PRESIDENT ALIYEV REVIEWS REGIONAL ISSUES WITH EUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 BAKU 001357

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY PASS TO A/S KAREN HARBERT, DAS ALAN
HEGBURG, OFFICE OF RUSSIA/EURASIAN AFFAIRS DIRECTOR LANA
EKIMOFF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL AJ
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT ALIYEV REVIEWS REGIONAL ISSUES WITH EUR
A/S FRIED

Classified By: Ambassador Anne E.Derse, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: President Aliyev told A/S Fried that,
although he was pleased with Azerbaijan,s overall economic
and social situation, he was concerned by the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the potential for religious
extremism in Azerbaijan. Aliyev believes that Ukraine's
paralysis and Moldova's weakness are holding back GUAM; he
affirmed that Azerbaijan would continue to be a staunch
friend of Georgia in the face of increasing Russian
provocations. While he was ready to offer Azerbaijan's
infrastructure to assist Turkmenistan exporting energy west,
Aliyev said that Azerbaijan would not take the lead in this
project. A/S Fried said that Azerbaijan was an important
ally of the U.S., and thanked President Aliyev for GOAJ's
defusing the recent terrorist threat directed against the
U.S. Embassy. He briefed President Aliyev on the recent
Moscow 2-plus-2 talks, to include CFE, and missile defense,
telling President Aliyev that the U.S. would "do nothing
about Azerbaijan without Azerbaijan." END SUMMARY.


2. (C) On November 3, A/S Fried and the Ambassador had a
two-hour meeting with President Ilham Aliyev, followed by a
three-hour dinner (septel). Joining Aliyev in the meeting
were FM Mammadyarov and Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor
Novruz Mammadov; only Mammadyarov joined the dinner. Deputy
Pol/Econ Chief (notetaker) also attended.

SECURITY COOPERATION
--------------


3. (C) A/S Fried thanked President Aliyev for the GOAJ's
rapid and effective response to the recent terrorist threat
against the U.S. Embassy. Aliyev said Azerbaijan's law
enforcement authorities were very capable and would "protect
us and our friends." Strong USG-GOAJ bilateral cooperation
in the fight against terrorism was important for the region
and would continue. In this regard, Aliyev said that on
November 2 Azerbaijan's security forces had arrested a
"dangerous Arab terrorist" who had been on the run for a week
to ten days (septel).


4. (C) Fried said that Azerbaijan was important to the U.S.
and that a strong and independent Azerbaijan was both in
Azerbaijan's and also America's interest. Aliyev thanked
Fried for USG support, saying he valued the bilateral
relationship, and agreed with Fried that it was important
that the two countries coordinate in the region, where their
interests coincided.

ALIYEV TOUR D'HORIZON
--------------


5. (C) Aliyev said he was pleased with Azerbaijan's social
and economic situation. The economy was performing well and
the quality of life for Azerbaijanis was improving. Poverty
was down from 49 percent when he took office to 20 percent,
and will probably drop further to 15 percent next year. On
unemployment, in the last four years he has created six
hundred thousand jobs. Collected government revenues have
also increased. In the last four years the government's
budget has increased tenfold, from the equivalent of USD 1.4
billion dollars in 2003 to 12 billion in 2008, "more than the
budget of Armenia and Georgia combined." His government is
implementing sweeping infrastructure projects "everywhere,"
to include information technology, power, education, and
transportation. He has built 1,200 schools in the last four
years, and is equipping all schools with internet
connections. Average salaries were increasing from 70-80
dollars a month to approximately 230 dollars monthly.


6. (C) The GOAJ has entered into "a gas partnership" with
the EU, focused on the TGI and Nabucco pipelines. The State
Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) was increasing regional
investments, to include a refinery in Ceyhan and other
investments in the Romanian and Georgian energy sectors.
Germany has also invited the GOAJ to invest in its energy
sector. All of these countries rightfully see Azerbaijan as
a friend.


7. (C) Aliyev said Azerbaijan's avoidance of Russian gas

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purchases last winter was an "historic" achievement, which
"ruined Gazprom's monopoly." Azerbaijan's supplying gas to
Turkey and Georgia (and soon Greece) was an "ideological and
political victory." Azerbaijan offers a similar opportunity
to escape Russian dominance to Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan,
by offering them Azerbaijan's infrastructure as another venue
for gas transport. The Azerbaijani and Kazakh governments
have signed an intergovernmental agreement last summer, and
this summer commercial entities from each country signed
follow-on commercial agreements that will facilitate the
shipment of Kazakh oil through Azerbaijan. Preliminary talks
have also started with Turkmenistan on using Azerbaijani
offshore infrastructure to move Turkmen gas westwards.
Aliyev said that he and Turkmen President Berdimuhamedov have
agreed that such cooperation could be called a "technical
connection," vice a "trans-Caspian pipeline."


