THE VANISHING AZERBAIJANI OPPOSITION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAKU 001388

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR EUR DAS BRYZA AND EUR/CARC, EUR/ACE, DRL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2017
TAGS: AJ PGOV PHUM
SUBJECT: THE VANISHING AZERBAIJANI OPPOSITION

Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse, per 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: The Azerbaijani Opposition has been in a
steady decline since the 2005 parliamentary elections,
beleaguered by government pressure and its own chronic
disunity. According to a 2006 IFES public opinion poll,
support for the traditional opposition parties has dropped to
five percent. Opposition leaders believe Ilham Aliyev's
unwillingness to allow conventional political activity
betrays his insecurity and inexperience as a politician. The
abrupt jailing of ex-Ministers Farhad Aliyev and Ali Insanov
in October 2005 suggests that rivals for power exist within
the government as well as from the opposition. Some also
point to the lack of political avenues for dissent as
contributing to the development of religious extremism. End
Summary.

Pushed to Extinctio
--------------


2. (C) During the reig of President Heydar Aliyev
(1993-2003),the Azebaijani Opposition was skillfully
manipulated by the government, but did have some popular
support, political legitimacy and served as a weak, but
respected, institution within the political system. After
four years of Ilham Aliyev, the traditional opposition is all
but extinct. Former State Secretary and chair of the Popular
Front Party (PFP) Ali Kerimli predicts that if things do not
change in the remaining three to five-year window, there will
be no political opposition at all.


3. (SBU) Pulling up to opposition Godfather Isa Gambar's
office, you'd think you made a wrong turn somewhere. He has
been exiled to a remote corner of Baku in a dilapidated
apartment building. Although the Musavat Party has two
floors of the building all of the rooms are dark and the
corridors appear to be undergoing a massive renovation. Our
escort apologizes for the mess and admits that the
construction of the office has been ongoing for two years and
may never be completed because of a lack of funds. Gambar
sits in one of the only renovated rooms with his curtains
drawn and a noisy TV left on during meetings, presumably
trying to defeat listening devices.


4. (SBU) Former State Secretary and leader of the Azerbaijan
Liberal Party (ALP) Lala Shovket works out of a friend's
building in a dusty, garbage-filled river basin on the edge
of town. In a more dismal situation than the others, Ali
Kerimli, who has aged dramatically in the last four years, is
forced to work out of his personal apartment after the
government forcibly evicted his party from its downtown
office in November 2006. Kerimli complains that landlords
are pressured by the government not to rent office space to
opposition parties.

Even the Paranoid have Enemies
--------------


5. (C) Opposition leaders complain that their weakness is
the result of a focused and determined government strategy to
target opposition meetings, financing, office space and
travel of political leaders. "We're like two boxers with one
boxer fighting with his hands tied behind his back. We keep
coming up for another round and getting knocked out," the
flamboyant Shovket describes while taking another drag from
her cigarette holder. She adds that her local party offices
have been systematically closed down and party workers are
routinely denied access to the media and cannot even meet
openly. Shovket has complained to the Embassy that when
traveling through Azerbaijan, authorities consistently
prevent her from meeting with party members.


6. (C) A trimmed down and confident Isa Gambar takes a more
defiant stance. He asks rhetorically, "If the opposition is
so genuinely weak, what is the government afraid of? Why
can't we be shown on TV? Why can't we meet? Why are they
arresting journalists?" Opposition presidential candidate
and former Heydar Aliyev adviser Eldar Namazov describes a
relentless campaign to keep him out of the public eye. He
recalled how the police prevented him from renting a tea
house in Guba to hold a private celebration of his party's
anniversary.


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7. (C) Opposition parties in Azerbaijan,s regions complain
of similar problems. In Tovuz, regional opposition party
representatives report that if as few as four of them gather
at a teahouse, police break up the "meeting" and detain and
question the participants. In Ganja, oppositionists report
having to throw fake birthday parties in private homes on the
outskirts of town to be able to conduct routine party
meetings. The Ganja branch of the Musavat Party,s office
was broken into and vandalized, reportedly by the police.
The landlord kicked the party out the next day.

The Devil Within
--------------


8. (C) The other often discussed reason for the steady
decline of the Azerbaijani opposition has been its consistent
divisiveness, inexperience and personality-based politics.
Sitting in his palatial office in one of the most expensive
downtown neighborhoods, the ruling Yeni Azerbaijan Party's
(YAP) Executive Secretary Ali Ahmadov attributes the weakness
of the opposition to a lack of fresh faces and new ideas.
"The opposition made some strange decisions in past
elections, always talking about boycotting and then choosing
to participate. They lack a political program and instead
only focus on individual leaders. If the same guy loses the
elections time after time, people get tired of voting for
him. Look at John Kerry. No one supports him running
again," remarked Ahmadov.


9. (C) The Chairman of the Central Election Commission
Mazahir Panahov, a well-connected official in a supposedly
nonpartisan position, said that because of 70 years of Soviet
rule, Azerbaijanis have plenty of experience in governance,
but none in opposition. "All the opposition programs look
the same and none of them have political platforms. Their
platforms are, 'Let's go hold a demonstration in the town
square,'" Panahov commented.


10. (C) In unguarded moments, opposition leaders themselves
admit a lack of leadership. Shovket said she has publicly
criticized the opposition for its inability to present a
united front against pressure from the government. Shovket
was elected in 2005 to Parliament, but refused the seat as a
protest against electoral fraud in other parliamentary races.
Similarly, Ali Kerimli commented that the opposition leaders
themselves often admit that they are too passive. Eldar
Namazov said that amongst the traditional opposition (from
which he excludes himself) there is no one with significant
political experience and most of them were responsible for
mishandling the early stages of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
during former President Albufaz Elchibey,s administration.


