Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAKU1069
2007-08-24 04:45:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baku
Cable title:  

AZERBAIJANI ISLAMIC STRUCTURE'S LAGGING LEGITIMACY

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM KISL KCOR AJ 
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INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 2333
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAKU 001069 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KISL KCOR AJ
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJANI ISLAMIC STRUCTURE'S LAGGING LEGITIMACY
POSES RISKS

REF: A. BAKU 00096

B. BAKU 00581

C. BAKU 00748

Classified By: Ambassador Anne Derse for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAKU 001069

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KISL KCOR AJ
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJANI ISLAMIC STRUCTURE'S LAGGING LEGITIMACY
POSES RISKS

REF: A. BAKU 00096

B. BAKU 00581

C. BAKU 00748

Classified By: Ambassador Anne Derse for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: The Caucasus Muslim Board (CMB) -- the
official GOAJ establishment for administering Islam -- is a
legacy from the Czarist and Soviet approach to religion, and
is responsible for the education and placement of imams
throughout Azerbaijan. The CMB -- and its leader, Sheikh
Allahshukur Pashazade -- appear to enjoy little support from
religious Azerbaijanis, who view the Sheikh and his fellow
CMB imams as corrupt and poorly educated. While Sheikh
Pashazade cultivates an image as protector of Azerbaijan,s
tradition of religious tolerance and works effectively with
his counterparts from the Christian and Jewish communities,
his rent-seeking activities, such as skimming money from
donations at pilgrimage sites, the hajj, and clerical
appointments are quickly reducing his credibility with
religiously observant Muslims. The CMB's lagging legitimacy
is opening up a religious vacuum for alternative sources of
religious authority, which could create problems for the GOAJ
over the next decade, if radical, external actors fill the
void. End Summary.

Caucasus Muslim Board: Historical Inheritance
-------------- --


2. (C) The Caucasus Muslim Board (CMB) is a legacy from the
Russian Czarist and Soviet approach to Islamic practice in
Azerbaijan. Both political systems created religious
departments within their respective governments as tools to
control Islam. These institutions served as gatekeepers for
appointing official clerics, regulating Islamic education,
and shaping the overall character of Islamic practice to
ensure it supported Moscow. The GOAJ has almost entirely
retained this structural approach toward Islam.


3. (C) The structure represented by the CMB increasingly
appears outmoded against the slow but steady resurgence of
Islamic practice in Azerbaijan. While most Azerbaijanis
still have a limited understanding of Islamic theology, a

gradual change is occurring, particularly among Azerbaijanis
under the age of thirty-five. Azerbaijanis' gradually rising
interest in learning more about Islamic theology and practice
is a key dynamic that is unraveling the GOAJ's anachronistic
approach toward Islam as represented by the CMB.

The Caucasus Muslim Board as Gatekeeper
--------------


4. (C) The Baku-based CMB administrative headquarters are
located next to the Blue Mosque, although the CMB hopes to
move to the grounds of the Teze Pir (New Holy Place) Mosque.
(NOTE: The two mosques are the largest Shia mosques in Baku.
The Teze Pir takes up an entire block in one of Baku's
oldest neighborhoods.) We estimate the CMB has several dozen
employees. During a recent visit, clearly armed
thuggish-looking young men were congregating in an office
near the Sheikh's. While they were likely bodyguards, the
open display of weapons detracts from the sense of
religiosity of the area. All mosques must receive CMB
approval before they can be officially registered with the
State Committee on Work with Religious Affairs (SCWRA).
(NOTE: The SCWRA was established in 2001. Rafiq Aliyev, the
first chairman of the SCWRA, had acrimonious relations with
the Sheikh and the CMB. Since the July 2006 appointment of
new SCWRA leader Hidayat Orjuvov, however, relations between
the two bodies have warmed considerably. Local contacts
report the Sheikh and Orujov have reached a modus vivendi on
the respective responsibilities for the two institutions,
with the Sheikh taking the lead on Islamic issues. Per ref
A, Orujov publicly deferred to the Sheikh during a December
2006 lunch hosted by the Ambassador.) The CMB also organizes
Azerbaijanis, participation in the hajj and other religious
pilgrimages.


5. (C) The CMB is the gatekeeper for controlling official
clerics and official mosques. The CMB oversees the education
and placement of all state-appointed imams (known locally as
akhunds) and other Islamic teachers to mosques and madrassas.
The CMB administers the Baku Islamic University and its
extension branches, which are the official pathway for

BAKU 00001069 002 OF 004


becoming a cleric (ref B). The CMB also keeps tabs on the
contents of Friday sermons in some mosques. According to
Islamic scholar Aysel Vazirova, the CMB provides general
guidance to akhunds in preparing their sermons. Popular Shia
cleric Ilgar Ibrahimoglu also suggested the CMB provides
general instructions for akhunds, but it is unclear how
closely the CMB monitors compliance with its official advice.