8. (C) Regionally, Aliyev said he was pleased with the GOAJ's
relations with the EU and GUAM, with whom Azerbaijan is
cooperating on energy issues. There are talks of Azerbaijan
cooperating with Ukraine and Poland on a new pipeline to the
Baltic Sea. Poland, Romania, and Lithuania had become
"strong supporters of Azerbaijan," as had many countries in
"old Europe."


9. (C) Azerbaijan "had made a deliberate choice to align
itself with the European neighborhood, and was using its
influence to contribute regionally and globally, to include
helping in the Muslim world. Azerbaijan was moving toward
prosperity, and lifting its citizens' lifestyles towards
"European levels."

ALIYEV'S TWO CONCERNS
--------------


10. (C) Aliyev said that he had two major concerns:
Nagorno-Karabakh and religious extremism. Concerning the
latter, although the situation in Azerbaijan was currently
satisfactory, the regional and Middle East situation was "not
helpful" and if Azerbaijan were not careful, "it could have
problems from both the north and the south." Recent episodes
in Azerbaijan were "a signal that we need to take measures."


11. (C) A/S Fried thanked Aliyev for his views, which by and
large he shared. On the first of President Aliyev's two
concerns (N-K),Armenian FM Oskanian has told Fried there has
been progress on the "Paper of Principles." Fried had asked
Oskanian whether he (Fried) could tell President Aliyev that
Armenian President Kocharian was serious about resolving N-K.
Oskanian told Fried that Kocharian was serious. Fried told
Aliyev that although "Kocharian freezes up whenever an
agreement is close," according to Oskanian he was ready to
push forward. On Turkey, Turkish PM Erdogan, President Gul
and FM Babajan all are seeking to "move towards the world"
and make Turkey more active in global affairs, which is good
for the GOAJ and USG. Turkey strongly supports Azerbaijan,
and if there were progress in N-K, it would "unlock Turkey's
ability to play a larger role, which would in turn give
Azerbaijan more freedom of action." Turkey would also be
much freer in its relations with Armenia which would
strengthen Turkey's strategic importance and also help "kill
the Armenian resolution" (HR 106) once and for all." If
Armenia "comes out of its shell," it would be good for
everyone in the region. The good news is that as far as N-K
is concerned, Russia "is not acting as a spoiler."


12. (C) On President Aliyev's second major concern -
religious extremism - Fried said that the short-term answer
was focused on increased security cooperation, but that a
longer-term solution could be found in following the Turkish
model, where the AK party is the Turkic equivalent of the
Christian Democratic Party. The AKP shows that an Islamic
party can be modern, and as democracy develops in Turkey, so
does the political space for Islam.

GOAJ-USG BILAT RELATIONS
--------------


13. (C) Fried said the U.S. has and will continue to support
GOAJ efforts towards the Southern Corridor. The real
progress on energy issues that Azerbaijan and the U.S. have

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made within the last year has increased Russian nervousness.
In this regard, Russia's May agreement with Turkmenistan and
Kazakhstan to build a new gas pipeline, and Putin's comments
at the recent Tehran Caspian summit, were signs of Russian
nervousness, not confidence. Although it is strange that
"America is more active than Europe" in supporting projects
like Nabucco, another piece of good news within the last year
was that Europe has "woken up" on the issue of energy
security. Although in Germany the Social Democrats aren't
worried about Russian energy dominance, "the European center"
was moving toward the USG/GOAJ position on European energy
security. On the eastern Caspian, Fried said that one of the
USG's regional priorities was to support the "strategic
freedom of choice" for countries such as Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan, this policy being in no way "anti-Russian." He
was heartened to hear that Aliyev and Nazarbayev were
bolstering their cooperation, to include investing in
Georgia. On Turkey, the situation was complicated by the PKK
and by the recent Congressional resolution (HR 106) on
"Armenian genocide." One bright spot in U.S.-Turkish
relations was in energy cooperation, and in this regard he
hoped that the GOT-GOAJ impasse on gas transit would be
resolved.

