PRESIDENTIAL FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR PROVIDES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 001072

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2017
TAGS: ENRG ETRN PBTS PGOV PREL IR AJ
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR PROVIDES
READOUT ON IRANIAN PRESIDENT AHMADINEJAD'S VISIT TO BAKU

REF: A. STATE 98631

B. BAKU 1017

C. BAKU 1052

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Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: According to Presidential Foreign Policy
Advisor Novruz Mammadov, Iranian President Ahmadinejad sought
to use his August 21-22 visit to Baku to counter his
international isolation. Mammadov said the visit - including
four new bilateral agreements and a joint declaration -
served Azerbaijan's economic and cross-border interests.
Ahmadinejad sought to play a larger role in the resolution of
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and proposed that Azerbaijan
and Iran cooperate on the transportation of Turkmen gas,
initiatives Mammadov said the Government of Azerbaijan (GOAJ)
rejected as not in accordance with Azerbaijan's strategic
interests. With regard to Iran's nuclear programs, Mammadov
said that President Aliyev had urged Ahmadinejad that "we
must act in conformity with the international community if we
want peace, security, and prosperity in the region." Deputy
Transport Minister Musa Pahanov separately downplayed the
importance of two of the transportation agreements, noting
that key details remained to be resolved and, until the
Nagorno-Karabakh issues is solved, Azerbaijan has no choice
but to work with Iran on these issues. Ahmadinejad's visit
was in keeping with the overall bilateral relationship:
low-key and focused on pragmatic border issues, with the
Azerbaijanis resisting Iranian political and energy
overtures. End Summary.

Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Mammadov on the Visit
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2. (C) On August 24, Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor
Novruz Mammadov provided the Ambassador with a read out of
Iranian President Ahmadinejad's August 21-22 visit to Baku,
noting that he had no information to share from the
Presidents' tete-a-tete. Characterizing the visit as
"satisfactory and important," Mammadov said that the visit
went well for both countries. Mammadov said that Ahmadinejad
was seeking any opportunity to make foreign visits "given the
situation he is in," referring to Iran's increasing political
isolation and that was the main goal of his visit to
Azerbaijan. Outlining Iran's repeated requests for an
official visit - in March, May, and again in June - Mammadov
said that it was impossible for Azerbaijan to keep turning
down the Iranian requests. Characterizing Azerbaijan's
relationship with its larger neighbor as "complicated" and
pointing out that "Iran plays a great role in Azerbaijan,"
Mammadov said that he was pleased with the five agreements
signed during the visit. Mammadov said that Azerbaijan was
interested in all of the five agreements - a joint
declaration reflecting on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
(emailed to NEA/IR and EUR/CARC separately) and four MOUs
dealing with "minor economic issues and Nakhchivan" - because
they "served our purposes."


3. (C) Mammadov described the Iranian position during the
visit as "very simple and straightforward." According to
Mammadov, Ahmadinejad stressed that Iran was interested in
peace, security, and stability in the region, "acting as if
he was looking for partners in this." In response, Mammadov
said that President Aliyev brought up Azerbaijan's position
on the Iranian nuclear program, with Aliyev telling
Ahmadinejad that "we must act in conformity with the
international community if we want peace, security, and
prosperity in the region."


4. (C) According to Mammadov, Ahmadinejad wanted greater
cooperation in the energy sector, suggesting that moving
Turkmen natural gas through Iran and Azerbaijan in order to
reach world markets would be "very lucrative" for both
countries. While not surprised by Ahmadinejad's interest in
greater energy cooperation, Mammadov was struck that
Ahmadinejad had presented this proposal "in a more concrete
way," something Mammadov attributed to interest from the
Turkmen side. Mammadov said that Ahmadinejad had "close
relations" with Turkmenistan's President, adding that this
was "evident from his remarks." Mammadov told the Ambassador
"I think it is important for us all - the EU, US, and Turkey
- to continue working with Turkmenistan due to the great
potential and opportunities located there, and to counter
Iranian influence. Mammadov sai, "Azerbaijan did not
respond" to Ahmadinejad's rquest because "they remained
political ideas haning in the air" and "we (Azerbaijan)

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understand accepting this would undermine the strategic
choice we've made."


5. (C) Mammadov said that Ahmadinejad demonstrated "an
active position" on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, indicating
a clear desire to become more involved in the issue.
Although the Azerbaijani side was not surprised by this
overture from the Iranians because Iran had previously made
several similar proposals, Mammadov was surprised that Iran's
expression of interest "was presented so openly and clearly
at the presidential level." Telling the Azerbaijanis that
the West will never help Azerbaijan resolve the problem, Iran
claimed that it could be more efficient than the OSCE because
it had good relations with Armenia. Characterizing the
Iranian proposal as "bad" because it contradicting
Azerbaijan's strategic interests, Mammadov said that
President Aliyev told Ahmadinejad that he was hopeful that
Nagorno-Karabakh could be resolved within the international
framework, adding that while additional initiatives were not
welcome, assistance was. Commenting that Iran knows that
resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is Azerbaijan's top
foreign policy objective, Mammadov said that he believed the
Iranians were simply "using it for maneuvering - we will not
accept their overtures."


