Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD969
2007-03-19 14:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

PRT TIKRIT: SAMARRA'S LOCAL POLITICS, DFI AND

Tags:  PGOV PINR KDEM IZ 
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VZCZCXRO9127
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0969/01 0781412
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 191412Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0267
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000969 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINR KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: PRT TIKRIT: SAMARRA'S LOCAL POLITICS, DFI AND
MOSQUE RECONSTRUCTION KEY ISSUES

Classified By: PRT LEADER Stephanie Miley, for reasons 1.4 b and d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000969

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINR KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: PRT TIKRIT: SAMARRA'S LOCAL POLITICS, DFI AND
MOSQUE RECONSTRUCTION KEY ISSUES

Classified By: PRT LEADER Stephanie Miley, for reasons 1.4 b and d.


1. (U) This is a PRT Tikrit, Salah ad Din cable.


2. (C) SUMMARY. Local political rivalries in Samarra
threaten stability as tensions mount with the reconstruction
of the Golden Dome Mosque (reftel). Samarra's city
officials, who are holdovers from Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) days or were elected through ambiguous tribal
means, are not representative and are not respected by city
residents. The defunct city council does not meet, and its
President (CCP),Asad Ali Yassin al Abasi, actively
undermines the city's Mayor, Mahmoud Khalaf Ahmed al Bazi.
Meanwhile, the Mayor has taken a more active role in
representing the city's interests with the Golden Dome
Mosque's reconstruction and in pursuing long promised
Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) monies. Fighting between the
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and terrorists, the city remains
laden with terrorists is constant. Al Qaeda's (AQIZ) Islamic
State of Iraq (ISI) exerts some influence in
the area. As reconstruction of the Golden Dome Mosque
focuses more attention on the city, obtaining the promised
Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) monies, a will likely help
assuage some tensions among the city's residents. Bio notes
in paras 13 and 14. END SUMMARY.

--------------
City Leaders Not Representative
--------------


3. (C) None of the city's officials has a strong mandate to
hold his position. Many of them are holdover appointments
from the CPA or were put in office through ambiguous tribal
proceedings. Samarra's boycott of the 2005 elections
resulted in the city having no representation at the
provincial level. The informal local sheikhs' council
reportedly "elected" Asad Ali Yassin al Abasi, a
Saddam-exiled Samarra native with strong political ties in
Baghdad, as the City Council President (CCP) in January 2006.
A staff member for the former Mayor, Mahmoud Khalaf Ahmed al
Bazi became Samarra's Mayor through unknown means in early
2005, after insurgents killed his predecessor. The city
council does not meet, and there is not a functional court in

the city. Of late, the Mayor's office has become more active
in the city's management.


4. (C) In the heavily tribal city of Samarra, neither the CCP
nor the Mayor enjoys support outside of his respective tribe.
Though all are Sunni Arab, the city's tribes combat and
undermine each other's interests.

--------------
Dynamics between the CCP and the Mayor
--------------


5. (C) CF relations with the CCP soured over a disagreement
about the purchase of the CCP's downtown Samarra home for use
as a police station. In early January 2007, a car bombing
destroyed half of the house. Due to the circumstances
surrounding the incident, it is possible that the CCP may
have orchestrated the bombing in an attempt to obtain
compensation for the damages. CF relations with the Mayor,
however, have been improving because of his active engagement
on bettering the city's municipal services. Although the CCP
was initially the lead on Development Fund for Iraq projects,
the Mayor has recently become more active due to the CCP's
continual absence from the city.


6. (C) From opposing tribes, the Mayor and the CCP have long
been at odds. The CCP openly states that he believes the
Mayor is associated with anti-Iraq forces (AIF) because the
Mayor has not received as many threats or attempts on his
life. Recently, the Mayor and the CCP have become more
suspicious of each other and will not speak In meetings where
the other is present.

--------------
Reconstructing the Golden Dome Mosque
--------------


7. (C) One year after its February 22, 2006 bombing, the
Golden Dome Mosque (AKA Ali al Hadi Shrine, al Askariya
Shrine) remains in ruins. Reconstruction, under the auspices
of a GOI committee and the UNESCO (reftel),is slated to
begin on April 18. Initially, Mayor Mahmoud took the lead on
the mosque's reconstruction, attending conferences and
meetings in Baghdad and Amman. With the recent publicity,
the CCP has attempted (with little success) to become the
city's sole interlocutor on the project, using his GOI
contacts for invitations to the
discussions.