GUAM - UKRAINE
--------------


14. (C) A/S Fried said that GUAM has great potential, but
its success depends in part on a strong Ukraine.
Unfortunately, Ukraine has been "weak and paralyzed" for over
18 months. He didn't care whether the government was "orange
or orange-blue;" a strong and independent Ukrainian
Government would be good not just for Ukraine and GUAM, but
for the U.S. If Ukraine becomes a strong force within GUAM,
"then Moldova will follow." Aliyev said that Yushchenko
"can't run a country with 15 percent support." However,
Aliyev said that Yushchenko probably assumes that as long as
there is no government he can remain president, whereas once
a government is formed he becomes a lame duck. Fried
repeated that the U.S. will support any democratically
elected Ukrainian Government. Aliyev said that Yushcenko
wanted "someone neutral" as head of the Ukrainian Government,
but that this wouldn't happen. Fried said that Yushcenko's
greatest tactical strength was shown in forcing early
elections ("by breaking the law," President Aliyev
interjected),but that now "the country is on hold, with no
strategic direction." Aliyev said that when Yushchenko was
elected he had tremendous support, but had "squandered it."


15. (C) In response to Fried's question as to whether
Yushchenko's problems stemmed from poor health, Aliyev said
that Yushchenko had told him he'd had health problems since
being poisoned. Fried said he had hoped that Yushchenko
would "spring forward" after having called for new elections,
but it hadn't happened. He needs to build a genuine mandate.
Ukraine's paralysis means that Russia can ignore the Balkans
and pressure Georgia, whereas it could not ignore a strong
Ukraine. Whereas chaos might tactically help Yushchenko, his
popularity is declining.


16. (C) Aliyev agreed that Azerbaijan needed a strong
Ukraine in GUAM and that a failed Ukraine "would leave a bad
image in the world." Azerbaijan has tried to buttress GUAM
by participating in various energy and transportation
projects, to include the Odessa-Brody project, where
Azerbaijan just took a share in the Sarmatia joint venture to
fund a feasibility study on its expansion. However, in 2004
the Ukraine FM had been saying that "Azerbaijan doesn't have
the oil" for Odessa-Brody, and now Azerbaijan needed to know
Ukraine's position on this pipeline, since without Ukraine
support the project wouldn't work. The GOAJ was also seeking
political guarantees from the EU before going too far on
Odessa-Brody.

GUAM - MOLDOVA
--------------


17. (C) President Aliyev said Moldova was "a problem." He
expressed concern about Moldovan President Voronin, who was
"not too stable" and who had "avoided" the two most recent
GUAM summits, after which Moldovan wine was once again

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allowed into Russia. Aliyev thought Ukraine President
Yuschchenko "totally committed" to GUAM, but had real doubts
about Voronin. Georgian President Saakashvili shared
Aliyev's concerns. A/S Fried agreed with Aliyev's
assessment, calling Voronin a "provincial communist" who is
"terrified of Romania." Voronin doesn't see Moldova's future
in Europe, but Azerbaijan needs to help convince Voronin that
Moldova has a European future. Aliyev said that given
Moldovans' ability to acquire Romanian citizenship, the joke
was that Moldova would have a President and Parliamet, but
no people. Fried said that with Romania eing a part of the
EU, this desire for Romanian itizenship is quite logical.

GUAM - GEORGIA
--------------


18. (C) A/S Fried said that "Georgia and Azerbaijan can't be
the only two pro-Western countries in the region." While
most recently in Georgia he had spent much time with
Saakashvili and had also met with the opposition. Fried told
Saakashvili that Georgia's institutions were still weak and
needed to be strengthened, as right now in Georgia "it is all
Saakaashvili." In this regard, it would be better if
Saakashvili had better Parliamentary opposition. Aliyev
agreed that "there was no one to replace" Saakashvili,
although Parliament speaker Nino Burjanadze was a good person.