6. (C) Our best judgment is the CMB and the security
services keep close tabs on mosques that are suspected of
advocating a radical or political message. At least two
factors, however, constrain the GOAJ's ability to regulate
sermons. First, a wide variety of Baku-based Islamic
commentators report that radical Islamic networks
increasingly have been pushed underground, complicating the
GOAJ's monitoring efforts. Second, the GOAJ's ability to
keep tabs on mosques diminishes as one leaves Baku for the
regions.

The Sheikh: Inveterate Survivor
--------------


7. (C) Sheikh Allahshukur Pashazade -- an ethnic Talysh
(Persian) and a professing Shia -- was born in 1949 in a
village near the southern city of Lenkaran. The Sheikh
received some theological training at the Mir-i Arab Madrasa,
subsequently graduating from the Tashkent Islamic University
in 1975. He began working at the CMB in 1975, and assumed
the CMB chairmanship in 1980.


8. (C) The Sheikh's public image rests on his role as the
protector of Azerbaijan's tradition of religious tolerance
and the manager of good relations among other religious
confessions. The Sheikh appears quite comfortable in this
role, and uses his large, well-appointed home to entertain
other religious officials, from Azerbaijan and abroad. The
Sheikh has warm public relations with the heads of several
other religious confessions in Azerbaijan, especially the
representatives from the Orthodox Church, Catholic Church,
and the local Jewish communities. (The Sheikh and other
religious leaders make a regular point of showing up together
at diplomatic functions throughout Baku. President Aliyev
privately refers to them as "the Sheikh and his team.") In
meetings with the Sheikh, these religious officials show a
clear deference to the Sheikh by reiterating his points or
acknowledging his role in promoting religious tolerance.
Even in private meetings with these religious officials, they
often cite the well-rehearsed talking point that the Sheikh
has been instrumental in ensuring freedom of religion for
their community. The Sheikh also maintains good relations
with Islamic officials abroad, usually traveling several
times a year to other Islamic countries. Although the Sheikh
has cordial relations with the Embassy and U.S.-based
religious groups, his public rhetoric over the last year took
on a surprisingly anti-American tone following travels to
Russia and Iran.


9. (C) Even the Sheikh's critics admit the Sheikh is a savvy
politician, skilled at crafting a public persona, and an
inveterate survivor. The Sheikh's ability to hold onto his
position during the transition from the Soviet period through
the early years of independence and throughout former
President Heydar Aliyev's time in office and into Ilham
Aliyev's presidency is a testament to his political survival
skills. Local contacts unanimously report that during the
Soviet period, the Sheikh was widely believed to be a serving
KGB colonel. Contacts argue that the Sheikh's ability to sit
atop the CMB for over 25 years -- despite the liability of
being perceived as a tool of the Soviet intelligence
apparatus -- underscores that the Sheikh is no political
lightweight. One of the keys to the Sheikh's ability to
survive the transition from the Soviet period to independent
Azerbaijan was his public role in galvanizing a public
response to "Black January," when Soviet forces stormed Baku
and killed approximately 130 Azerbaijani citizens in January

1990.


10. (C) In addition to the Sheikh's political instincts and
ability to craft a public image, the Sheikh's riches also
appear to have reinforced his longevity. As noted below,
local contacts report the Sheikh is engaged in a variety of
rent-seeking activities, such as skimming money from
donations at pilgrimage sites, the hajj, and appointing

BAKU 00001069 003 OF 004


clerics to key positions. While we lack explicit evidence,
we believe the Sheikh probably has to pay a portion of this
money to the Presidential Administration to maintain his
position.

CMB and Sheikh's Moral Authority Limited
--------------


11. (C) There is strong contrast between the Sheikh's
carefully groomed public image and the Sheikh's dwindling
popularity among the general population. After meeting with
a range of Islamic scholars and practicing believers, our
overriding conclusion is that the Sheikh and the CMB have
little to no religious or moral authority among the general
population, particularly among practicing, educated
believers. Local contacts consistently point to two factors
that undercut the religious authority of the Sheikh and the
CMB: their limited theological knowledge and the Sheikh's
rent-seeking behavior.


