TALK OF NEW IRAQI POLITICAL PARTY COALITIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 000941

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM PTER IZ
SUBJECT: TALK OF NEW IRAQI POLITICAL PARTY COALITIONS

REF: A. BAGHDAD 828

B. BAGHDAD 842

C. BAGHDAD 805

D. BAGHDAD 790

E. BAGHDAD 452

F. BAGHDAD 863

Classified By: PolCouns Margaret Scobey for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. Reports about negotiations among Iraqi
political parties to break up the current sectarian blocs and
form new alliances have intensified following secular
nationalist Iraqiyya,s March 1 announcement that it would
withdraw from the GOI and Shia Fadhila's March 7 withdrawal
from the Shia coalition. Those anxious to form new political
blocs criticize the Maliki government for its alleged
sectarianism and pro-Iran stance, and for failing to move
forward on national reconciliation. They are also frustrated
at their own marginalization. Some say they support the PM
in implementing key benchmarks, while others seek to become a
true opposition. Negotiations to form new coalitions have
generally been instigated by parties with a relatively small
number of Council of Representative (CoR) seats, and involve
courting the Sunni Tawafuq alliance, independent Shia
elements, and the Kurds. Despite similar policy
prescriptions, so far none of the various efforts has come to
fruition, and competing personal ambitions are one chief
obstacle. End Summary.

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Iraqiyya's Withdrawal an Empty Gesture
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2. (C) After a long absence, former PM and Iraqiyya party
leader Ayad Allawi returned to Iraq in mid-February. Allawi
briefed the Ambassador on his efforts to form a broad
moderate coalition in the CoR shortly after his return.
Allawi described his goal to form an issue-based,
cross-sectarian, nationalist bloc and called for fast
progress on political benchmarks to support the Baghdad
Security Plan (BSP),including debaathification reform,
ridding Iraqi Security Forces and the police of militia
infiltration, and dealing with pensions for Saddam's army and
civil service. Allawi claimed that CoR speaker Mashadani was
interested in joining his coalition, and that a variety of
others were either on board or in negotiations to join. He
listed the Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP),Sunni Hewar, Shia
Fadhila, and elements of the Sadrists. Allawi said that
according to SCIRI VP Abdel Medhi, the Dawa party was split
on the issue.


3. (C) Allawi claimed wide support in Arab capitals. He
told the Ambassador he planned to hold a press conference
February 25 to announce an 80-seat moderate coalition with
the goal of rebalancing the Iraqi political arena along
non-sectarian lines. Announcement of the National Salvation
Front never materialized, but Allawi and Vice President and
IIP leader Tariq al-Hashemi did hold a joint press conference
acknowledge that they were engaged in discussions about
working together.


4. (C) On March 1, media reported that Allawi's
cross-sectarian secular Iraqiyya (25 seats) was withdrawing
from the GOI. Leading party member Adnan Pachachi made a
public statement accusing the Maliki government of
encouraging sectarianism and failing to make progress on key
issue of national reconciliation.


5. (C) Allawi told the Ambassador March 2 that he had
carefully crafted the statement, which read "the Iraqi List
feels it will soon no longer be able to accept the
responsibility of being in the government because of its
sectarian domination and narrow-mindedness," to reflect an
open-ended threat to pressure the PM to take action, but fall
short of quitting the government. Despite the announcement,
Iraqiyya,s supposed &withdrawal8 appears to be an empty
gesture -- Allawi said he had no plans to withdraw his five
ministers, adding that he was not really part of the
government anyway, since Iraqiyya had been marginalized and
given no role in GOI decision-making (Ref A).

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Fadhila to Remain On Its Own...For Now
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6. (C) On March 7 the 15-seat Shia Fadhila party announced
it had pulled out of the Shia coalition. Fadhila bloc leader
Hassan al-Shammari told Poloffs March 8 that the decision is
final and not a ploy to win a ministry or vie for increased
influence within the GOI (Ref B). Al-Shammari blamed
sectarianism for Iraq's current crisis and said sectarian or
ethnic-base coalitions "influenced by foreign countries"
cannot solve Iraq's problems.

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7. (C) Al-Shammari reported that Fadhila's leaders,
including its spiritual leader Ayatollah Yacoubi, had been
planning this move for a while. He claimed Fadhila had no
plans to join in forming any new coalitions and would remain
an independent. (Comment: Despite al-Shammari's claim that
the party will remain on its own, Fadhila comes up in every
discussion among those trying to form new cross-sectarian
alliances; it is just as likely that the newly independent
party may be sitting back to weigh its options and determine
how to negotiate the most influence. End Comment.)


8. (U) The Iraqiyya and Fadhila announcements spawned a
series of contradictory press reports and political
statements, such as Sunni Iraqi Accord Front (IAF) leader
Adnan Dulaimi's announcement March 7 of the "Iraqi National
Front," a new bloc including Iraqiyya, Salih al-Mutlaq,s
National Dialogue Council and Shia Fadhila.

