Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAKU1511
2007-12-19 05:21:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baku
Cable title:  

AZERBAIJANI DEFENSE MINISTER ABIYEV PROVIDES

Tags:  PREL PGOV MARR MASS RU AJ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKB #1511/01 3530521
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 190521Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4493
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY 0193
RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY 0061
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0734
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAKU 001511 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MASS RU AJ
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJANI DEFENSE MINISTER ABIYEV PROVIDES
READOUT ON CIS AND RUSSIAN MEETINGS, GABALA DISCUSSIONS

REF: A. BAKU 01431

B. BAKU 01467

Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAKU 001511

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MASS RU AJ
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJANI DEFENSE MINISTER ABIYEV PROVIDES
READOUT ON CIS AND RUSSIAN MEETINGS, GABALA DISCUSSIONS

REF: A. BAKU 01431

B. BAKU 01467

Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. Defense Minister Safar Abiyev on November
12 told the Ambassador that he stood up for Georgia during a
recent CIS Defense Ministers meeting, which was considering
the leadership of the CIS peacekeeping unit in Abkhazia.
Abiyev said during Russian Defense Minister Serdykov's visit
to Azerbaijan, Serdykov broached the possibility of extending
the Russian lease of the Gabala radar station and Serdykov
was not optimistic about the prospects for joint U.S.-Russian
access to the facility. Abiyev claimed that Russia withheld
information about Gabala's technical capabilities during the
September U.S.-Russian visit to Gabala. In response to the
Ambassador's request for an update on the GOAJ's position on
providing additional troops for Iraq and Afghanistan, Abiyev
said the Ambassador needed "to catch Foreign Minister
Mammadyarov by the throat" to get an answer because "I do not
take this decision." End Summary.


2. (U) The Ambassador, accompanied by the defense attache
and naval attache, met with Defense Minister Safar Abiyev on
December 13.

I Defended Georgia!
--------------


3. (C) Abiyev, who typically begins meetings with a harangue
about Azerbaijan's readiness to retake Nagorno-Karabakh (NK)
and the occupied territories, opened by saying he wanted the
Ambassador to know that he sought to defend Georgia at the
November 27 meeting of CIS Defense Ministers in Astana.
Specifically, Abiyev said he tried to back Georgia's attempt
to have Major General Sergei Chaban removed from his position
as the head of CIS peacekeeping troops in Abkhazia. When
Russia proposed renewing his mandate, Abiyev said he
objected, noting that this could not be done in Georgia's
absence. Chaban was temporarily reinstated, but Abiyev
suggested that a replacement to Chaban will be appointed in

January as a result of his intervention. Abiyev also
suggested that Azerbaijan would not follow Russia's lead on
the CFE treaty by withdrawing from the treaty (a position the
President and MFA have confirmed).

Recent Russian Visits
--------------


4. (C) Abiyev downplayed the importance of Russian Defense
Minister Serdykov's November 27-28 visit to Baku (ref A). In
addition to meeting with Prime Minister Rasizade, Serdykov
traveled to Gabala radar station with Abiyev (insisting on
driving when weather prevented helicopter travel) and they
had a separate one-on-one meeting at the Defense Ministry.
Abiyev suggested Serdykov did not have good information on
key issues such as Gabala and Russian military support to
Armenia, and he may not be a key player in the Russian
government.


5. (C) Abiyev proudly observed that he told Serdykov that
Gabala was Azerbaijan's property. Serdykov, according to
Abiyev, asked about the possibility of extending the Russian
lease at Gabala when it expires in 2012; Serdykov also stated
that "only one part" of the new Armavir radar will be
finished be late 2008/early 2009. Abiyev noted that former
Russian Defense Minister Ivanov had previously claimed
Armavir was finished. Abiyev said a possible GOAJ decision
on extending the Russian lease could not be made until 2012.
(This contrasts with Deputy Foreign Minister Azimov's
assessment that Russia will probably leave the facility in
2012, ref B.) Abiyev said Russia intentionally did not
provide the U.S. with all available technical information on
the Gabala radar's capabilities during the September 18
U.S.-Russian visit to Gabala. Abiyev stated that he raised
this point with Serdykov, while observing that Serdykov only
has limited control over this issue within the Russian
government. When Abiyev asked Serdykov about potential joint
U.S.-Russian use of Gabala, Serdykov reportedly said the
facility probably would not be used jointly. Abiyev offered
his personal opinion that he never thought Russia genuinely
was interested in joint access to Gabala.


