A/S LOWENKRON'S LUNCH WITH RELIGIOUS ANALYSTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 000106

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DRL, EUR/CARC, NEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2017
TAGS: PREL PHUM KDEM KISL IR AJ
SUBJECT: A/S LOWENKRON'S LUNCH WITH RELIGIOUS ANALYSTS

REF: A. BAKU 1700


B. BAKU 01810

C. BAKU 01367

Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse for reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: At a December 19 lunch hosted by A/S
Lowenkron and the Ambassador, independent religious analysts
argued that several foreign Islamic ideas and practices --
specifically from Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia -- are
influencing the traditionally tolerant variant of Islam
within Azerbaijani society. The failure of the secular
opposition has created a political and ideological void,
which proponents of political Islam seek to fill. While
foreign Islamic influences are growing, one commentator said
that it would be "very difficult to sell a theocratic
political model" to Azerbaijani society. End Summary.


2. (U) In honor of visiting Assistant Secretary for
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Barry Lowenkron, the
Ambassador hosted a December 19 lunch discussion with four
local religious analysts. The following Azerbaijani
commentators attended:

Dr. Nariman Gasimoglu, Azerbaijan Center for Religion and
Democracy
Dr. Arif Yunusov, Institute of Peace and Democracy
Dr. Altay Geyushov, Professor of Turkic-speaking People and
Caucasus History, Baku State University
Dr. Naile Suleymanova, Azerbaijan National Academy of
Sciences Institute of Manuscripts


3. (C) A/S Lowenkron and the Ambassador welcomed
participants, saying they looked forward to hearing their
views about religion in Azerbaijan. They each remarked that
Azerbaijan can serve as a model of religious tolerance.


4. (C) Gasimoglu agreed that Azerbaijan could serve as a
positive model of moderate Islam. Since independence,
however, new external Islamic trends are coming to Azerbaijan
that could change Azerbaijan's traditional, moderate brand of
Islam. Gasimoglu stated the "politicization of Islam is in
progress in Azerbaijan." He pointed to fundamentalist
threats that he had received regarding some of his public
positions on Islam. He also said the GOAJ has failed to
bring to justice Azerbaijanis who called for the death of a
newspaper writer who wrote an article that some regarded as
insulting Islam. (Note: Gasimoglu was referring to a
November 2006 article by Azerbaijani author Rafiq Tagi in a
local Azerbaijani newspaper, which questioned whether Islam
impeded the development of modern society. In the wave of
criticism against the article, some Azerbaijanis in the
conservative city of Nardaran, as well as some Iranian
clerics, issued death threats against Tagi. See ref A.) In
this context, Gasimoglu suggested that the USG should push
the GOAJ to support moderate Muslims. He also observed that
even some individuals in the secular opposition are using
Islam for political purposes.


5. (C) In response to the Ambassador's question whether
political Islam is growing, Yunusov said a distinction should
be drawn between Islam as a religious phenomenon and Islam as
a political tool. A natural process of religious awakening
has been occurring in Azerbaijan for some time, Yunusov
argued, although the use of political Islam is increasing.
Yunusov said there are three categories of opposition to the
current government: the secular, western-oriented opposition,
Russian-oriented groups, and Islamic-inspired individuals.
In the period before the 2003 Presidential elections and the
2005 Parliamentary elections, only the first group played a
large role. Islam, however, is growing as a political
ideology and an alternative to oppositionists who favor
democracy and Western integration. Still, most of the
Azerbaijani population favor a Turkish variant of Islam, not
a Saudi or Wahhabi model.


6. (C) A/S Lowenkron asked how this change -- the
possibility of political Islam filling the void left by the
failure of the secular opposition -- had occurred. Yunusov
said that whereas five years ago, human rights defenders went
to the US Embassy for assistance, they increasingly go to the
embassies of Norway, Germany, or the UK. He said that many
Azerbaijanis perceive BP as another symbol of America and
corruption, despite the fact that the company is British.
Yunusov mentioned that the Iranian television station Seher
Two (which broadcasts in Azerbaijani) is a key source of news
for those living in southern Azerbaijan. To some extent, the
television station plays a role similar to the one played by
Radio Free Europe during the Soviet period. Yunusov argued

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that it is a dangerous situation when segments of the
Azerbaijani population are turning to Iran for news about the
outside world. Yunusov also observed that there is a
similarity between the domestic political environment in
Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, in that political Islam is filling
a vacuum left by weak, secular parties. Yunusov gave the
example of mosques in Azerbaijan's regions serving as centers
for political discussions in the absence of alternative sites
for such discussions. (Note: Yunusov made many of the same
points during a dinner with the Ambassador on December 6 --
reftel B.)