11. (C) Over the past few years, the opposition has
continued to splinter, resulting in a greater number of tiny
parties gathered around insignificant leaders with big egos.
Perhaps the most spectacular example was this year,s split
of the Azerbaijan Democratic Party. The party was previously
united around exiled former Speaker of Parliament Rasul
Guliyev, who in 2005 attempted unsuccessfully to return to
Azerbaijan. The party that retained the Azerbaijan
Democratic Party name is headed by Guliyev,s former deputy
Sardar Jalaloglu, who recently announced that the party will
support Ilham Aliyev,s candidacy in the 2008 presidential
election. Guliyev,s few remaining supporters now make up
the Open Society Party, which appears obsessed with the
prospect of another potential homecoming attempt by Guliyev.
Shovket remarked "A man keeps his word. If (Guliyev) had
come back, he would have spent a few years in jail and
emerged a leader. Now he is nothing."

It's Not Business, It's Personal
--------------


12. (C) Opposition leaders are quick to recall the golden
age of Heydar Aliyev when opposition parties were allowed to
operate with relative freedom. They ascribe the changes to
personal weakness and insecurity on the part of President
Ilham Aliyev. "The difference between Ilham and his father
is that Ilham wants the oil money for himself. It's like a
narcotic. Whereas, Heydar saw money as a political tool, not
a goal unto itself. Heydar was able to balance opposition
leaders. It was like theater for him," remarked Lala
Shovket. "He understood that imitation of democracy was

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essential. Now we don,t even have an imitation," she added.
Similarly, Eldar Namazov described Heydar Aliyev as a "very
experienced politician and a self-made man." Whereas, Ilham
just parachuted in with no real political experience.


13. (C) According to Ali Kerimli, the government pursues
this policy of suppressing the opposition because of Ilham
Aliyev's personal fears. "Heydar Aliyev allowed political
activity, but controlled activity. He was always more
careful about the West. Ilham claims to have Western
political standards, but in reality his interests are
personal and business-focused, not professional. He fears
debates and press conferences and does not want competition,"
he argued.


14. (C) By contrast, Isa Gambar believes that Ilham,
bolstered by oil wealth, has a sense of confidence that his
father lacked. Gambar quoted former Russian Finance Minister
Yegor Gaidar, but noted that this is equally true of
Azerbaijan: "As the oil wealth of a country increases, the
intellectual capacity of its government decreases." Gambar
asserted that Heydar Aliyev was afraid of foreigners and
would go only up to the limits set by the international
community. With his son, the international community, and
its money, have little influence.

The "Pocket Opposition"
--------------


15. (C) The Azerbaijani Government appears to have been
working steadily over the years to create a new, alternative
opposition to replace what it calls the "radical opposition"
parties such as Musavat, Popular Front and the Liberal Party.
The traditional opposition and some NGO activists are
disparaging of the so-called "pocket opposition" groups,
thought to include the Ana Veten (Motherland) Party, the Umid
(Hope) Party, the Civil Solidarity Party, and the Azerbaijan
Democratic Reforms Party, which they note consistently
support government positions. The Ana Veten Party, for
example, routinely floats ideas that would benefit the
government but are too controversial for the ruling party to
touch. In 2006, the party proposed extending the
presidential term to seven years. Like the more established
opposition parties, these new "pocket opposition" groups have
murky finances and flashy new cars, leaving them lacking
credibility in the eyes of the public.

Comment: A Dangerous Trend
--------------


16. (C) The traditional political opposition is a spent
force. Even without the intense government pressure, they
now lack legitimacy in the eyes of most Azerbaijanis, and
seem to spend most of their time concerned with their
international appearance rather than trying to find a
domestic foothold. They criticize government corruption, but
they themselves cannot explain how they finance their own
limited activities. Notably, none of the major opposition
parties have cultivated new younger leadership, which leads
some to question how democratic they are in managing their
organizations.


17. (C) "A democracy requires a strong opposition," declared
ruling party Executive Secretary Ahmadov, echoing private
statements by President Aliyev. Without a viable political
opposition, voices of dissent and opposition will find other
outlets. Both CEC Chairman Panahov and presidential
candidate Namazov believed that a weak political opposition
creates opportunities for Islamic extremism. "Islam is now
slowly taking the place of political opposition because the
reaction to injustices in society," Namazov cautioned.
Panahov also believed that the real threat to the government
was not the weak opposition, but the growing numbers of
Islamists in society.


18. (C) Finally, the other possible outlet for challenging
President Ilham Aliyev is within his own government and
ruling party. One school of thought suggests that the
tightly interwoven financial concerns of many key officials
make it unlikely that any current ministers would be willing
to rock the political boat. On the other hand, while the
traditional opposition lacks the money, street power and
credibility to mount a serious challenge to the Aliyevs, many

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of the President's own ministers (notably the power
ministers, including the ambitious Minister of Emergency
Situations) have all of these capabilities. The question is
whether they have the nerve. The arrest and humiliation of
former ministers Farhad Aliyev and Ali Insanov in 2005 was
clearly meant to warn other powerful ministers against
becoming too independent. Certainly part of the President's
gradual replacement of key cabinet ministers is intended to
balance political forces, but also ensure those who were once
loyal to the father, remain loyal to the son.
DERSE