit was positive, as was Azerbaijan-NATO cooperation,
and "100 percent" of the Ambassadors present expressed
support for Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan cooperates with NATO
because of shared interests. Armenia's military cooperation
with Russia is extensive, and to the extent it cooperates
with NATO it is only because Azerbaijan is so doing. More
generally, Armenia's strategic decisions have caused it to
have bad relations with three of its four neighbors, and to
miss out on becoming a regional player. Armenian President
Kocharian does whatever Putin says - "this is the truth. The
last delay on NK was because of Kocharian's visit to Sochi
and meeting with Putin. Without Russian bases in Armenia and
Russian support NK would be solved today. We all know why it
is not."


23. (C) COMMENT: While the State-DOD visit had been planned
with a focus on Iran, in the immediate wake of President
Putin's Munich speech and Azerbaijan's open defiance of
Russian pressure in the fall and winter, Aliyev also
demonstrated a marked preoccupation with Russia. Aliyev's
comments made clear that in light of regional pressures, he
is less concerned than previously about his neighbors'
sensitivities to deeper US-Azerbaijan engagement, signaling
repeatedly to the USG delegation that he wants the protection
afforded by a higher public profile to the relationship.
This represents an opportunity we should seize to advance our
objectives across the range of our interests in Azerbaijan -
political and economic reform, energy and security. END
COMMENT.



23. (C) This cable was cleared by A/S Rodman.
DERSE