7. (C) Geyushov said Azerbaijan had been a model of moderate
Islam before the Soviet period in part because there was a
strong core of Westernizing intellectuals. A group of 2,000
- 3,000 western-educated Azerbaijani intellectuals were
formative in fashioning a positive role for Islam in
Azerbaijani society before the Soviet period began. After
independence in 1991, there was an attempt to have a similar
class of westernized intellectuals lead Azerbaijani society
toward the West, while reserving a modernizing role for
Islam. This attempt by the post-independence, secular,
western opposition to mimic the intellectuals of the First
Azerbaijani Democratic Republic has failed, according to
Geyushov. The current opposition failed because they are not
as well educated as their intellectual ancestors and they are
not adept politicians. The modern opposition also failed to
establish the former close link between religion and society
that the pre-Soviet western intellectuals managed to do.
Geyushov explained that most Azerbaijanis lost their
knowledge of Islam during the Soviet period. Increasingly,
Azerbaijan is resembling most other states in the Islamic
world that are characterized by an authoritarian regime and a
weak, secular opposition. In response to A/S Lowenkron's
question, Geyushov clarified that he thought the secular
opposition's ideas were "bankrupt." Despite this failure,
Geyushov said that the overwhelming majority of Azerbaijani
society prefers a Western, American-style form of society
instead of an Iranian-style society.


8. (C) Geyushov continued, saying the growth of Islam is
"very strong" among the new generation of Azerbaijanis. This
growth is largely due to foreign missionary efforts --
especially from Iran, Wahhabis and the Turkish Nurcu sect.
The growth of Islam -- under these foreign influences -- is
occurring in the major urban centers and in the regions. It
is also not just the stereotypical poor, uneducated
individuals who are turning to Islam, but also the
intelligent, affluent Russian-educated Azerbaijanis who are
attracted to it because it is not corrupt, according to
Geyushov. Increasingly, the opposition is considering how to
incorporate Islam into its political platform. Despite these
trends, Geyushov cautioned that it would be "very difficult
to sell a theocratic political model" to Azerbaijani society.
Instead, it is more likely that a "Turkish model" could gain
traction within Azerbaijani society. Geyushov explained that
by a "Turkish model," he meant the influences of the ruling
Turkish Justice and Development Party and a focus on
corruption as a central issue. Geyushov clarified that he
was not referring to Kemal Attaturk's policy of forced
modernization and secularization.


9. (C) In response to a question from A/S Lowenkron,
Gasimoglu expresed concern that the GOAJ wanted to get rid
of te secular democratic opposition, which he described as
"a very dangerous step."


10. (C) Suleymanova said there was a "better relationship"
between Islam and politics during the pre-Soviet period. The
role of Islam diminished during the Soviet period, as
religious courts were closed and Russian language schools
opened. She noted that the number of mosques and madrassas
dramatically declined during the Soviet period. Suleymanova
clarified that this process occurred with all religions
during the Soviet time, not just Islam. Azerbaijanis never
lost their Islamic orientation despite the Soviet Union's
anti-religious drive, said Suleymanova. After independence,
Suleymanova said foreign education was a key means for
transmitting foreign variants of Islam to Azerbaijan.
Specifically, Azerbaijanis who studied in Iran, Turkey, and
Saudi Arabia were inclined to bring these countries'
respective Islamic models back to Azerbaijan. The ideas from
Saudi Arabia are growing because the Wahhabis have a strong
"propaganda approach," although their numbers are much
smaller than students who studied in Iran and Turkey. These
students who studied abroad generally like to discuss the
role that Islam should play in politics. On several issues
involving the role of Islam in politics, these three "camps"
strongly disagree with one another. Suleymanova argued that

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Azerbaijanis educated within Azerbaijan tend not to be as
divisive.


11. (C) Explaining why the Turkish brand of Islam was not as
popular as the Saudi Arabian approach, Geyushov said the
former's discourse primarily is focused on religion and not
political issues. Yunusov said Nurcular is the key Turkish
Islamic force in Azerbaijani society. He said that Nurculars
are not presently active in politics, but are instead focused
on increasing the future influence of Islam in society.
Yunusov -- providing examples of Turkish Islamic influence in
Azerbaijani society -- said Nurcu theology influences Kavkaz
University in Baku and the Fetullah Gulen movement's Turkish
television Samanyolu can be received via satellite in Baku.
Yunusov commented that people in Azerbaijan's southern
regions know who Sistani is and identify him as their
religious leader. (Comment: The GOAJ has recently taken
steps to remove Samanyolu. End Comment.)

Comment
--------------


12. (C) As we have reported in the past (reftel C),
Azerbaijanis of all political persuasions agree that
religiosity is on the rise in Azerbaijan. The degree to
which this growing interest in and observance of religion
will translate into political Islam is an issue we continue
to assess. The statements made by some of these analysts --
particularly Yusunov,s charge that political Islam will be
the "only" alternative to a failed, secular opposition --
strike us as somewhat premature at this time. The only
formal "political Islam" movements that currently exist in
Azerbaijan are led by minor religious leader Ilgar
Ibrahimoglu and the Islamist Party. Both movements are
widely believed to be financed by Iran and, as such, do not
enjoy wide popular support. Informal social and humanitarian
efforts may be enjoying greater success; however, Azerbaijan
is very much a society in transition and, as such, could be
more open today to outside influences than it has been in the
past if the GOAJ is not perceived as responding to the
people,s needs -- a possibility of which the GOAJ is keenly
aware. We continue to monitor this issue carefully and will
report further.


13. (U) A/S Lowenkron cleared this message.
DERSE