19. (C) Aliyev said Saakashvili has to endure "lots of
provocations from Russia," which will only get worse. A/S
Fried said Saakashvili needs a "steady friend who knows the
neighborhood." The U.S. cannot always be such a friend, but
Georgia was Azerbaijan's strategic partner, and Azerbaijan
could be this friend. Aliyev agreed, saying Saakashvili
always called him when he needed help, and that Azerbaijan
"always helps Georgia," to include supplying weapons in 2004,
gas last winter at vastly sub-market prices, and most
recently with wheat when Saakashvili called him from Portugal
about a wheat shortage. Russia was displeased with GOAJ
support to Georgia, especially last winter's gas sales, but
Aliyev said that "Russia has Armenia, we have Georgia."
Although Saakashvili sometimes "talks stupidly," Aliyev said
"he wouldn't do anything stupid." Fried said he had told
Saakashvili that although Russia "feels itself invincible,
time was on his side" in his relations with Russia, as the
Georgian economy was improving yearly. Although Abkhazia is
worse for Georgia than N-K was for Azerbaijan, he counseled
Saakashvili not to let Russia "get to him." Aliyev said that
whereas Azerbaijan's antagonist in the N-K confrontation was
weak Armenia, Georgia's nemesis was a strong Russia.


20. (C) Fried said that Georgia had done an impressive job
attracting foreign capital, and that "every time he visited
Tbilisi, it looked better," Aliyev agreed, saying he had been
in Tbilisi most recently in May, and that its progress was
impressive. Fried said Saakashvili, like Aliyev, was
popular, as both are "presidents during good times" and can
draw on a reservoir of goodwill.


21. (C) Aliyev said that Kosovo was a serious problem for
the region. He thinks Russia will recognize Abkhazia,
especially if Kosovo is recognized unilaterally. If Russia
recognizes Abkhazia, Saakashvili told Aliyev in Vilnius that
Georgia would break diplomatic relations with Russia, and,
with its strong army and military budget, would reclaim
Abkhazia militarily. Aliyev told Fried that this chain of
events could cause the region to "blow up," hence his worry
about Kosovo.


22. (C) Aliyev said Russian FM Lavrov had told him in so
many words in May that Russia was considering recognizing
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, not N-K. A/S Fried agreed it was
unlikely Russia would "cause trouble" in N-K. Despite
Lavrov's comments, he himself didn't think that Russia would
recognize Abkhazia: the USG has told Russia that its
recognition of Abkhazia would be a major problem in bilateral
relations, and Secretary Rice herself had warned Russian FM
Lavrov so. If Russia were to recognize Abkhazia, the U.S.
and Europe would respond so forcefully that it would
"humiliate" Russia. Furthermore, Russia recognizing Abkhazia
would be an aggressive move that would "re-open the 1991
Territorial Recognition Act," something the Russians would

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not want. Fried and Aliyev agreed that a Georgian military
response to Russian Abkhazia recognition would be foolhardy,
and Fried said he had warned Saakashvili against using the
military option in Abkhazia. Fried had told Saakashvili that
if Russia recognized Abkhazia, Georgia would "feel the
world's support." In turn, Saakashvili had told A/S Fried on
Kosovo that the U.S. shouldn't feel "frightened" by the
Russians, but should go ahead and recognize Kosovo.

ENERGY
--------------


23. (C) Ambassador Derse mentioned that she would be going
to Ashgabat for the November 14-15 Turkmenistan International
Oil and Gas Exhibition (TIOGE) and would be meeting with
senior GOTX officials, and asked how she could help advance
bilateral GOTX-GOAJ energy cooperation. Aliyev said that the
GOTX "must choose now" about its future and that the USG
could help "push" it towards making the right decision. It
is positive that Berdimuhamedov is talking with the
international community, but his strategy seems to be "saying
yes to everyone," to include the U.S.,
Azerbaijan, China and Russia. The GOTX says it is ready to
supply gas to Europe "at its border, but which border?"
Azerbaijan cannot initiate GOTX energy sector outreach to
Europe, nor act as if it needs Turkmen gas. Much as the USG
"woke Europe up" as to where its interests lay and was the
driving force behind the BTC and SCP pipelines, so it should
help raise Turkmenistan's awareness of its strategic options.
In Tehran, Berdimuhamedov publicly called for a littoral
agreement on Caspian energy use, but in a private talk with
Aliyev said that their two countries need to build a
trans-Caspian pipeline, which does not need the approval of
any other littoral state. Aliyev said that Azerbaijan had
over two trillion cubic meters of gas, and as such doesn't
need to buy any gas from Turkmenistan.
However, it was willing to provide its infrastructure to
Turkmenistan in furtherance of the Southern Corridor Project.


24. (C) Aliyev said that in Tehran he had talked with Kazakh
President Nazarbayev about similar energy cooperation, with
Nazarbayev once again suggesting a trilateral heads of state
meeting with Turkmenistan. Aliyev approved of the idea and
said Azerbaijan would support it, suggesting that Nazarbayev
organize and host such a summit, although Aliyev doesn't
think that Nazarbayev would follow through.