12. (C) Elshad Miri, a former SCWRA employee who has written
over a dozen books on Islam and administers a popular
website, told us the Sheikh has little moral authority among
believers in Azerbaijan. Miri highlighted the Sheikh's
widely perceived involvement in using the hajj and the
donations collected at pilgrimage sites for his own profit.
Kenan Guliyev, a reporter on religious issues for the
opposition Yeni Musavat newspaper and a recent IVP
participant, highlighted that while the Sheikh is formally a
Shia cleric, he has no religious rank within the Shia
clerical hierarchy.


13. (C) Farda Asadov, a former professor of Islamic history
at Baku State University's Oriental Studies Department and
the current executive director of the Open Society Institute,
drew a contrast between the Sheikh and the other wings of the
GOAJ. Asadov argued that whereas the GOAJ has generally been
successful in monopolizing the political space, the Sheikh
has failed to exert his authority in the religious sphere.
Asadov pointed out that only a minority of the akhunds
appointed by the CMB are respected by the general population,
whereas unofficial Islamic teachers generally have a much
higher level of support within their communities. As other
commentators have argued, Asadov said the number of
unofficial, underground mosques is rising, although it is
impossible to quantify this trend.


14. (C) Fuad Aliyev, a young Western-educated Azerbaijani
who heads a discussion group on Islamic values, estimated
that only 30 percent of the official clerics are respected by
local believers. While Azerbaijanis lack of respect for
akhunds can be explained in part by Soviet period's
anti-clerical disposition, Aliyev said the clerics' lack of
education is a central reason for their low-standing among
the Azeri populace.


15. (C) According to a range of contacts, the Sheikh and the
CMB make money from several of the official religious
activities they administer. Key sources of income for the
Sheikh and the CMB include skimming money from donations
boxes at mosques and holy places, the hajj (ref C),and
funeral rites. In addition to these rent-seeking activities,
the Sheikh and his family reportedly have a wide variety of
suspect personal business interests. Fuad Aliyev told us
that Sheikh has a personal cut of General Motors' business in
Baku, granting the Sheikh access to a variety of imports
coming from Dubai. Many other contacts report that the
Sheikh or his family members have shady business interests in
the construction and lumber sectors, as well as the sale of
fruit and vegetables in southern Azerbaijan.

Why is the Sheikh still around?
--------------


16. (C) Given the legitimacy problems surrounding the Sheikh
and the CMB, we asked local contacts why the GOAJ has not
fired the Sheikh or sought to clean up the CMB's image. Most
argued that the GOAJ lacks a long-term strategy to deal with
the consequences of this legitimacy problem. Nariman
Gasimoglu, a local Islamic scholar, told us that the Sheikh
and the CMB's lack of legitimacy have opened up a religious
vacuum (reftels),where Azerbaijanis interested in learning
about Islam are looking for alternative religious leaders.
Gasimoglu continued that, while all alternative religious

BAKU 00001069 004 OF 004


leaders are not necessarily dangerous as the GOAJ sometimes
suggests, some radical Islamic doctrines can fill the void.
Farda Asadov said that while GOAJ elements probably
understand the dynamic Gasimoglu described, they also
probably perceive a risk in undertaking a CMB house-cleaning.
Removing the Sheikh would be an inherent admission by the
GOAJ that the CMB structure is illegitimate. Seeking to
reform the CMB could also open the door to clerics "outside
of the establishment" that the GOAJ would be less capable of
controlling.

Comment
--------------


17. (C) The Sheikh and the CMB have a clear legitimacy
problem with the Azerbaijani population. As Gasimoglu noted,
there is a real danger that Azerbaijanis -- especially the
youth -- seeking to learn more about the Islamic faith will
turn to alternative, non-official sources of religious
authority, some of which may be radical. In our view, it is
a mistake to assume that removing the CMB's monopoly on
Islamic practice will necessarily lead to radicalization, as
there currently is very little support within Azerbaijan for
radical Islam.


18. (C) Weakening the CMB's grip on religious activity in
Azerbaijan certainly could open the door to some radical
doctrines, but it would also level the playing field for more
authentic, credible, indigenous voices to guide Azerbaijan's
Muslims. On balance, we believe U.S. policy toward the CMB
should mirror our calls for reform, liberalization, and
de-monopolization in the political and economic spheres. The
Embassy plans to continue to use assistance funds to support
programs that challenge this principle of exclusive
government control of religious practice. Moreover, it will
raise at the highest levels of the government our analysis
that the current corrupt religious monopoly breeds what they
fear most -- the spread of radicalism. Decreasing the CMB's
power would open up the religious playing field, and we think
the moderate domestic actors currently are more powerful than
the external, radical actors. If the CMB maintains its
corrupt, religious monopoly, the influence of external,
radical voices could become stronger over the next decade.
DERSE