6. (C) Abiyev said he raised his concerns with Serdykov
about Russian military support to Armenia, some of which is
transferred to NK and the occupied territories, but Serdykov
"did not understand too much" about Russia's support to
Armenia.


7. (C) While providing a readout of the December 11 visit of
Anatoly Antonov, Director of the Russian MFA's Department of
Security and Disarmament, Abiyev suggested to the Ambassador
that the GOAJ would not follow the Russian precedent of
withdrawing from the CFE treaty. Antonov reportedly said to
Abiyev that both Russia and Moscow had congruent CFE
positions, but Abiyev claimed that he clarified the issue,
saying that the GOAJ has not taken the step of withdrawing
from the treaty. Abiyev said he told Antonov that Azerbaijan
has declared a force majeure position because of Russian
armaments going to NK through Armenia, to which Antonov
reportedly was silent.


8. (C) Abiyev said Antonov was not empowered to address
Gabala-related issues. For example, Abiyev said Antonov
appeared to have bad information on the location of U.S.
x-ray radars and could not give a frank answer whether Russia
would support joint U.S.-Russian access to Gabala.


9. (C) The Ambassador outlined for Abiyev U.S. efforts to
cooperate with Russia on missile defense and CFE, sharing
several nonpapers, and discussed the recent Iran NIE, noting
the need for continued international pressure on Iran and our
ongoing concern about Iran's enrichment efforts. Abiyev
questioned whether international pressure had genuinely
caused Iran to back down, then commented that if the U.S. can
exercise such pressure over Iran, it should do the same with
Armenia. The Ambassador reinforced the need to solve the NK
conflict peacefully, that a return to violence would have
enormous costs and would not resolve the conflict, and that
bellicose statements are not helpful.

NATO
--------------


10. (C) The Ambassador asked Abiyev for his perspectives on
the GOAJ's approach toward NATO. She broached the idea of a
lunch with other NATO Ambassadors; Abiyev welcomed the
suggestion, saying he would like to host the event. Abiyev
pledged to share his thoughts on Azerbaijan's NATO policy in
this forum. Abiyev expressed interest in more frequent
meetings with the Ambassador.


11. (C) While discussing EUR A/S Fried's recent speech on a
strategic partnership between the U.S., Azerbaijan, and
Turkey, Abiyev said he would welcome Turkish participation in
U.S.-Azerbaiijani military exercises being considered by the
MOD for 2009.

Troop Contributions
--------------


12. (C) In response to the Ambassador's request for an
update on the GOAJ's position on troop contributions for Iraq
and Afghanistan, Abiyev said the Ambassador needed "to catch
Mammadyarov by the throat," as he, not Abiyev, would make the
decision. (NOTE: See septel report on a subsequent meeting
with the President.) The Ambassador will follow up with
Foreign Minister Mammadyarov.


13. (C) Abiyev presented several tidbits of peculiar
extraneous information as well. These included report of a
"secret" Russian base in Nizhni Asher that can "cause"
earthquakes (as it had the 1988 Armenia earthquake),his
ministry's interception of radio messages from a Russian ship
that sunk near Astrakhan, and that Russia had moved some
30-50 ships based in the Caspian near Iran, without
clarifying what their mission was or why Russia took this
step.

Comment
--------------


14. (C) Since his participation and speech at the Embassy's
first celebration of U.S. armed forces day on May 12, at
which he outlined publicly to the discomfort of official
Russian attendees the range of U.S.-Azerbaijan security

cooperation, Abiyev has been more open to engaging with the
Embassy with some welcome trickle down effects on our
security cooperation programs.
DERSE