BAKU EAC MEETING - 11/9/07

S E C R E T BAKU 001352

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
NOFORN

DEPT FOR D, P, M, INR, DS/IP/EUR, DS/ICI/PII, DS/DSS/ITA,
EUR/CARC, S/CT AND CA; FRANKFURT FOR MCESC REGION I

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2027
TAGS: ASEC CASC PREL PINR PTER AJ
SUBJECT: BAKU EAC MEETING - 11/9/07

REF: BAKU 1326 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Donald Lu per 1.4 (b,c,d).


1. (S/NF) DCM convened an EAC meeting on November 9 at 1400
to review the latest information concerning an ongoing threat
against the Embassy (reftel) and the Embassy's security
posture in response to this threat. DCM, CONS, GRPO, IMC,
IMO, MSG, POL/ECON and RSO attended. GRPO reported that
Azerbaijani authorities had captured one of the four
fugitives in the Baku metropolitan area on November 4.
According to the Ministry of National Security (MNS),the
fugitive was armed with hand grenades and had written a
suicide note. The MNS also reported that the fugitive
confirmed that the group led by Kamran Asadov had planned to
attack the U.S. Embassy on October 27. The MNS believes that
the three remaining fugitives are still armed and in the Baku
metropolitan area and most likely are together. The MNS
believes the group is not trying to flee Baku and may not
have given up on its plans to attack the Embassy; however,
the MNS does not believe there is an imminent threat against
the Embassy nor does the MNS believe that there is any
information indicating a specific threat against the Marine
Corps Ball. The MNS now believes the group was responsible
for the October 27 armed robbery of a gas station in Baku
(reftel). GRPO reported that the Asadov group has historical
links to a separate Islamic Jihad Union-affiliated terrorist
group. There are no obvious operational links between this
group and the Asadov group. Full reporting in GRPO channels.


2. (S/NF) The EAC noted that the latest information from the
MNS contradicts previously available information. The EAC
agreed that the situation was likely to remain fluid and that
we were unlikely to have a more full picture of the group,
its intentions, capabilities or possible expanded links. The
EAC agreed that the Embassy must maintain a heightened
security posture and discussed the need to reduce the
subsequent strain on Embassy resources. The EAC recommended
that the Ambassador take a careful look at the number of USG
visitors requiring extra security protection and the number
of large representational events that require extra security
staff, in light of the need to maintain extra guard shifts
for the foreseeable future. The EAC also agreed that the
Embassy should move to a mandatory, staggered work schedule
in order to reduce the numbers of Embassy personnel entering
and leaving the Embassy at peak hours, and to reinforce among
Embassy staff the need to maintain a heightened security
posture.


3. (S/NF) The RSO reviewed security precautions for the
Marine Corps Ball, in light of the continuing threat against
the Embassy. Although the RSO, working with local police,
has done everything possible to increase our security posture
for the event, the EAC agreed that drop-off and pick-up
remained a vulnerability. The EAC recommended that the DCM
send a message to Embassy personnel to urge them to either
use a driver who could drop them off and pick them up within
the security cordon or park at the Embassy's unclassified
annex and use an Embassy-provided shuttle to reach the event.
The EAC unanimously agreed that the Ball should be held on
November 10 as planned, with the additional security
precautions.


4. (U) The EAC adjourned at 1500.
DERSE