FORUM ON KARABAKH ADVOCATES SETTING A DEADLINE FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 001099

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PBTS AM AJ
SUBJECT: FORUM ON KARABAKH ADVOCATES SETTING A DEADLINE FOR
MINSK GROUP PEACE PROCESS

Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Representatives from the Forum on Karabakh
-- a nascent association of opposition-leaning individuals --
on August 29 told the Ambassador that their organization is
increasingly impatient with the Minsk Group process due to
its lack of progress in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict. The Forum advocates setting a three to five year
timeline on the Minsk Group's efforts, and also urges
enhanced GOAJ efforts to lobby other countries to label
Armenia as the aggressor in the conflict. The Forum supports
the use of force to retake NK and the seven occupied
territories if negotiations fail. The Forum representatives
argued that the continued status quo of the unresolved
conflict is not in the interests of Azerbaijan or the U.S,
adding that Azerbaijanis' generally favorable view of the
U.S. is declining because many Azerbaijanis question the U.S.
commitment to serve a solution to the NK conflict due to the
Minsk Group,s continuing failure to resolve the conflict. We
believe the Forum,s views increasingly represent a growing
trend in Azerbaijani society that must be countered to ensure
that the peace process is not disrupted. End Summary.


2. (C) On August 29, the Ambassador met with three
representatives from the Forum on Karabakh, at their request,
to hear the group,s perspectives gauge popular opinion on
resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Each also heads a
small opposition party. The Forum on Karabakh is an informal
association of several opposition-leaning individuals who
have held several meetings to address the NK conflict. The
Forum is not a tight-knit, well-organized group, but a
nascent umbrella organization. Their most recent meeting was
in July, and they have sent a letter, which outlines their
recommendations for settling the NK conflict, to President
Aliyev. While the movement is nascent, we believe it
reflects growing opinion within Azerbaijani society that the
Minsk Group is not capable of resolving the conflict and
other means to secure a resolution must be explored. (The
three representatives and their political affiliation are:
Ahmad Oruj (Azadliq Party),Taleh Aliyev (Azerbaijan Way),
and Hasan Hasanov (Azad Azerbaijan).)


3. (C) The Forum provided the following eight proposals to
President Aliyev, suggesting a new approach to resolving the
NK conflict. The Forum also is preparing a broader plan for
a Government-wide approach to resolving the conflict.
Informal Embassy translation of the eight points follows:

-Disclose the framework of negotiating principles.
-Stop looking for internal enemies and eliminate internal
clashes so Azerbaijan is more unified in its approach to
resolving the NK conflict.
-Raise the issue of the withdrawal of Russian troops from
Armenia.
-Put a deadline on the work of the OSCE Minsk Group.
-Establish a Karabakh or Territorial Problems Institute to
deepen Azerbaijan's approach toward the conflict.
-Nationalistic groups should start a campaign to call on the
U.S., Russia, France, and Iran to stop supporting Armenia.
-Azerbaijan should lobby neighboring countries to label
Armenia as the aggressor in the NK conflict, paving the way
for economic and political sanctions.
-Create a Karabakh Commission within the Parliament.

Status Quo Not in Azerbaijan's Interest
--------------


4. (C) The Forum representatives argued that Azerbaijanis
increasingly believe that Azerbaijan should not continue with
the Minsk Group process unless there are clear results. Oruj
said a number of recent statements by the OSCE Minsk Group
Co-Chairs -- including the U.S. Co-Chair's August interview
that mentioned American revolutionaries and Karabakhis --
have heightened Azerbaijanis' immediate frustration with the
Minsk Group process. However, he noted that there also is a
more long-term trend of mounting skepticism toward the Minsk
Group. One of the Forum's key recommendations is that the
GOAJ should put a clear timeline on the Minsk Group's work.
Specifically, the Forum believes that the GOAJ should set a
three to five year deadline on Minsk Group negotiations. If
negotiations fail after this period, the GOAJ should retake

BAKU 00001099 002 OF 003


NK and the seven occupied territories.


5. (C) Oruj argued that the GOAJ should be more proactive in
pursuing Azerbaijan's interests vis-a-vis NK and not assume
that other countries will necessarily act in Azerbaijan's
best interests. Despite their opposition affiliation, the
Forum representatives advocated a more cohesive national
consensus between the government and the Azerbaijani people
regarding NK. Oruj said that if the GOAJ broadens the public
dialogue on NK, this would create greater trust and
solidarity between the Azerbaijani population and President
Aliyev. Oruj said some oppositionists would put aside their
political agenda if President Aliyev moved forward with
concrete actions to settle the NK conflict in a manner more
consistent with Azerbaijan's interests.