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Anti-Maliki Fronts
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9. (C) When he spoke with the Ambassador, Allawi said he
would support the Prime Minister, but complained that Maliki
has allowed sectarian interests to stall progress on the BSP
political goals necessary to establish lasting security.
However, Allawi,s professed support for Maliki flies in the
face of Iraqiyya's &withdrawal8 from the GOI, Allawi,s
constant public criticism of the PM, and his not-so-secret
desire to replace Maliki as PM.


10. (C) Shortly before his return to Iraq for the first time
since June 2006 to attend the March 12 opening CoR session,
Sunni Hewar bloc leader Saleh Motlaq told Poloff he planned
to create a new front (Ref C). Motlaq contended that the
current sectarian-based governing system was not viable and
therefore the CoR should vote to oust the Maliki government
and replace it with competent, non-sectarian leaders. He
said Hewar had been canvassing Iraqi politicians and found a
critical mass of support for this plan from a range of
parties, including Fadhila, Iraqiyya, Tawafuq, and "other
smaller groupings." Motlaq also claimed regional support for
his initiative listing Turkey, Qatar, Egypt, the UAE, and
Saudi Arabia.


11. (C) Motlaq considered the government positions offered
by the Maliki government as too minor and has spent much time
outside Iraq since the GOI was formed. Motlaq claimed that
he and Allawi were in agreement on the idea of a cross
sectarian, issue-based front, but that Allawi insisted on
being its figurehead because of his ultimate aim to be the
PM. Motlaq said he did not object to this in theory, but
questioned the extent to which the former PM had enough
popular support to win the seat.

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Where the Sunnis Stand
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12. (C) Sunnis may have arrived at the conclusion that
joining cross-sectarian efforts will increase their
influence. Senior IIP member Alaa Mekki told Poloffs that
Fadhila has not agreed at this point to join any front with
Sunni parties, although discussions continue. IIP CoR member
Saleem Jabbouri said that Tawafuq is having conversations
with Hewar to join together in a new bloc under a new name,
but that Tawafuq did not trust Saleh Motlaq to act as a team
player and therefore hesitated to include him in any
coalition. VP Hashemi told Ambassador February 27 that
Tawafuq is engaged in "good discussions" with Iraqiyya, as
well as Hewar, the Turkomen Front, and Fadhila to form a
national unity bloc. Some Sunnis say that Allawi's
insistence on leading any new coalition and IIP's refusal to
agree remains a stumbling block.


13. (C) IIP CoR member Ayad Sammaraie emphasized that the
Iraqi National Front, prematurely announced by al-Duliaimi,
"was not a project to bring down the government." He said
that there were several major obstacles to an anti-Maliki
bloc and argued that the Kurds and U.S. would have to agree
for such a bloc to succeed. He pointed out that Fadhila has
expressed a preference for operating independently in order
to avoid criticism and was "political bloc shopping."
Sammaraie added that it was clear that the U.S. was not
supportive of a movement to oust Maliki. Sammaraie noted
further that an effort to remove the Maliki government would
create too much tension with the Shia coalition. Already, he
said, Dawa contacts had approached IIP with worries that this
front was conspiring to bring down the Shia-led government
and that IIP had assured them this was not the case.


14. (C) On March 14, Sunni CoR Speaker Mashadani told

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PolCouns a deal was essentially done. Tawafuq, Salih
al-Mutlaq, Iraqiyya, and Hewar were ready to cooperate and
Fadhila was likely close to joining. The "structure" of the
new coalition was simple, said Mashadani, comprising a
roundtable of constituent group leaders and no overall
"head." A spokesman may represent the group, which would
seek practical cooperation without a designated leader.

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A Front Reaching Out to Insurgents
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15. (C) Fadhila member Nadim al-Jabiri briefed PolCouns
February 8 on his effort to form a "national front" to solve
Iraqi's political crisis and confront Iranian influence (Ref
E). He claimed he has support from all Sunni leaders
including VP Tariq al-Hashemi, CoR Speaker Mahmoud Mashadani,
Khalaf al-Ulayan, Adnan al-Dulaimi, and Saleh Motlaq. He
also claimed that all leaders of the insurgency except AQI
were behind the national front effort, along with Arab states
and Turkey. On the Shia side al-Jabiri said Fadhila was on
board and negotiations with the Sadrists were in advanced
stages. Al-Jabiri added, apologetically, that in order to
gain support of the insurgency the plan called for withdrawal
of coalition forces, "although not immediately."
Nevertheless, he insisted, the national front and the U.S.
have the same goals for the future of Iraq.


16. (C) It was never clear that al-Jabiri had the support
of, or represented, his Fadhila party in conducting these
discussions. Fadhila may indeed be talking about this, as it
seems to be on other front efforts as well, but according to
Fadhila leader al-Shammari, the official party line is that
Fadhila will remain independent for the time being.