BAGHDAD 00000969 002 OF 003



8. (C) After recent meetings with UNESCO and the GOI
reconstruction committee, the Mayor began working to garner
support among Samarra residents for the project. According
to the Mayor, Abdel Aziz al Hakem has agreed to back
revitalization of the marketplace around the mosque and to
construct a school, medical clinic, and smaller mosque as
part of the larger Golden Dome Mosque reconstruction project.
The Mayor has also been working on security provisions with
the Ministry of Interior representative and Samarra native
General Adnan Thabit, who is charged of security during the
reconstruction. General Adnan has reportedly said that he
plans to bolster security forces throughout the city. The
Mayor also says that while in Amman he opened discussions
with UNDP to secure funding for essential services in the
city.

--------------
DFI Update
--------------


9. (C) Working with Samarra's governance structures, the PRT
has been assisting the city in obtaining its Development Fund
for Iraq (DFI) monies, as a method of developing a functional
relationship between the Samarra city government and the
provincial government as well as between the provincial
government and the central government. Through the extensive
DFI process, which required claim submissions from over 1,000
of the city's residents, many have become expectant of the
promised compensation money. Continual delays in receipt of
the funding is eroding the city leaders' already tenuous
mandate, thus reducing their ability to affect change in the
city. Additionally, the DFI holdups are exacerbating the
city's tensions with the central government, which most
residents see as Shia-dominated and revenge-seeking for the
bombing of the Golden Dome Mosque, a Shia shrine.


10. (C) Samarra's total DFI package is USD 25 million. It
will be used in three sectors: USD 10 million for
compensation monies for battle damage with oversight from the
Ministry of Water Resources, USD 11 million for
reconstruction projects with oversight from the Ministry of
Public Works, and USD 4 million for electrical grid
refurbishment with oversight from the Ministry of
Electricity.


11. (C) At present, the compensation funds of USD 10 million
are in an account at the Ministry of Water Resources. Before
distribution of the compensation monies can begin, the
Ministry of Water Resources must make the final approval and
transfer the funds from Baghdad to Tikrit. The Ministry of
Electricity is in the final stages of approving contracts to
complete the electrical grid
refurbishment; the Ministry has set up accounts, but is still
waiting for the funds to be transferred. The Ministry of
Public Works has released USD 600,000 and will begin projects
over the coming months. However, significant follow-up is
still required to ensure that the DFI funding makes it to the
people of Samarra.

--------------
Security Issues
--------------


12. (C) In June 2006, the CF considered Samarra a model
example of reclaiming a small city from AIF control. Attacks
were diminished to tribal disputes and CF handed security
over to the ISF. Atmospheric reporting suggested confidence
was growing in ISF. However, through strategic targeting,
AQIZ used tribal rifts to destabilize the security situation.
By August 2006, the ISF's new found
confidence was diminished, and intimidation and attacks took
the ISF off the streets. With the further exacerbation of
tribal tensions, some tribes began aligning themselves with
AQIZ. Fighting continues between the Iraqi Security Forces
(ISF) and terrorists, and the city remains laden with AIF.
Al Qaeda's (AQIZ) Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) exerts some
influence in the area. According to CF atmospherics
reporting, ISI has forced several outlying villages to
implement Sharia customs, such as requiring women to be
veiled and banning smoking in public. Other reporting
continues to indicate AQIZ presence and operations around the
city.

--------------
Comment
--------------


13. (C) Ensuring near-term disbursement of DFI funds,
especially the compensation payments, will likely help
assuage some tensions among Samarra's residents and add a
measure of legitimacy to the city's leadership. By
demonstrating that the GOI is interested in Sunni concerns in

BAGHDAD 00000969 003 OF 003


Samarra and will deliver on its promises, it will also assist
in combating AQIZ's attempts to undermine the GOI and to
strengthen the Islamic State of Iraq's (ISI) influence around
the city. The task of rebuilding the Golden Dome Mosque,
however, remains contentious. Without coordination from the
city's leaders, its reconstruction has the potential to be
divisive in the city. Additionally, given the mosque's
symbolic importance and the public interest throughout Iraq,
a smooth reconstruction process will be important for
reconciliation efforts. END COMMENT.
KHALILZAD