25. (C) In Tehran, Nazarbayev also told him that each
Caspian country should be free to pursue its own projects, as
opposed to Putin's position that due to environmental reasons
all five littoral states must approve of Caspian energy
projects. Aliyev said he had told Putin that since 1949,
thousands of kilometers of underwater pipeline had been laid
in the Caspian without any problems. Putin then said the
problem in the Caspian had to do with "underground
mountains," at which point Aliyev called over octogenarian
SOCAR First VP for Geology, Geophysics and Field Development
Khoshbakht Yusifzade, who told Putin that he had been working
in the Caspian longer than Putin had been alive, and that he
(Putin) was wrong. Putin then conceded, Aliyev said, that
bilateral energy project development was "not a problem in
principle," although Aliyev said that Putin will doubtless
act differently.


26. (C) Aliyev said that if Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan were
to join up with Azerbaijan in Caspian energy development, it
could "change the geopolitics of the region." A/S Fried
agreed, saying that for this reason Russia was desperate to
stop Kazakh and Turkmen cooperation with Azerbaijan and the
West. If Russia were unable to "lockdown" Caspian gas,
"their plans fail, and they would have to reform Gazprom."
As such, Russia is "leaning on" Nazarbayev and
Berdimuhamedov. Nazarbayev can handle Russian pressure,
although it is not clear that he is strategically committed
to moving westward. Turkmenistan however will need GOAJ help
in resisting Russia. The GOTX is "completely at sea" as to
how to operate regionally and globally, which is why it is
"saying yes to everything." Azerbaijan, with its seasoned and
experienced diplomats and officials, can help Turkmen
officials in this learning
process.

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27. (C) Aliyev said that Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan were
both telling Russia that Azerbaijan was the one seeking to
draw their energy westwards, so as to deflect Russian anger
away from them. However, "Azerbaijan can handle Russia's
anger," as "they have nothing on us" - they tried to pressure
Azerbaijan with gas, it didn,t work. They next tried to
pressure Azerbaijan by expelling Azerbaijani nationals from
Russia, but that too was unsuccessful. However, neither
Kazakhstan nor Turkmenistan has Azerbaijan's strength of will
to resist Russia. Azerbaijan should be an example for these
countries, for if they just "take one step into the Caspian,"
Azerbaijan can do the rest.


28. (C) A/S Fried said that the U.S. needs to help "handle
the public side" of the Caspian energy issue and help dispel
the myth that "Russia has won" in the battle for Caspian
energy, while neutralizing additional Russian pressure on
Azerbaijan. Russia is seeking to create the impression that
it has secured Caspian energy for itself, but Europe needs to
know the truth that this is not the case. European energy
companies know the truth, but they are remaining quiet. In
Western Europe some think that "we should just accept"
Russian energy dominance, although the situation has improved
since the time of German Chancellor Schroeder. It is a U.S.
(vice Azerbaijani) challenge, but Aliyev should be aware of
this "perception management problem," where Russia is trying
to "dominate the information space."


29. (C) Aliyev said in this regard he always seeks to comment
publicly on Azerbaijan's energy potential and production.
Azerbaijan will produce 15-16 billion cubic meters (BCM) of
gas next year, and is working to develop a new field. It is
moving toward producing 25-30 bcm/a, which could help in
supplying Europe's energy needs. Azerbaijan also
participates in regional energy-focused events, to include
his own participation in the Vilnius and Krakow summits this
year, where he highlighted GOAJ energy production. In this
regard, his actions and those of the U.S. have helped turn
around Hungary's perceptions about Azerbaijan energy. A/S
Fried agreed, saying he had "spent 90 minutes with Prime
Minister Gyurcsany, 90 percent of which was about energy," in
the attempt to convince him that he had options.


30. (C) Aliyev said that SOCAR had also recently opened up a
regional office in Romania, to help its energy outreach
downstream. Fried said that USG-GOAJ energy interests
coincide, and the two countries will continue to work closely
together. DAS Bryza has done a great job in this regard, and
others in the USG are also ready to help. He told President
Aliyev that his standing offer was that if Azerbaijan needed
help on any matter, "just let us know."