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Pro-Maliki Fronts
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17. (C) In 2006 the Embassy engaged in an effort to assist
formation of a &moderate front8 of SCIRI, Sunni IIP, and
the Kurds to support the GOI to enact key legislation and
isolate extremists. Currently this effort remains deadlocked
over several obstacles, including PM Maliki,s suspicions
that the front would usurp his power while increasing
SCIRI's, disagreement over the front's structure and
function, and the Shia coalition's unwillingness to openly
isolate the Sadrists. Although unable to come to a formal
agreement, as powerful blocs within the national unity
government, there is no reason these groups cannot work
together in a 'virtual front' in support of the GOI.


18. (C) PolCouns met with former Transitional National
Assembly (TNA) Speaker and BSP Political Committee member
Hajim al-Hassani March 7. Al-Hassani spoke of the need to
bolster PM Maliki to ensure success of the BSP and its
political component. He outlined his own plan for changing
the Iraqi political arena by breaking up the Shia, Sunni and
Kurdish blocs to form a new coalition of Dawa, IIP, KDP, and
Fadhila in support of PM Maliki. Such an alignment, he
contended, would comprise 142 CoR seats, thereby allowing
Maliki to succeed in pushing through key political benchmarks.


19. (C) The leader of the tiny 5-seat Solidarity Front, Shia
independent CoR member Qassem Daoud, told PolCouns March 13
that in order to build on the positive momentum of initial
BSP successes what was required was a solid pro-Maliki front.
The GOI and the CoR are weak, he said, and Maliki does not
have the support of all factions of the national unity
government, or even of all of his own Dawa party.

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Where Do the Kurds Fit In?
--------------


20. (C) With 55 CoR seats, the Kurds would be the key
members of any significant political coalition. Without the
Kurds, no proposed new coalition has a serious chance of
success. PM Maliki understands this well, as evidenced by
his nervousness about an early March meeting between Allawi
and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Masoud
Barzani. We can only speculate about what effect Allawi and
Barzani,s back-to-back visits to Saudi Arabia later in March
had on the PM.


21. (C) Although Kurdish leaders proved willing to talk to
Iraqiyya about the possibility of working together on
particular issues, the are currently no indications that
President Talabani's PUK or Barzani's KDP are thinking
seriously about abandoning the national unity government.
Barzani spoke at length with Allawi and Pachachi March 2 and
3 about cooperating together in the CoR on issues of common
interests, but offering only support of a debaathification

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reform law.


22. (C) Barham Salih brainstormed March 4 in Dukan with
Allawi and Pachachi, agreeing in particular on their shared
concerns about Iranian influence. Pointing a finger at
Iraqiyya, Salih said the Iraqi liberal agenda was weak and
could not prevail unless it joined with the Kurds and Sunnis.
But convincing the Kurds to break their alliance with the
UIA would require agreement to Kurdish designs on Kirkuk, to
which he assessed Tawafuq would never agree (ref F). Sunni
leader Saleh Motlaq took the same position with Poloff,
arguing that the Kurds would be necessary to from a new
cross-sectarian bloc, but said that Kurdish territorial
ambitions were problematic (Ref C).


23. (C) In an apparent backlash against reports that new
coalitions were imminent, on March 14 spokesman for the
Kurdish Coalition Firyad Rawandouzi criticized the "Iraqi
Lists maneuvers" to form a new political bloc in an attempt
to bring down the Maliki government. And on March 10 Kurdish
CoR member Adnan al-Mufti reaffirmed that the Kurdish MPs
will maintain its alliance with the UIA saying, "we insist on
keeping this relationship."

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Comment: New Bloc Efforts Look a Lot Alike
--------------


24. (C) These many attempts to form new political fronts are
remarkably similar. All call for progress on issues of
political reconciliation that mirror the actions Maliki
promised would accompany the BSP. All involve almost
identical casts of characters. All complain they are
marginalized and accuse the GOI of behaving as a sectarian
majority, not a national unity government. All say they aim
to break up the three sect-based blocs in favor of
non-sectarian, issue-based alliances. Proponents for new
coalitions are not against the GOI's political program, but
fed up with what they view as Maliki's inability to implement
it.


25. (C) Despite similar policy prescriptions, conflicting
personal ambitions remain the chief obstacle to new
coalitions. No GOI party is willing to give up its
ministerial posts. Allawi continues to insist on his own
leadership. Former Speaker al-Hassani, who promotes an
almost identical agenda, is also motivated by an interest in
regaining his former position or in getting a ministry in a
much-anticipated cabinet reshuffle. Until the politicians
driving the discussion of cross-sectarian fronts can put the
political reconciliation objectives above their ambitions and
get serious about developing practical plans for success,
efforts to build an effective cross-sectarian front are
unlikely to succeed. End Comment.
SPECKHARD