Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD878
2007-03-12 19:22:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

CONTINUING A STRATEGIC DIALOGUE WITH SCIRI

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINS ECON IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2995
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0878/01 0711922
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 121922Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0142
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000878 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS ECON IZ
SUBJECT: CONTINUING A STRATEGIC DIALOGUE WITH SCIRI

REF: 2006 BAGHDAD 4172

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Daniel Speckhard for reasons 1.4 (b) a
nd (d).

-------
Summary
-------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000878

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS ECON IZ
SUBJECT: CONTINUING A STRATEGIC DIALOGUE WITH SCIRI

REF: 2006 BAGHDAD 4172

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Daniel Speckhard for reasons 1.4 (b) a
nd (d).

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (S/NF) The Charge and Vice President Adel Abdel Mehdi
chaired on March 11 a second round of strategic dialogue
between the US and SCIRI. The Charge emphasized the U.S.
commitment to developing its relationship with SCIRI despite
recent events that had caused some tension in the
relationship. Abdel Mehdi acknowledged this tension but
reaffirmed SCIRI's resolution to move forward. Senior
Embassy and MNF-I officials previewed principles and
priorities important to the US in the three issue areas
identified in the initial round of dialogue. Abdel Mehdi
expressed full agreement with the Embassy's thinking on
economic issues but noted several potential differences in
perspective on security issues. On the political track,
Abdel Mehdi discussed the connection in Shi'a minds between
reconciliation initiatives such as deBaathification and the
problem of terrorism, much of which emanated from Arab
states. The next step in the strategic dialogue will be to
break into working groups to discuss these three tracks in
more depth. End Summary.


2. (SBU/NF) Embassy participants included the Charge,
PolCouns, EconCouns, General Caldwell, IRMO Director, and
Acting PolMilCouns. Abdel Mehdi and Tahsin al-Azawi (CoR
member and deputy Badr commander) participated from the SCIRI
side.

-------------- --------------
US Committed to Continuing the Strategic Dialogue
-------------- --------------


3. (S/NF) The Charge began the meeting by telling Abdel Mehdi
that the Embassy wanted to continue the strategic dialogue
with SCIRI begun in November 2006. The initial dialogue, he
said, showed that SCIRI and the US shared many common
principles that would be a good basis to build on. The
Charge observed that SCIRI leader Abdulaziz al-Hakim's
December visit to the US was an important step in furthering

the SCIRI-US relationship. Yet recent months had also seen
tests to the relationship, the Charge noted, including
realization from the U.S. side of the degree of Quds Force
complicity in EFP networks and of the associations the Badr
organization had with the Quds Force. The SCIRI side, the
Charge acknowledged, also had concerns about events such as
the detention of Badr members, the shooting of the VP's guard
on Christmas Eve, the brief detention of Ammar al-Hakim, and
a recent incident involving landing clearance for a plane
carrying Abdel Mehdi. The Charge explained that it was
important not to allow these incidents to disrupt the
important strategic dialogue begun in November. The Embassy,
he said, had correspondingly assembled a senior team
indicative of its commitment to this dialogue. This team was
prepared to engage in discussions on political, economic, and
security tracks, the same tracks identified by the Vice
President in November.

--------------
A Catholic Marriage
--------------


4. (S/NF) Abdel Mehdi expressed appreciation for the Charge's
message and agreed that it was important the dialogue
continue at a faster pace. "We are in a Catholic marriage,"
Abdel Mehdi said. "We have gone too far to be able to
divorce." SCIRI and Shi'a more broadly, he continued, had
feared during the fall that U.S. policies were changing.
While al-Hakim's visit to the US had given SCIRI confidence
that the relationship was on the right track, the raid on the
SCIRI compound and Ammar's detention had raised questions
about how serious the US was in pursuing the relationship.
Without exaggerating or downplaying these incidents, SCIRI
was resolved to move forward, Abdel Mehdi said; "I can't say
that 100 percent of our people believe in what we are doing,
but the vast majority do." Abdel Mehdi, who had just
returned from Karbala, apologized that he had not had enough
time to bring a full team from the SCIRI side and promised to
have his team assembled for the next round of the dialogue.