MOSCOW 2-PLUS-2 TALKS
--------------


31. (C) Prefacing his comments by saying that the USG always
sought to keep its friends informed, A/S Fried assured
President Aliyev that the USG would do nothing with Russia on
Azerbaijan without first consulting with Azerbaijan: "we will
do nothing about you without you." As such, A/S Fried said
he would like to brief the President on the "strategic basket
of issues" of nuclear issues, arms control, CFE and missile
defense they had discussed in Moscow during the 2-plus-2
talks. Fried said the USG was looking for areas to cooperate
with Russia where their interests overlap, given their
disagreements on many issues, to include Kosovo, energy and
Iran. Finding such areas of cooperation would help stabilize
the relationship during the upcoming transitional periods in
the two countries, given the upcoming U.S. presidential
election and the "from Putin to Putin" transition in Russia.

CFE
---


32. (C) A/S Fried said that Russia was interested in "oing
past the block" concerning Istanbul commitmnts. Georgia and
Moldova want to be helpful. Russia is trying to decide
whether to suspend CFE and then negotiate, or to seek a deal
now, with some EU pressure on Russia not to suspend. The USG
offer was a good one that showed some flexibility. Russia

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was seeking to lower national and territorial ceilings for
NATO countries. Russia had demanded that the U.S. commit to
abolishing flank limits for Russia, saying that the U.S.
could do the same for itself. Fried said the U.S. refused
this offer, and that Secretary Rice had instructed him that
while he has negotiating flexibility on other issues, there
was "no flexibility" on this issue. Fried told Aliyev that
given Azerbaijan's interest in revised national and
territorial ceilings he would be interested to know that the
U.S. had put forward a counter-offer to Russia of a
multilateral discussion of flanks and also national and
territorial ceilings. The U.S. proposal stipulated that
these discussions would begin after the adopted treaty went
into effect. In sum, A/S Fried said that the CFE situation
was "better in private than it appeared in public." He was
scheduled to meet his Russian counterpart on November 7, at
which point he would have a better idea of the Russian
response. He suspected there would be movement on this issue
from the Russian Foreign Minister on the margins of the
upcoming OSCE conference in Madrid.

MISSILE DEFENSE
--------------


33. (C) Aliyev thanked Fried for the information, jokingly
adding that it seemed the only areas where Russia and the
U.S. cooperated, i.e. N-K and anti-missile defense, related
to Azerbaijan. He said that the GOAJ had true military
cooperation with the U.S., but made only limited military
purchases from Russia. When he talked with Putin two years
ago about the Gabala radar station, Putin said he planned to
shut it down when the current lease ended. Aliyev said that
the GOAJ had no reason to prolong the agreement, since it
hadn't been a good deal for Azerbaijan when it was signed in

2000. But evidently the Russian thinking on Gabala has
changed. There was a provision in the original agreement
that Russia could not make any changes in Gabala without GOAJ
agreement, which was why Putin had called
Aliyev before pitching U.S.-Russian cooperation at the site.


34. (C) A/S Fried said that if the Russians were serious
about the Gabala offer, there would be other U.S.-GOAJ
bilateral questions that would need to be discussed, to
include the possibility of Azerbaijan coming under increased
Iranian pressure. By definition, "if Russia gets serious on
missile defense, it means an increase in U.S.-GOAJ security
cooperation...we would undertake certain responsibilities vis
a vis Azerbaijan." It is a statement of the obvious, not an
obligation, to say that if Gabala were part of an
early-warning system protecting Europe, Russia and the U.S.,
then Azerbaijan would be part of the missile defense system.
A/S Fried said that if it worked out, it would mean that
Azerbaijan would have a military connection with NATO. He
said the U.S. would "wait to see what Russia does" regarding
Gabala, which does have "real capabilities." Europe was
still undecided about missile defense, although the situation
was better than it was six month ago. President Aliyev said
it would be good for Azerbaijan to be part of this global
defense system. Concerning Iran, he said Azerbaijan was
already feeling increased pressure due to the Gabala offer,
but he had told Ahmadinejad that he should be bothering
Putin, as U.S.-Russian cooperation on Gabala was Putin's idea.


35. (C) A/S Fried referred to the Train and Equip (TEP)
program in Georgia, saying it had been a great success,
giving discipline to the Georgian military. If Azerbaijan
were to consider increasing its forces in Afghanistan to
battalion-size, Fried and Aliyev agreed that a similar
program could be considered for Azerbaijan.


36. (U) This cable has been cleared by A/S Fried.
DERSE