Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD869
2007-03-12 11:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

IRAQI POLICE SERVICE CAUSES DELAYS TO PROVINCIAL

Tags:  PREL PINR PNAT PINS MOPS MARR IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2491
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0869/01 0711128
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 121128Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0129
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC// PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000869 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2017
TAGS: PREL PINR PNAT PINS MOPS MARR IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI POLICE SERVICE CAUSES DELAYS TO PROVINCIAL
TRANSFER OF CONTROL

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Daniel V. Speckhard for reasons 1.4 (a
),(b),and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000869

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2017
TAGS: PREL PINR PNAT PINS MOPS MARR IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI POLICE SERVICE CAUSES DELAYS TO PROVINCIAL
TRANSFER OF CONTROL

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Daniel V. Speckhard for reasons 1.4 (a
),(b),and (d).

1.(C/REL MNF-I) Summary: On March 9, National Security
Advisor Dr. Mowaffak al-Rubaie called a meeting of the
principals of the Joint Committee for the Transfer of
Security Responsibility (JCTSR) to discuss impediments to
accelerating the transfer of provinces to Iraqi civilian
control, with Iraqi participants focusing on the readiness of
the police service as the major obstacle. Rubaie said he and
the Prime Minister were concerned that the schedule to PIC
provinces was slipping and that the coalition was not living
up to the agreement the PM and President Bush made in Amman
in November. As it played out, however, systemic Iraqi
problems, such as poor accounting for weapons, unclear
staffing levels for police, and lack of central MOI control
over the provinces were disclosed as the root causes of the
delay in the PIC schedule, and the US and coalition were
largely spared from the disdain of the Iraqi participants.
The Minister of Interior Jawad Bolani said the police system
is troubled by equipment shortages, employment imbalances,
and leadership and loyalty problems. Bolani committed to
working with members of the JCTSR to overcome these
obstacles. End Summary.


2. (C/REL MNF-I) As the director of the Iraqi agency charged
with managing the JCTSR process, Dr. Rubaie hosted a meeting
to discuss the delay in transferring provincial security to
Iraqi control. The JCTSR principals in attendance included
Minister of Interior Jawad Bolani, Minister of Defense Abdul
Qader, DCM Speckhard, UK Ambassador David Asquith and MNF-I
Lieutenant General Graeme Lamb. Other participants included
NSA Deputy Directors Dr. Safi al-Safaa and Mr. Hamza
al-Jaburi and MNF-I Major Generals' Kurt Cichowski and David
Fastabend. Rubaie called the meeting to lament what he
believed was a failure of the coalition to live up to the

November Amman agreement between the PM and POTUS to seek an
acceleration of the PIC process.

Equipment Shortages
--------------


3. (C/REL MNF-I) Bolani said equipment shortages are delaying
provincial transfer. He said the Iraqi police are not fully
equipped and therefore not able to sufficiently maintain law
and order and counter existing threats. To illustrate this
point, he recalled the autumn uprising in Al Amarah where the
Iraqi army had to move in and secure the city because the
police ran out of ammunition, had too few heavy weapons, and
lost most of its vehicles in the battle. Abdul Qader
reminded Bolani that his ministry plans to give the MOI
several hundred used rifles once the Iraqi army receives its
new purchase of pistols. Abdul Qader also agreed to look
into providing MOI with some of the weapons the army captures
in military operations.


4. (C/REL MNF-I) Dr. Safaa cautioned that any additional
equipment for the Iraqi police would need to be funded by the
MOI as MNF-I has nearly completed its equipment contribution
to the police. (NOTE: All MNF-I deliveries for the police
service will be concluded by end of June 2007 and were based
on the 2004 US-Iraq agreement on authorized police numbers
for each province. END NOTE.) Dr. Safaa added that in
several provinces, MNF-I has fielded much more equipment than
it originally committed to. For example, Maysan police have
received over 200% of the originally promised patrol
vehicles, vehicle radios, body armor, kevlar helmets, and
over 100% of rifles and base station radios. Dr. Safaa
pointed out that the equipment shortage was due to the
thousands of additional police that have been employed above
the originally authorized number established and agreed to by
the MOI and MNF-I in 2004.

EMPLOYMENT IMBALANCES
--------------


5. (C/REL MNF-I) Dr. Rubaie asked Bolani to explain why most
provinces have hired more police than originally authorized
by the central MOI in 2004. Bolani indicated many of the
additional police were hired before his time and were never
authorized by the central government. Bolani defended some
of the over-authorization levels as necessary, saying the
originally established numbers established by MOI and MNF-I
failed to consider each province's unique circumstances.


6. (C/REL MNF-I) Bolani said because of employment related
issues, his ministry had recently held a human resource
conference where participants reviewed each province's

BAGHDAD 00000869 002 OF 002


security needs and developed modified employment levels for
each provincial police service. He said his ministry will
train and equip based on these rationalized levels. Again,
Dr. Safaa noted all police hired above the 2004 authorized
level would be the funding responsibility of MoI, not MNF-I.
The DCM cautioned Bolani and Rubaie that not abiding by the
2004 authorized levels and purchasing more equipment would
likely further delay provincial transfer.

Leadership and Loyalty Issues
--------------


7. (C/REL MNF-I) Bolani lamented the lack of control the
central MoI has over provincial police services. He said the
service suffers from poor leadership, high levels of
corruption, and severe loyalty issues. He said he is working
to make the Provincial Police Chiefs more accountable, citing
his recent requirement to have all of them sign a loyalty
oath and commit to upholding a number of principles. UK
Ambassador recommended Bolani actually 'test' the leaders to
ascertain whether they are actually living up to these
standards. Bolani said he is and many are failing. Rubaie
stressed to Bolani that he must support the police chiefs and
their forces but must also relieve them promptly when he
learns they are disloyal or corrupt. The Iraqi principals
concluded that they will work closely with Bolani to develop
solutions for dealing with poor and corrupt leaders and
police services infiltrated with militias.


8. (C/REL MNF-I) Comment: The JCTSR principals meeting did
not raise any new issues nor did they resolve any of the
existing problems. However, it was refreshing to observe a
discussion led by our Iraqi interlocutors led with little
participation from outsiders. We were encouraged that the
conversation on the police problems did not dissolve into a
blame game with MNF-I taking the heat for all of MOI woes,
especially in terms of equipment 'shortages.' In this
meeting, the Iraqi principals agreed the number one problem
with the police was leadership and allegiance and seemed to
accept that any equipment shortages would need to be resolved
by the Iraqis not MNF-I. End Comment.
SPECKHARD