6. (C) Mammadov said that Ahmadinejad did not show much
interest in the Qabala radar station in any of the meetings
that Mammadov attended, but noted that he was not in the two
Presidents' one-on-one meeting. Concerning the upcoming
Summit of Caspian Littoral Heads of State, Mammadov said that
President Aliyev does not wish to attend, but would feel
obliged to if the other heads of state did. According to
Mammadov, Ahmadinejad told Aliyev that the other heads of
state had agreed to attend, including the President of
Kazakhstan. However, Mammadov maintained no firm date or
place had been decided. While acknowledging that discussions
had taken place concerning the visa regime between the two
countries, Mammadov said that no agreement had been reached
and "we want to keep it that way."

Most Agreements Related to Transportation
--------------


7. (C) As reported reftel, several of the agreements signed
during the visit focused on transportation. Deputy
Transportation Minister Musa Panahov, who negotiated the
transportation agreements with the Islamic Republic of Iran
(IRI),characterized the two Memoranda of Understanding (MOU)
as "very beneficial for Azerbaijan." Under the first
agreement, the GOAJ and the IRI agreed to construct a new
bridge at the Culfa border crossing. Panahov said that
the current bridge has severe structural damage and is
unusable. Under the MOU, the Iranians agreed to finance
design costs; the two governments will share construction
costs "50-50." Under the second MOU, the two governments
agreed to open a passenger bus service between the
Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan and Baku. Panahov
stressed that the MOU was an expression of intent only,
adding that it did not address any of the key operational
details such as the route or visa requirements. Under the
MOU, the two sides agreed to work out these details over
the next two months. Panahov was skeptical that they would
be able to do so, noting that the visa questions were
especially problematic.


8. (C) Panahov dismissed press reports of a new north-south
railroad agreement as an exaggeration. The
Iranians made a surprise proposal during the visit to link
the Iranian city of Kazvin with the Azerbaijani city of
Astara, Panahov said, adding that this stretch of railroad is
the missing link in the Iranian-Russian plan to build a
north-south corridor to the Persian Gulf. Panahov said the
GOAJ agreed to consider the proposal if the Iranians would
build the stretch between the Iranian cities of Kazvin and
Rasht; Azerbaijan would then build the stretch between
Astara and Rasht. Panahov was skeptical that the Iranian
Government would agree to these terms. He also noted that,
from Azerbaijan's perspective, the IRI's proposed north-south
corridor would soon be made irrelevant by the
Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railroad, which will reach the
Mediterranean Sea in a much shorter distance.


9. (C) Panahov was skeptical of Iran's overall intentions
toward Azerbaijan, pointedly noting that Iran is one of
Armenia's largest trading partners. Referring to
Nakhchivan's isolation between Armenia and

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Armenian-occupied territories, Panahov commented that
"Nakhchivan is our biggest transportation problem, and we
have to find ways to provide services to Nakhchivan." Until
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is resolved, he said
that Azerbaijan has no choice but to work with Iran on these
issues.

Local Analysts Downplay Visit's Significance
--------------


10. (C) Political analysts still are digesting the substance
of the visit. Local political commentator
Ilgar Mammadov told us the visit was not very important,
downplaying the substance of the five agreements
(four memorandums; one joint declaration). He characterized
the four memorandums on transportation
and economic cooperation as part of normal state-to-state
interaction. Asked about the broader joint declaration,
Mammadov argued that this was a typical Soviet-style
agreement. Mammadov speculated that if there was a more
important private deal reached during the visit, it likely
would involve Iran making concessions on Caspian
delimitation in exchange for Azerbaijan not supporting any
U.S. attempts in the UN to further sanction Iran.
Despite Mammadov's assertion that no date had been agreed,
President Ahmadinejad announced on August 22 that the
next meeting of Caspian littoral states will be in Tehran on
October 18 He also announced that all five Caspian
leaders have confirmed their participation. Respected
commentator Rasim Musabayov also argued that the visit
probably lacked substance, given the limited importance of
the public agreements. Musabayov observed that the
visit was part of President Ahamadinejad's broader effort to
reach out to a variety of countries. Musabayov, too,
speculated that Ahmadinejad may have leaned on Aliyev not to
support any further attempts by the U.S. to sanction
Iran through the UN.

Comment
--------------


11. (C) Based on Mammadov's readout and press coverage of
the visit, it appears that the GOAJ lived up to its
promises that it would keep Ahmadinejad's visit low-profile.
In general, the visit was in keeping with
Azerbaijan's complex relationship with Iran. While the GOAJ
has a real need to work out daily border and
transportation issues with its much larger neighbor, it is
rightfully wary of Iranian attempts to meddle in
Azerbaijan's internal affairs or regional developments of
critical importance, such as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
or energy security. Mammadov in his readout underscored the
point that closer energy or Nagorno-Karabakh
cooperation with Iran would undermine Azerbaijan's "strategic
choice." We are encouraged that President
Aliyev engaged President Ahmadinejad on Iran's nuclear
program, pointing out to his guest that working with the
international community was critical to ending the impasse.
We have requested meetings with Foreign Minister
Mammadyarov and President Aliyev to gain further perspective.
DERSE