--------------
Political Track: Reconciliation and Terrorism
--------------


5. (S/NF) Turning to PolCouns, the Charge suggested that the

BAGHDAD 00000878 002 OF 002


Embassy side preview some of the principles and priorities it
planned to raise with SCIRI in each of the three issue areas.
PolCouns touched briefly on principles of importance to the
US in a strategic partner, including commitment to democracy,
rule of law, and human rights. She identified four priority
areas for discussion with SCIRI: deBaathification reform,
provincial elections and provincial-central government
relations, constitutional review, and regional outreach.
Abdel Mehdi said these issues would make an excellent
starting point. He asked for U.S. help on regional outreach,
noting that the Arab world was concerned about Iranian
influence in Iraq as well as the "Shi'a emergence." Abdel
Mehdi raised the political aspect of terrorism, saying that
Iraq wanted strong relations with the Arab world but that
most of the terrorism in Iraq was financed in the Arab or
Islamic world: "The Shi'a are asking why we should be
flexible on deBaathification or constitutional review if
terrorism continues and they keep killing us." The Charge
noted that there was a change in dynamics in Sunni
communities in Iraq, and that it was important to provide
political support to those Sunnis who chose to fight Al-Qaida.

--------------
Security Track: Some Differences Identified
--------------


6. (S/NF) General Caldwell then shared the U.S. vision for
helping to build a secure Iraq through developing Iraqi
security forces (ISF) as the sole security entity in Iraq.
The ISF, he said, needed to be free of sectarian bias,
represent all Iraqis, and understand the importance of human
rights. Embassy priorities for the U.S.-SCIRI working group
on security, General Caldwell continued, included the impact
of deBaathification on security institutions, the popular
committees, and DDR programs to address the militia problem.
Abdel Mehdi noted the importance of having a real discussion
on these issues, as the US and SCIRI might understand some of
these terms differently. In evaluating candidates for the
new Iraqi army, Abdel Mehdi claimed, some would call an
officer from the old army "neutral" and a Badr member
"biased." SCIRI, on the other hand, believed that the Badr
member was far more likely to be loyal to the new regime.
Abdel Mehdi asked why the US was supporting the arming of
tribes in Anbar to fight al-Qaida but was concerned about
local Shi'a groups arming themselves for the same purpose.
Finally, Abdel Mehdi stressed the importance of negotiating a
security agreement to redefine authorities and
responsibilities. The Charge remarked that this exchange
would be the starting point for a good discussion, though he
pointed out that the issue of the security agreement was
perhaps better addressed in a U.S.-GOI dialogue.

--------------
Economic Track: Broad Agreement
--------------


7. (S/NF) EconCouns then outlined the principles the US
thought important for the development of Iraq's economy,
including diversification, a healthy private sector,
development of the oil and gas sector, budget execution, and
a needs-based social safety net. In addition to passage of
the hydrocarbon law and continued progress on budget
execution, EconCouns identified implementation of the
investment law, alleviation of the fuel crisis, and signing
of the International Compact with Iraq as key U.S.
priorities. Abdel Mehdi said SCIRI agreed completely on the
principles, noting his concern that state subsidies had
reached the equivalent of about USD 200 per Iraqi family per
month. He highlighted the need to work with officials and
business people in the provinces on implementation of the
investment law and to remove bureaucratic obstacles to
innovation that remained from the extreme centralization of
the Saddam era. Abdel Mehdi asked whether it made sense to
seek a single international consortium to develop Iraq's oil
and gas sector. EconCouns replied that current thinking was
that several international consortia might form to compete
with each other in different areas of Iraq.

--------------
Looking Ahead
--------------


8. (S/NF) Shortly after Abdel Mehdi returns from his trip to
the US and Brussels, we plan to continue the strategic
dialogue through working groups in the economic, security,
and political tracks.
SPECKHARD