6. (C) The representatives commented that the continuation
of the status quo increases the risks of a country or
international fora recognizing NK's independence. In
particular, Oruj was nervous about Moscow taking this step.

. . . or the US' Interest
--------------


7. (C) Aliyev observed that the current stalemate is
decreasing Azerbaijanis' generally favorable impressions of
the U.S. Anti-U.S. forces are playing on this theme. In
response to the Ambassador's question, Aliyev said there is
no homogenous group of anti-U.S. forces, as it includes a
range of politicians, NGO activists, journalists, and
intellectuals. Just as the U.S. provides grants to a range
of civil society groups, Russia and Iran actively maintain
their own outreach tools. Aliyev and Oruj said Russia seeks
to exacerbate ethnic tensions between Azerbaijanis and
several non-Turkic minorities, including Lezgis, Talysh, and
other groups indigenous to Dagestan. On the other hand, Iran
has outreach efforts to religious groups in Azerbaijan.

Recognize the Aggressor
--------------


8. (C) Oruj argued that the Minsk Group's basic stance is
not terribly different from the position of the Soviet Union
because neither actor distinguishes between the aggressor and
the victim. The Forum's appeal to President Aliyev called
for increased GOAJ lobbying efforts for other countries to
label Armenia as the aggressor in the conflict because it is
"unjust" to ignore the distinction between aggressor and
victim. The representatives suggested the GOAJ should work
with the Azerbaijani diaspora to achieve this goal.

Territorial Integrity is Key
--------------


9. (C) Taleh Aliyev said the only alternative to maintaining
Azerbaijan's territorial integrity is war. Aliyev and Oruj
cautioned that while Azerbaijanis generally are quiescent,
they can also be emotional and would never accept a
compromise when it comes to Azerbaijan's territory. If
Azerbaijan did not make such a compromise when it was a weak
state in the 1990s, why would Azerbaijan now make a
compromise from a position of greater strength, asked Oruj
While arguing for the inviolability of Azerbaijan's
territorial integrity, the representatives underscored the
importance of granting all ethnic Armenian Azerbaijani
citizens clear minority rights in their proposal.

Treat Azerbaijan as a Partner
--------------


10. (C) The representatives' appeal was grounded in a
favorable -- albeit receding -- view of the U.S. and
Azerbaijan's Euro-Atlantic orientation. (COMMENT: As a
variety of polling shows, the majority of Azerbaijanis have a
favorable view of the U.S., but this has been gradually
declining over the past several years.) Oruj stated that the
U.S. is the only country in the Minsk Group that Azerbaijan
can trust and that Azerbaijan and the U.S. have created a
strong partnership, which is in both states' interests. He
complained, however, that the partnership is one-sided.
Reflecting a common sentiment, he argued that while

BAKU 00001099 003 OF 003


Azerbaijan has been a consistent partner for the U.S. in the
areas of counterterrorism and energy, the U.S. has not
adequately treated Azerbaijan as a strategic partner. Oruj
cited Armenia's acceptance into the Millennium Challenge
program and the U.S. Congress' financial assistance to NK as
evidence of the U.S.' lack of a fair approach toward
Azerbaijan.

Push GOAJ on Democracy Agenda
--------------


11. (C) The representatives asked that the U.S. take a
stronger stand on pressuring the GOAJ to undertake democratic
reforms. They argued that the U.S. faces an image problem
among average Azerbaijanis, who perceive that the U.S. is
toning down its criticism of the GOAJ's democratic failings
on the altar of U.S. energy interests. Noting that "we
expect a lot from the U.S. as our strategic partner," Oruj
asked for the U.S. to not soften its criticism of the GOAJ's
undemocratic behavior, particularly in the area of rigging
elections and the clampdown on independent media.

Comment
--------------


12. (C) We believe the representatives' criticism and
impatience with the Minsk Group peace process reflects
growing opinion within Azerbaijani society. The majority of
everyday Azerbaijanis and a number of educated Azerbaijani
commentators routinely state that the Minsk Group process is
ineffective and has little legitimacy. This sentiment
appears to be growing, along with the number of Azerbaijanis
who favor the GOAJ taking more robust diplomatic, economic,
and military steps to regain NK and the seven occupied
territories (septel). This is in keeping with a broader
sense -- fueled in large part by Azerbaijan's energy wealth
-- that Azerbaijan is an increasingly important regional
player, whose views on the conflict should carry greater
weight. As we consider how best to advance the peace
process, we will need to take into account Azerbaijanis'
growing skepticism and its increased ability to act in
support of its perceived interests.
DERSE